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      This dissertation attempts to give an account of philosophical language in Hegel, with 
particular emphasis on his claim that a philosophical exposition must be living and self-
moving.  Since Hegel did not provide an extended, thematized account of philosophical 
language, my primary approach is to take the resources of his thought in general and 
attempt to construct an account which is consistent with his philosophy as a whole.  Thus, 
a large portion of this dissertation is not directly about philosophical language, but about 
other determinations such as becoming, indifference, contradiction, life, the 
understanding, reason, etc., which lay the groundwork for discussing philosophical 
language in the final chapter. 
      As a preface to all of this, however, I devote Part I of the dissertation to an 
investigation of Hegel’s view of how one should go about comprehending philosophical 
determinations, i.e., those things which are the subject matter of philosophy (e.g., the 
determination ‘plant’ but not ‘poison ivy’; the determination ‘art’ but not ‘Flemish 
Baroque painting’).  Chapter 1 deals with his critique of the formalistic approach which 
attempts to comprehend things by ‘applying’ categories to them (e.g., applying ‘thinking’ 
and ‘animal’ to comprehend ‘human being’).  In Chapter 2 I discuss Hegel’s alternate 
view of comprehension, describing this view in terms of the idea of ‘expression’: later 
categories in his encyclopedia are comprehended not by applying earlier ones to them, 
but by grasping the later ones as developmental expressions of the earlier ones.  Thus, 
expression is not only a linguistic but also an ontological category, a point which is 
investigated in more concrete detail in Chapter 3 through a close reading of the statement 
“being and nothing are one and the same.”  As it turns out, this linguistic expression of 
being plays an essential role in being’s ontological expression and development. 
      In Part II, I explore the logical determinations of ‘mechanism’ and ‘life’ in the 
Science of Logic.  To set the stage for this, Chapter 4 gives an account of the relation of 
‘indifference’ (present between the ‘parts’ of a whole) and the relation of ‘reciprocity’ 
(present between the ‘moments’ of a whole).  These two kinds of relations allow us in 
Chapter 5 to see more clearly why Hegel views the logical determination of mechanism 
as involving a movement of thought whose source is external to it, and the logical 
determination of life as involving self-movement and self-determination.  To further 
clarify what Hegel means by calling philosophical thought ‘living,’ I discuss what he 
might mean by the word ‘movement’ in the Logic, along with his view of the relation 
between becoming, contradiction, and self-movement. 
      In Part III I argue that, regarding the logical determinations of mechanism and life, 
the former finds particularly vivid expression in the operations of the understanding and 
its ‘ordinary language’ (Chapter 6), while the latter finds such expression in the 
operations of reason and its ‘philosophical language’ (Chapter 7).  The faculty of the 
understanding, whose nature it is to have objects standing over against it (Gegenstände) 
and to operate according to the category of formal identity, is characterized by finitude 
and abstract thinking.  As such, the ordinary language which it produces is characterized 
by these same qualities.  This entails a.) that this language is incapable of expressing the 
interdependence of identity and difference, b.) that it thus views the copula (‘is’) as 
containing merely formal identity, and c.) that it tends to define its words in abstraction 
from each other.  Another result of ordinary language being produced by the 
understanding is that it is incapable of providing a genuinely philosophical account of 
anything, insofar as such an account requires a level of self-reflexivity which the faculty 
of the understanding, in isolation, renders impossible.   
      The faculty of reason, on the other hand, both includes the understanding (with its 
abstracting powers) and goes beyond it, particularly in its rejection of identity as merely 
formal (i.e., identity as independent of difference).  Crucially, it is this rejection which 
allows reason to comprehend the dissolutions of the contradictory logical determinations 
which move thinking forward.  Directed not toward ‘objects’ but toward its own self, the 
goal of reason is self-knowledge via the concrete experience of thinking through its own 
thinking, a ‘thinking through’ which is necessary and self-moving insofar as its internal 
contradictions propel it down one (and only one) logical path.  The language of reason – 
philosophical language – is an essential part of this process.   
      Philosophical language, qua language, possesses a contingent dimension, e.g., the 
way the words sound and the letters are shaped.  But this contingency, I argue, does not 
compromise philosophical language’s ability to mediate the non-contingent nature of 
philosophical thought; for, the nature of logic is that it can reach its full expression only 
through the determinations of spirit, and all such determinations (with the exception of 
philosophy itself) necessarily contain contingencies. Philosophical language belongs not 
to the logical sphere (i.e., the sphere which is wholly ‘within itself’ and thus wholly 
necessary), but rather to the spiritual one (i.e., the human realm).  As a result, this 
language must possess contingent dimensions, for it is precisely its ‘not-being-within-
itself’ which allows it to be other to the realm of logic, and thus to be its expression.  
      In contrast to ordinary language, philosophical language is able to give expression to 
the interdependence of identity and difference, and to create the meaning of its words not 
as isolated ‘parts’ but rather as ‘moments’ which depend on the meanings of all the other 
words which it has generated.  Because of this, philosophical language engages in a 
continual diaeresis (division) and synagoge (collection) of its meanings, splitting the 
meaning of a term into an opposed meaning which contradicts the previous one and leads 
to a new word with a new meaning, containing the remnants of the previous ones.  This 
dialectical process is a living one insofar as the oppositions and contradictions which 
move the exposition forward are immanent to the exposition itself.  Operating throughout 
the entire encyclopedia (Science of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Spirit), 
the self-moving linguistic diaeresis and synagoge reaches its conclusion in the final 
definition, that of the term ‘philosophy,’ thereby bringing together in one word the living 
remains of the meanings of all prior determinations. 
     Because philosophy and philosophical language constitutively determine one another, 
neither can be, or be comprehended, apart from the other.  In Hegel’s view, although one 
is doing philosophy from the very first words of the Science of Logic, one can only 
account for philosophy at the 1,500-page encyclopedia’s very end; my claim is that, in 
the same way, although one is using philosophical language from the very beginning, one 
can only account for this language at the very end.  Philosophical language receives its 
determinateness from philosophy, and vice versa.  As a result, only at the encyclopedia’s 
end can one fully comprehend what one has been doing and saying for the last 1,500 
pages.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
But those who speak this speech [that all things are in motion] must set down  
some different language, since now at least they don’t have the words for their  
own hypothesis…. ~ Theaetetus 183B  
  
1. The Difficulty with Hegel 
      Because G.W.F. Hegel is likely more notorious than any other philosopher for the 
difficulty and density of his language, I would like to ask why he uses the sort of 
language that he does.  I would also like to ask what sort of language he believes 
philosophy needs to use.  To this end, this dissertation will focus on philosophical 
language in Hegel with a particular emphasis on one issue, his claim that a philosophical 
exposition must be living and self-moving.    
      One approach I will use to talk about philosophical language in Hegel’s thought will 
be to provide commentary on what he explicitly says about the issue.  However, since he 
did not provide an extended account of this sort of language, the primary approach I will 
use will be to take the resources of his thought in general and attempt to construct an 
account which is consistent with his philosophy as a whole.  Thus, a large portion of this 
dissertation will not be directly about philosophical language, but about other 
determinations such as becoming, indifference, reciprocity, life, the understanding, etc.  
When these other matters have been worked through, important groundwork will have 
been laid for discussing philosophical language in the final chapter.  There, I will argue 
that the proper place within Hegel’s encyclopedia for an account of philosophical 
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language is in the “Philosophy” section at the very end of the Philosophy of Spirit.1  That 
is, my claim is that an account of philosophical language belongs within the category of 
philosophy itself, the final section of Hegel’s account of both spirit and the whole.  
Briefly put, I make this claim because I believe that the language which philosophy uses 
to think itself is a kind of language which is essentially and constitutively determined by 
its relation to philosophy, and which therefore cannot be comprehended apart from this 
relation.  In Hegel’s view, although one is doing philosophy from the very first words of 
the Science of Logic, one can only account for philosophy at the encyclopedia’s very end; 
I will argue that, in the same way, although one is using philosophical language from the 
very beginning, one can only account for this language at the end.  Philosophical 
language becomes the sort of entity that it is through philosophy, and likewise philosophy 
is not possible without philosophical language.  As a result, only at the encyclopedia’s 
end can one fully comprehend what one has been using and doing for the last 1,500 
pages.     
                                                                       ~ 
      To open this investigation, we can begin with what is probably the first thing we 
notice when we read Hegel’s own philosophical language, viz., its extraordinary 
difficulty.  So as to have an example of his manner of writing directly before us, we can 
consider this description of nature from the opening of the Philosophy of Nature: “Since 
[in nature] the idea is as the negative of itself or is external to itself, nature is not external 
simply relative to this idea…rather, the externality constitutes the determination in which 
                                                 
1 I will use the word ‘encyclopedia’ to refer to Hegel’s philosophical thought as a whole.  
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nature is as nature.”2  This passage is a fairly typical one for Hegel in the sense that, 
while consisting easily recognizable words, the syntax is so foreign to that of everyday 
expression that most readers must read it two or three (or more) times merely to grasp the 
way that the words fit together, much less to understand the meaning.  What is it, then, 
about this mode of expression that makes it so counterintuitive to ordinary thinking, and 
why does Hegel tend to put words together in such a peculiar way?   
      In addition to the dense and winding syntax of his philosophical language, a further 
challenge in reading Hegel is the fact that the individual words which he uses often have 
several different meanings.  Some words, in fact, have many meanings, a fact that can be 
attested to by anyone who has ever wondered what Hegel means by “reason” or “spirit.”  
Indeed, one might be justified in supposing that the more crucial a term is for Hegel, the 
more meanings it will carry.  The way in which his words shift about in their meanings 
and generally refuse to stand still often leaves the reader not only puzzled about just 
which meaning is currently being intended, but about whether Hegel is even being 
consistent with his own terminology.   
      The collective effect of winding syntax and shifting meanings can at times lead to the 
sense that Hegel’s language is nothing less than nonsensical.  Take, for instance, this 
description of spatial movement in the Science of Logic: “External, sensuous motion 
itself is contradiction’s immediate existence.  Something moves, not because at one 
moment it is here and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here 
                                                 
2 G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1978), §247, my translation.  Hereafter, referred to as “Philosophy of Nature.” 
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and not here, because in this ‘here,’ it at once is and is not.”3  It is due to passages such as 
this one that, for the last several hundred years, commentators as diverse as Kierkegaard 
and Schopenhauer and Russell have launched harsh critiques against Hegel, critiques 
ranging from those claiming to demonstrate the invalidity of Hegel’s philosophy, to those 
claiming that demonstrating this would not even be worth the effort.  Even when one is 
fully willing to engage Hegel in a serious way, one finds oneself regularly faced with 
passages which – even when one seems to have grasped both the words and the syntax – 
appear to defy comprehension.   
      In light of all of the above, readers new and not-so-new to Hegel can reasonably pose 
the question: does Hegel actually need to use such a crowded, twisting, shifting form of 
expression to convey what he has in mind?  If yes, why?  If no, why would he not use a 
clearer mode of writing?  It seems likely that the answers to these questions will have 
some bearing on how we receive what this strange user of language has to say about 
philosophical language itself. 
    
   a. General Reasons for Being Difficult 
     When authors use an extremely challenging form of expression, a form largely opaque 
to the everyday reader, the decision to do so could arise for a number of reasons.  One 
would be that such authors wish to conceal what they think from a certain sort of reader, 
either because they believe that the ideas would be harmful to these readers, or because 
they believe that the readers, upon reading the ideas, could be harmful to the authors.  
                                                 
3 G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999), 440.  
Hereafter, SL.  
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Hegel was quite familiar with these kinds of motivation, as evidenced by his discussions 
of esotericism in his lectures on Plato and Aristotle.4  While he does not deny that an 
author might obscure certain ideas from certain readers, he claims that no author can 
ultimately keep ideas concealed, “as if a philosopher were in possession of his thoughts 
like external things,”5 or as if they could “keep them in their pockets.”6  Instead, he says 
that “[t]houghts are something totally different; conversely, it is the philosophical idea 
that owns the person.”7  Thus while an author might write in such a way as to conceal 
some ideas in the text from a particular audience, these ideas (if they are true) will, in 
Hegel’s view, eventually make their way into the public sphere.8  While never denying 
the possibility or the usefulness of a kind of ‘local’ and temporary esotericism, Hegel 
views the ‘global’ and permanent concealing of philosophical ideas as not only imprudent 
but impossible.   
      Yet Hegel is no radical egalitarian on these matters.  His view that ideas cannot 
ultimately be bottled up does not prevent him from claiming that a person must possess a 
certain level of desire and motivation in order to grasp certain ideas.  When ideas of great 
complexity are set forth, and even when the presentation is as clear as the subject matter 
will allow, some people will still not comprehend them.  He expresses this point quite 
clearly in his lecture on Plato’s Sophist: "The esoteric is the speculative, which, even 
though written and printed, is yet hidden from those who do not have the sufficient 
                                                 
4 e.g., Lectures in the History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, trans. E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (Lincoln, 
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 11-12, 68, 129 (see especially his critiques of Tennemann’s 
interpretation of Plato).   
5 Ibid., pg. 11, my translation. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 both in theoretical and in practical (e.g., moral/social/political) terms.   
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interest to exert themselves.  It is not a secret, and yet is hidden.”9  Hegel is thus claiming 
that the only ‘hiddenness’ inherent in philosophical ideas stems, not from the author’s 
mode of presentation, but from the interplay between a lack of will in the reader and the 
complexity of the ideas themselves.    
      Another reason why authors in general might use a counterintuitive and ‘inaccessible’ 
style of writing is a variation on the above-mentioned desire to conceal their views, viz., 
the desire to make oneself appear more insightful than one actually is.  Of course, this 
desire – one which generally springs from a person’s desire for honor being greater than 
their desire for knowledge – is the root of what is often called sophistry.10  Such authors 
are aware that obscurity can appear as profundity, and they express ideas in a convoluted 
manner with the intention of creating the impression of hidden depths just out of reach of 
the reader.11 Those who succeed in this intention do indeed appear wise to a certain sort 
of reader, thereby gaining admiration they seek.  But while the pejorative label of 
‘sophistry’ is easy to use and easy to set up as standing over against philosophy, we can 
suspect from reading from Plato’s Sophist that determining whether a particular author is 
a sophist or a philosopher is a task of the utmost difficulty; for, as this dialogue 
communicates, these two types of human beings tend to look more similar to each other 
than to nearly any other type of human being.  So, for example, if Hegel is a sophist, it 
                                                 
9 Ibid., pg. 68.  
10 Here I am using the everyday sense of the word “sophistry.” In Encyclopaedia Logic §121, Hegel 
distinguishes that sense of the word from what he holds to be the essence of sophistry, namely, abstract and 
ground-less argumentation.  
11 An author might do this to appeal to the sort of human being whom Seneca describes in On Tranquility 
when he says, “…there are people who disdain anything within reach.”  A similar sort of person is 
described by Lucretius in On the Nature of Things: "For fools always have a greater admiration and liking 
for any idea that they see obscured in a mist of paradoxical language, and adopt as true what succeeds in 
prettily tickling their ears and is painted with a specious sound." (I.641-645) 
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seems that this could be determined only after a serious and extensive study of his 
thought.   
      Another reason authors might write in a relatively inaccessible style is that they are 
simply bad writers.  In this scenario, as in the case of sophistry, the obscure might appear 
to be profound.  Then again, it might simply appear to be obscure.  Whatever the case, it 
is clear that the sole cause of an opaque style of writing might merely be a poor writing 
style, e.g., one which does not clearly indicate the relations between various clauses, or 
which uses cumbersome clauses where more straightforward ones would do.  With 
respect to Hegel’s particular manner of writing, this explanation seems the least likely of 
the options mentioned so far, given the entirely accessible, straightforward, and at times 
even eloquent nature of his ‘popular’ writings in newspapers and journals.  The same 
qualities often appear in the Remarks and Additions in his philosophical writings.  An 
example of the former would be his ironic and extremely funny essay “Who Thinks 
Abstractly?”; an example of the latter would be the Addition to his exposition of the 
qualitative syllogism in the Encylopedia Logic, where he illustrates the act of syllogizing 
with the example of a person waking up on a winter’s morning and knowing that the 
ground has frozen overnight based on the particular creaking sounds of the carts passing 
by.  While Hegel may not have had the refined prose of a Schelling or a Goethe, a casual 
reading of Hegel’s writings which are not strictly philosophical reveals that he is fully 
capable of writing in a lucid and accessible style.      
      Unless Hegel is an esotericist or a sophist, it would thus seem safe to say that he uses 
the language he uses because he believes it is necessary to do so.  Naturally, though, if 
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Hegel is in fact an esotericist or a sophist, he would not be a very proficient one if he 
made this obvious to his readers.  Nor would any critiques he might give of esotericism 
and sophistry entail that he had not actually embraced one or the other, given that 
presenting such critiques would very likely be just what an esotericist or a sophist would 
do.  But because this question is clearly not one that can be settled here in an 
Introduction, let us hold these possibilities in mind but place them off to the side, in order 
to consider a line of thinking about the possibility that Hegel uses the language he does 
for specific and necessary reasons.  
 
b. What is Hegel’s Reason for Being Difficult? 
      i. What the Language is About  
      One step in examining Hegel’s reasons for being difficult would be to consider the 
possibility that the ‘counterintuitiveness’ of his philosophical language is a reflection of 
#1) the couterintuitiveness of what his language is about, and #2) the counterintuitiveness 
of what philosophical language in its own nature is.  A particularly appropriate topic to 
address to shed light on both of these points is the issue of movement, for movement is 
not only one of the more fundamental topics about which philosophers speak, but is for 
Hegel an essential dimension of philosophical language itself, in its own existence.  Let 
us then take up the issue of movement with regard to #1), i.e., what Hegel’s philosophical 
language is about. 
      A cursory reading of the history of philosophy reveals that movement – whether 
movement in place or other kinds of movement – is one of the first great themes of 
philosophy, and also one of its most challenging.  That the nature of movement is not 
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self-evident to ‘common sense’ can be seen in the fact that an intelligent and yet still 
accessible consideration of spatial movement can result in some very strange conclusions.  
Zeno’s famous argument, for example, claims that the very idea of spatial movement is 
self-contradictory due to the impossibility of infinite divisibility, thus making movement 
impossible.12  Whether one agrees with Zeno or not, what is clear is that when we 
consider serious attempts to explain whether spatial movement exists and, if so, how it 
exists, we find ourselves considering accounts which are anything but simple, anything 
but immediately intuitive to ‘everyday common sense.’  From Aristotle’s efforts to refute 
Zeno by invoking dynamis and energeia in Physics Book VI, to modern physics’ similar 
efforts against Zeno using ideas such as special relativity and the Lorentz covariance, 
comprehending spatial movement is certainly not immediately intuitive to common 
sense.  We can think back, then, to Hegel’s manner of writing in the lines where he 
describes spatial movement as involving what is “at one and the same moment...here and 
not here” and what “at once is and is not,” and we can pose this question: ‘Is this way of 
writing counterintuitive?’  Yes.  ‘Generally speaking, does it appear to be more or less 
nonsensical?’  Yes again.  Yet, apparently, so does spatial movement itself to some very 
great minds, with the only difference being that Hegel’s language about it appears 
nonsensical on the face of it, while spatial movement itself appears so (even if it, in the 
end, it is not so) after only a small amount of reflection.  This suggests that accounting 
                                                 
12 For what a Greek would call ‘movement in place,’ I will use the term ‘spatial movement’ simply for the 
sake of terminological consistency with Hegel, and in a non-technical sense.  Thus, I do not intend this term 
to entail an abstracted Newtonian notion of space, one which, e.g., both Aristotle and Hegel would reject.  
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for fundamental philosophical issues (such as movement) which are not immediately 
amenable to everyday common sense may require modes of expression that follow suit.  
  
      ii.  The Language Itself 
      Hegel does in fact hold that, to account for fundamental philosophical issues, it is at 
least sometimes necessary to use modes of expression which are not the most obliging to 
‘everyday thinking.’  In speaking above about esotericism and about ideas being 
‘hidden,’ we noted Hegel’s view that there are ideas of such a kind that, even when they 
are presented as clearly as possible, will still not be immediately accessible to ordinary 
common sense.  Connected with this claim is the idea that the language used to set forth 
such ideas is also not something immediately accessible to ordinary common sense.   
      On this score, Hegel has an interesting ally in the form of Immanuel Kant, who, in his 
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, states, “There is no great trick to 
being commonly intelligible, if we give up the aim of achieving fundamental insights."13  
The pressure to be “commonly intelligible” – one exerted in increasingly greater intensity 
on Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment authors – was, in Kant’s view, equivalent to 
the pressure to not deal substantially with what is most philosophically important.  With 
egalitarian impulses gaining an increasing foothold in political and religious spheres, it is 
not difficult to see why Kant felt, and felt the need to resist, this pressure.  And it is easy 
to imagine how, when a philosopher’s language deals with something that common sense 
often believes to be readily understandable (such as movement), the tendency to place the 
                                                 
13 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant’s Foundations of Ethics, trans. Leo Rauch 
(Mills, MA: Agora Publications, 1995), 28.  
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blame on the philosopher’s language – rather than on the object of investigation, or on 
one’s own self – would be a relatively common event.  
      “In Accordance With”?  Some Assistance from Socrates 
      Yet, the claim that philosophers should aim to speak in accordance with that about 
which they are speaking is by no means a revolutionary idea.  Nor is it a very helpful one, 
given that the phrase ‘in accordance with’ is so general as to be nearly devoid of 
meaning.  Two quite different conceptions of what one might mean by this phrase are 
well-illustrated by a quick comparison of the reasons why Kant’s difficult passages are 
difficult when he writes ‘in accordance with’ his subject matter, and why Hegel’s 
difficult passages are difficult when he does the same.  Putting it very crudely, we could 
say that Kant is challenging to read because his explanations are about very complicated 
things (consciousness, knowledge, morality, etc.); Hegel, however, is challenging for the 
additional reason that the mode of his explanations is exceedingly difficult to 
comprehend.  While the distinction between form and content here is one that may not be 
able to be sustained, it makes some sense to rephrase the above by talking about the 
difficulty of the content of Kant’s language, and the additional difficulty of the form of 
Hegel’s language.  Of course, the form of Kant’s language in, say, The Critique of Pure 
Reason, is no stroll through the park.  But if, instead of using Kant’s general form of 
writing to explain how the categories of the understanding make knowledge possible, one 
used it to explain how to build a desk, this explanation would still be a fairly 
straightforward one (even if the sentences would be half a page long).  If, on the other 
hand, one were to use Hegel’s form of philosophical language to explain how to build a 
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desk (which, of course, Hegel would not think one should do), the resulting explanation 
would likely be about as challenging as his explanation of essence as positing reflection.  
As to why this would be the case, we can assume that it has something to do with the 
above-mentioned strange syntax and shifting meanings of words within Hegel’s 
philosophical language, insofar as these two characteristics appear to characterize 
‘formal’ aspects of Hegel’s writing.   
      But what would it mean for the form of language to be in accordance with what the 
language is about?  Also, in some cases the form of language seems to determine what 
content can be communicated – e.g., it would seem difficult to give a full and precise 
account of human sexual reproduction by means of a Shakespearean sonnet.  Thus it is 
not at all clear that the form and content of language can be fully separated in any other 
way than through an abstraction of thought.  
      What is clear, though, is that more specificity is needed about what it would mean for 
language to be ‘in accordance with’ its object.  On this issue, as with practically all 
others, Plato proves extremely illuminating.  In the Theaetetus, as Socrates and 
Theaetetus attempt to achieve knowledge of what knowledge is, they talk about how one 
would properly speak about movement and becoming, and Socrates voices the view that 
one must speak ‘in accordance with nature.’  In surveying the metaphysical views of the 
day, Socrates tells Theaetetus that, other than Parmenides, all those who are wise – e.g., 
Homer, Heraclitus, and Empedocles – assert that everything is in motion, and claim that 
“nothing ever is alone by itself” because “everything always becomes.”14  Because of 
                                                 
14 Theaetetus, trans. Seth Benardete (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 152D-E. 
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these claims, these wise men make corresponding claims about how one must speak, 
saying, for example, that “‘be’ must be removed from everywhere,”15 given that 
everything becomes and nothing in fact is.  Socrates continues his description by saying,  
But we ought not, the wise men say, to permit the use of …‘this’ or ‘that’ or any other 
word that implies making things stand still, but in accordance with nature [kata physin] 
we should speak of things as ‘becoming’ and ‘being made’ and ‘being destroyed’ and 
‘changing’; for anyone who by his mode of speech makes things stand still is easily 
refuted.16   
Thus we see these “wise men” claim that one must speak “kata physin,” which, in this 
particular context, they take to mean speaking of all things as becoming and in motion, as 
opposed to speaking of them improperly by making them, in one’s speech, simply be.        
      Later in the text, after Socrates and Theodorus have begun their own investigation 
into whether anything is, or whether all things become, Socrates asserts that “if all things 
are in motion – every answer, about whatever one answers, is similarly correct. Or if you 
want, in order that we may not put a stop to them in the speech, every answer becomes 
correct – to say, ‘This is so’ and ‘This is not so.’”17  If nothing endures, and nothing is, 
both an assertion that ‘X is the case’ and an assertion that ‘X is not the case’ would be 
equally correct.  After Theodorus gives his agreement, Socrates continues:  
Yes, Theodorus, except I did say ‘so’ and ‘not so.’  But one must not even say ‘so,’ for 
‘so’ would no longer be in motion, nor in turn ‘not so,’ for not even this is a motion.  But 
                                                 
15 Ibid, 157B. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid, 183A. 
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those who speak this speech must set down some different language, since now at least 
they don’t have the words for their own hypothesis….18 
Socrates thus seems to agree with the ‘motion men’ when they voiced the need to speak 
kata physin, and, more importantly, he seems to agree that if one is not attentive to the 
manner in which one speaks about something, i.e., to the actual words and sentences that 
one uses, it is possible for one to refute one’s speech by one’s speech.  An account has the 
possibility of invalidating its own content, and it does in fact do so when the words it uses 
to try to make a certain point (e.g., ‘everything is in a state of becoming’) run directly 
counter to that very point (e.g., ‘everything becomes’).19      
      Hegel and Kata Physin as ‘Form’ 
      In light of our current focus regarding Hegel, these passages from the Theaetetus 
serve three functions.  First, they sharpen our focus about what it might mean to speak 
‘according to the nature’ of what is spoken about, insofar as they illuminate one danger of 
not doing so – self-refutation.  Second, these passages suggest that in order for language 
to be in accordance with its object, it must be, so to speak, self-aware.  Similar to the 
discussion above regarding the respective forms of Kant’s language and Hegel’s 
language, in this Platonic dialogue we see the idea that language has the possibility of 
being or not being in accord with its object in a certain kind of ‘formal’ respect (e.g., 
using or not using ‘being’ verbs).  Third, these passages in Plato pointedly raise the issue 
of how challenging it is to speak about becoming and about movement ‘according to 
                                                 
18 Ibid, 183A-B.  
19 This same point sheds light on why the difficulties are so deep when one attempts to say what non-being 
is, as we see borne out in the conversations between the Eliatic Stranger and Theaetetus in the Sophist.  For, 
“is” seems to be just as improper a designation of non-being as it is of movement. 
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nature,’ and of some of the potentially intractable problems that might arise in trying to 
do so.  Taken together, these points are intimately related to the task of comprehending 
Hegel’s idea of philosophical language.  For, as a quick flip through the Science of Logic 
reveals, Hegel believes that the nature of logic is to be in movement. And, if Hegel is to 
give an account of what logic is, he must be able to speak in accordance with its 
movement.  It should thus come as no surprise that he holds that philosophical language 
must also itself be in movement, and that the movement of logic and the movement of its 
language cannot be separated.   
      What this claim by Hegel actually means is something we will address in the second 
part of this introduction, and in more detail in Chapter 7, but we can gain a bit more 
specificity on the matter here in our introduction by further considering the issue of Zeno 
and spatial movement.  While numerous thinkers after Zeno believed that they had been 
able to refute his account of the self-contradictory nature of spatial movement, Hegel’s 
view was that none of them had actually done so, for the simple reason that, on this point, 
Zeno was right.  What Zeno concluded from this point, however, was not something 
Hegel found persuasive.  In Hegel’s own words, “The ancient dialecticians must be 
granted the contradictions that they pointed out in movement; but it does not follow that 
therefore there is no movement, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction 
itself.”20  For Hegel, the self-contradictory nature of movement which Zeno and others 
pointed out is not an indication of movement’s impossibility, but rather is just what 
constitutes movement itself.  As he says, “it is necessary to think of movement as Zeno 
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thought of it, but to move this theory of movement itself further still.”21 And this is just 
what he attempts to do when he claims that spatial movement simply is contradiction in 
existent form, saying (as quoted above) that “[s]omething moves, not because at one 
moment it is here and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here 
and not here, because in this ‘here,’ it at once is and is not.”22  It is worth noting here – as 
we investigate the idea of language being ‘in accordance with’ its object – that Hegel 
develops his claim that spatial movement is existent contradiction by means of a 
statement that is itself explicitly contradictory.  It thus seems fair to say that his claim 
about contradiction and the contradiction in this very claim are not coincidental to one 
another.   
      Above it was suggested that the extreme difficulty of Hegel’s language might stem 
both from the couterintuitiveness of what his language is about, and from what his 
language in itself is.  If we focus on the latter in terms of its form as something that could 
either be or not be in accord with its object, we can see that attempting to explain 
extremely difficult issues might require an explanation that is extremely difficult not only 
in what it is talking about, but in how it is talking about it.  If Hegel were asked why his 
philosophical language is so counterintuitive to everyday common sense, I believe he 
would raise, among others, the issues we have mentioned above.  As to whether these 
issues have been properly outlined, and as to whether they justify his use of the kind of 
                                                 
21 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I, hrsg. Hegel-Institut Berlin (Berlin: Talpa-Verlag), 
433, my translation.  
22 SL 440. 
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language he uses, this can be determined only through a much longer and more thorough 
investigation of Hegel’s texts, one which the present work will attempt to accomplish.    
 
2. Hegel on Philosophical Language: An Opening Sketch 
  
    a. Language and Thought 
 
      As those steeped in ancient Greek philosophy tend to be, Hegel is very attentive to the 
relation between the activity of thought and the activity of language.  For example, in the 
Science of Logic he speaks of the “determinations of thought which we employ on every 
occasion, which pass our lips in every sentence we speak,”23 and in the Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy he elaborates on this theme when he says that, “[a]s it is with all 
expression of perception and experience, as soon a person speaks, there is a concept 
within; it cannot in any way be withheld….”24 
      While Hegel holds that language is always accompanied by concepts and by thinking, 
he also holds the inverse to be true, claiming that thinking never takes place completely 
apart from language.  One place where he refers to this other side of the coin is in the 
Philosophy of Spirit, when he concisely states that “It is names that we think,”25 also 
claiming that “we have determinate, actual thoughts, only when we give them the form of 
objectivity, or distinctness from our inwardness…the shape of externality.”26 He speaks 
of both sides of the coin, and spins it quite nicely, in the Preface to the Science of Logic: 
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25 Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Vol. 3, ed. and trans. M.J. Petry (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1978), §462.  Hereafter referred to as “Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.”  
26 Ibid. §462. 
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 “The forms of thought are, in the first instance, displayed and stored in human 
language….Into all that becomes something inward for humans, an image or conception 
as such, into all that he makes his own, language has penetrated, and everything that he 
has transformed into language, and expresses in it contains a category – concealed, mixed 
with other forms or clearly determined as such, so much is logic his natural element, 
indeed his own peculiar nature.”27   
In other words, every form of thought is penetrated by language, and every use of 
language contains a category, a form of thought.   
      Hegel’s insistence on this interrelationship and interdependency, and particularly his 
attentiveness to the role of language in the process of thinking, is illustrated throughout 
the Science of Logic.  A case in point is this passage from Doctrine of the Concept, on the 
difference between propositions and judgments: “When a proposition is to be converted 
into a judgment, then the specific content – when it, e.g., lies in a verb – is converted into 
a participle, in order in this way to separate the determination itself and its relation to a 
subject.”28  This conversion of a verb into a participle is not presented by Hegel as some 
sort of accidental or optional move, but rather as constitutive of a crucial move in the 
Doctrine of the Concept in which a proposition becomes a judgment such that thinking 
might make an advance toward its end.   That Hegel pays such close attention to the 
specific parts of speech, and places such importance on them in order to maintain the 
integrity and trajectory of his logic, is both a clear example of his claim that thought and 
language are interdependent, and an indication that he is attempting to bear this claim out 
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in his philosophical practice.  Part III of this dissertation will provide a much more 
thorough account of Hegel’s view of the interdependence of thought and language in 
general, but with this initial sketch in view we can now take a first look at the primary 
interest of this work, viz., the relationship between thought and philosophical language. 
 
   b. Philosophical Language  
      While Hegel never uses the phrases, it is useful as a starting point to think about 
language manifesting itself either as the ‘language of understanding (Verstand)’ or as the 
‘language of reason (Vernunft).’  The language of Verstand is one which Hegel would see 
as lying within the language of everyday speech.  Additionally, he would see the 
language of Verstand as the medium of all non-speculative philosophies.    
      But if a philosophical exposition has its own form of language, one associated with 
Vernunft, from where does it derive this language?  Surely it does not create it out of thin 
air?  What is the connection of this language to the language of everyday speech?  Hegel 
speaks to these questions in the Science of Logic when he says, “Philosophy has the right 
to select from the language of common life, which is made for the world of 
representations (Vorstellungen), such expressions as seem to approximate to the 
determinations of the Concept.”29  Insofar as Hegel sees a philosophical exposition as 
setting forth its various determinations, he sees a philosophical exposition as defining its 
terms as it goes. While philosophy draws, whenever possible, rough approximations of 
what it needs from the language of Verstand (either everyday speech, or non-speculative 
philosophies), the specific definitions that it gives to these words and the specific way 
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that it combines these words are of its own making.  Thus, instead of using the language 
which was ‘made for the world of representations,’ philosophy must make its own 
language, one which is suitable for the world of conceptual determinations.   
      The idea of there being two separate languages, one non-philosophical and one 
philosophical, is further elaborated by Hegel in the Preface of the Encyclopaedia Logic, 
in his comparison of religion and philosophy:  
The content is the same [of religion and philosophy], but just as Homer says about certain 
things that they have two names, one in the language of the gods, and the other in the 
language of ephemeral humans, so, too, there are two languages for that content: the one 
of feeling, of representation, and of the thinking that nests in the finite categories and one-
sided abstractions of understanding, and the other of the concrete concept.30  
Because the first kind of language – the language of humans – is a language of feeling, 
representation, and Verstand, it not wholly commensurate with the content it is trying to 
express.  Since this content which the two languages share just is the concept, the second 
kind of language – the language of the gods, i.e., “the language of the concrete concept” – 
is in fact appropriate to it, and able to express it.  Having sketched out these two kinds of 
language, Hegel goes on to say that “more is required than our merely having the habit of 
the language of ephemeral consciousness.”31  That is, humans must learn to use ‘the 
language of the concrete concept,’ i.e., philosophical language.  For Homer, the language 
used by transitory humans and the language used by the gods are what they are due to the 
natures of their respective users; for Hegel, the language used by 
                                                 
30 G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991), “Preface,” pg. 11, translation emended.  Hereafter, EL. 
31 Ibid., translation emended. 
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feeling/representation/abstract thinking and the language used by the concrete concept are 
what they are on that same basis.  How, in Hegel’s view, we humans can learn to speak 
the language of the concrete concept is one of the main issues that this dissertation is 
seeking to comprehend.  
      Having said this, it must be noted that the passage about the languages of gods and 
humans, when read in isolation from the rest of the Encyclopaedia Logic’s Preface, is 
somewhat misleading.  For, it suggests that the form and the content of language are 
indifferent to each other, such that how one speaks is fully separable from that about 
which one is speaking.  That is, the passage implies that how one speaks does not 
ultimately effect or determine that about which is speaking.  That Hegel does not actually 
hold this view is clear from many of his discussions of form and content both in the 
Logic’s Introduction32 and in the exposition of the Logic itself.33  The language used 
about the concrete concept is language used by the concrete concept, and the language of 
representation and abstraction is precisely that which is simply not able to speak truly 
about the concrete concept.  Additionally, and contrary to what one might infer from 
Hegel’s words above, the language of the understanding is not something which stands in 
complete opposition to the language of reason.  As we will see, it is instead a necessary 
element of the language of reason, in that it is taken up into the language of reason as one 
dimension of it.  With this these qualifications in mind, though, we can say that the idea 
of two kinds of language which can express the same content is, in spite of needing 
qualification and later revision, a helpful beginning.  And now we have a better basis on 
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which to give an initial sketch of Hegel’s claim that philosophical language – along with 
its thought, and (what is the same) its object – is not only moving, but self-moving and 
living. 
 
     c. Philosophical Language as Living  
      In the Preface to the Science of Logic, one of the ways that Hegel goes about 
distinguishing all of the logics of the past from what he wishes to do in this work is by 
characterizing the other logics as ‘dead,’ and true logic as ‘living.’  Speaking of “the pure 
essentialities which constitute the content of logic,” Hegel says that “their self-movement 
is their spiritual life and is that through which philosophy constitutes itself and of which 
it is the exposition.”34 ‘Life’ is a specific logical category in the Science of Logic which, 
appearing near the end of the work, is one of the most complex of the entire 800 page 
exposition.  And Hegel’s claim is that life is present in the Logic as more than something 
merely spoken about – it is genuinely operating within the work as a work.   
      But does this make sense to speak of logic and of thinking as ‘living’ and as ‘self-
moving’?  Is this not some sort of category mistake?  Or to the put the question another 
way: When Hegel speaks of language and thinking being either ‘living’ or ‘dead,’ is he 
not speaking metaphorically, using certain rhetorical images to helpfully convey some 
more literal point?  In the Preface and Introduction of the Science of Logic Hegel does 
indeed use the terms ‘life’ and ‘death’ very metaphorically, e.g., speaking about logic in 
terms of bodies and bones.  However, within the actual exposition of the Logic, he treats 
life as a specific logical determination.  In the process, he explicitly addresses the concern 
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of a category mistake by differentiating between life in the realm of logic and life in the 
realms of nature and spirit; elsewhere, he makes a clear contrast between “external, 
sensuous movement” and “internal self-movement proper.”35  From these discussions it 
even becomes evident – as we will see in Chapter 5 – that, far from the meaning of 
‘living logic’ being derived from some ‘literal’ sense of life such as plant or animal life, 
Hegel actually believes the opposite is the case.36  In his view, the life of logic is life in 
the first and most fundamental sense, and life as found in plants and animals (as well as 
in the realm of human affairs) are expressions of logical life. 
      But as Hegel concedes, the view that logic is living is not an immediately obvious 
conclusion at which to arrive.  He implies that one reason for our hesitancy about this 
view is a certain preconception that is often held about the nature of logic:  
The idea of life is concerned with a subject matter so concrete, and if you will so real, that 
with it we may seem to have overstepped the boundary of logic as it is commonly 
conceived.  Certainly if logic were to contain nothing other than empty, dead forms of 
thought, there could be no mention in it at all of such a content as the idea of life.37   
The reason that the idea of logic as living might seem like a fallacious one is that we tend 
to assume that logic is formal logic, i.e., that it consists of empty forms which are applied 
by some third party to some external content.  Thus, even if we are hypothetically willing 
to accept that life is a determination existing not merely in the natural world, our 
preconceptions of logic as formal might still stand in the way.  It is worthwhile, then, to 
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say a few words by way of introduction about what the difference is between Hegel’s 
idea of logic, and traditional formal logic.   
      In contrast to what Hegel considers the living nature of true logic, the forms within 
formal logic are, as he says in the Preface of the Logic, ultimately a “disordered heap of 
dead bones.”38 For, in their mere formality, they are applied to content external to 
themselves, and in relation to this content they are ultimately indifferent and unchanging.  
True logic, on the other hand, involves the activity in which these dead bones are 
“quickened by spirit”39 such that they receive a content of their own, viz., their own 
selves.  Logic must no longer be treated as something merely formal which is applied to 
something outside of itself; rather, what are normally considered the forms of logic must 
become simultaneously the content of logic, such that the forms are involved in thinking 
each other. To give one example of what this looks like: the category of ‘determinacy’ 
(i.e., the ‘form’) is used to think the later category of ‘quantity’ (i.e., the ‘content’) in that 
quantity is recognized to be a certain determinacy, i.e., quantity is recognized as having 
the determinacy of being ‘quantity.’  A further example from the Logic’s exposition, one 
which is even more directly self-reflexive, is the category ‘other’ being recognized as 
itself an ‘other,’40 thus making it both its form and its content.  For Hegel, when logic’s 
form is its own content in this manner, the movement of what is commonly characterized 
as logic’s ‘application’ is rather a self-movement, a spontaneous movement which 
originates out of itself and thus is not due to some cause external to it.  Furthermore, 
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Hegel closely connects that which has its principle of movement within itself  with what 
is ‘living.’  A great deal more must be said, and will be said, in order to explain these 
ideas more thoroughly, but by way of introduction it is sufficient to say that these are the 
grounds on which Hegel holds logic to be self-moving and living. 
      In light of the interdependence of thought and language discussed above, it is 
reasonable to expect that the language which enables the thinking of a living logic must, 
in some sense, also be living.  This is in fact what we see Hegel claiming when, in the 
Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, he says that not only the content of a 
philosophical proposition but also its form must be characterized by movement.  In 
describing “the dialectical movement of the proposition,” Hegel says that “[t]his alone is 
the actual speculative, and only the expression of this movement is a speculative 
exposition.”41  Additionally, he goes on to refer to this dialectical movement as “the 
course that generates itself, going forth from, and returning to, itself.”42 Since 
philosophical language is the expression and making actual of philosophical thought, 
much of what Hegel says of logic can also be said of philosophical language.  Like logic, 
if philosophical language were simply a matter of empty forms – with its words, 
grammar, and structure being that which were merely applied to a content to which it is 
wholly indifferent – then it would not in any sense be living. But if such language has a 
different relationship to its content, an internal and reciprocally constitutive one instead 
of an external and indifferent one, then it would make sense to speak of this language as 
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living.  And if the elements of such a language – its words, propositions, and 
combinations of propositions – are related to each other not like dead bones but like the 
members of a moving body, it would make even more sense to speak of this language as 
living.  Again, we have not yet begun to account for what such a language would actually 
look like, but our brief discussion here indicates the outlines of what Hegel means with 
his rather unusual claim that philosophy and its language are living.  This short 
discussion should also serve as a context for the general goal of this dissertation, viz., to 
give an account of Hegel's view of philosophical language by discussing how this 
language is able to express and effect both logical movement and its own movement, i.e., 
its self-movement.
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Part I. A Question of Comprehension: Application vs. Expression 
      Before looking at the issues of mechanism, life, and contradiction in Part II, and 
ordinary and philosophical language in Part III, I will spend Part I discussing several 
methodological issues regarding how the rest of this dissertation will proceed.  
Unfortunately, these issues turn out to be some of the very ones that this dissertation as a 
whole intends to explore.  For example, in Part I’s discussion about how this dissertation 
will go about investigating Hegel’s views of contradiction and philosophical language in 
Parts II and III, we will need to make specific claims about these very views and these 
very topics.  This is due, I believe, to the fact that these topics play a role in one’s mode 
of proceeding in any investigation at all.  Thus, the ‘content’ of Part I – the nature of 
philosophical comprehension – is to some degree the issue of what ‘form’ the rest of this 
dissertation should take in its attempt to comprehend philosophical language; yet, it also 
involves issues that will be part of the ‘content’ of the rest of the dissertation (e.g., 
contradiction).   
      In light of this, both Part I and the dissertation as a whole run the risk of being very 
long exercises in question-begging.  Because I will be attempting to use something 
similar to Hegel’s mode of comprehension in my attempt to give an account of his view 
of philosophical language, I am proposing to use Hegel’s mode of giving an account in 
my attempt to give an account of his view of what it is to give an account.  Thus, if the 
mode of investigation I will be using throughout is one I have derived from Hegel 
himself, am I not stacking the deck in his favor, making it likely that the conclusions I 
come to will be in agreement with his thinking?  This objection certainly has some force.  
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My primary response would be that, as stated in the introduction, my overall goal in this 
dissertation is to give an account of philosophical language which fits within Hegel’s 
thought as a whole, one which, insofar as I am able, resembles some of what he himself 
might have written.  In light of this goal, it seems that the account I give of what his 
views on this matter would be should proceed according to his mode of investigation.  
      Before looking into the issue of comprehension, there is one more issue that should 
be addressed.  The kind of comprehension which we will be investigating is 
philosophical comprehension, that is, the comprehension of the subject matter within 
philosophy’s jurisdiction.  For Hegel, this subject matter is limited to that which is 
necessary, i.e., to the determinations of the Concept.  These determinations – let us call 
them ‘philosophical determinations’ – are the ones which Hegel gives an account of in 
his Encyclopaedia as a whole.  So, for example, this would include the determination 
‘plant’ but not the determination ‘poison ivy,’ the determination ‘art’ but not the 
determination ‘Flemish Baroque painting,’ the determination ‘civil society’ but not the 
determination  ‘16th century Italian civil society.’  The second term of each of these pairs 
can, of course, be comprehended philosophically in terms of the first term, but not in 
terms of its own specificity, which Hegel would say lies in the realm of contingency.  In 
the 1817 version of the Encyclopedia, he gives several examples of such non-
philosophical and contingent determinations:   
The study of law, for example, or the system of direct or indirect taxation, ultimately 
require exact decisions which lie outside the determinacy in and for itself of the Concept.  
Thus a certain latitude of determination is left open, so that for one reason something be 
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said in one way but for another reason it can be said in another, and neither is capable of 
definite certainty.1 
Matters which lie ‘outside the determinacy of the Concept,’ then, are contingent, not 
knowable with absolute certainty, and not within the purview of philosophy.  
Incidentally, it is for this very reason that such matters are not within the purview of 
philosophical language.  Such language, like philosophy, is only concerned with the 
determinations of the Concept, i.e., the necessary and universal determinations which 
constitute the Science of Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit.  In our 
discussion below, then, our concern will be with what Hegel would consider 
comprehension proper (viz., that which grasps what is necessary), as opposed to 
comprehension in the everyday sense of the term, which would also be concerned with 
contingent (but of course still important) matters such as, say, the cure for cancer, or the 
best technologies for producing clean energy.   
      With these preliminaries about preliminaries out of the way, we will now discuss 
Hegel’s view of the basic mode in which philosophical comprehension should proceed, 
beginning with his critique of a mode in which he thinks it should not proceed.  
1. Application as Comprehension 
 
     a.) The Problem of Formalism 
 
      When a thinker does not provide a lengthy exposition of a given topic – as Hegel does 
not with the topic of philosophical language – a natural response on the part of the 
curious is to examine the categories which the thinker developed more extensively and 
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then apply them to the topic at hand.  For example: What would Descartes say about 
education?   ‘Consult the Passions of the Soul and the Discourse on Method,’ we might 
say, ‘and see how his discussions of emotions and of method apply to the issue of 
pedagogy.’  What would Aristotle say about humans as historical creatures?  ‘Consult the 
Politics,’ we might say, ‘and see how his discussion of revolution and regime change 
might apply to the issue.’  In order to comprehend philosophical language in Hegel’s 
thought, we might therefore decide to take particular categories which Hegel has 
developed and apply them to it.  Such an application procedure would likely consist of 
first studying Hegel’s detailed exposition of those categories, and then seeing how they 
can be identified within philosophical language in order to explain what it is, e.g., by 
seeing how they function as characteristics or properties or elements of it.  For example, 
since Hegel refers to language in the Phenomenology of Spirit as “the existence of 
spirit,”2 we might study the section on ‘existence’ in the Science of Logic and then apply 
what we find to what we know about language, and then to philosophical language.   
      From Hegel’s perspective, there would be a problem with such an approach, and the 
problem would be that it totally misguided.  In the Phenomenology and the Logic, he 
repeatedly and adamantly rejects any approach in which one takes categories from a 
schema and then applies them to something in order to grasp what it is.  Thus, to 
approach any issue in Hegel in terms of the ‘application’ of logical categories is, in his 
view, a thoroughly faulty strategy.  While this mode tends to be the one that most 
immediately suggests itself to (as Hegel would say) ‘ordinary consciousness,’ to use it 
                                                 
2 Phenomenology §652. 
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would be to start off in the wrong direction, and to ensure that we would not comprehend 
what Hegel is trying to say. 
      The word that Hegel sometimes uses to describe such a mode of proceeding is 
‘formalism.’ One indication of his deep opposition to this mode is the amount of time he 
spends critiquing it in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.  In fact, one of his 
primary goals in the Preface overall is to distinguish between the formalism of the 
understanding (Verstand) and the nature of philosophical thinking, i.e., between the 
“argumentative procedure” (räsonierenden Verhalten) of the understanding and the 
“conceptual thinking” (begreifende Denken) of speculative philosophy.3  In this context, 
Hegel describes the understanding’s formalism as consisting of a particular way of 
conceiving what subjects and predicates are, along with a particular way of relating them 
to each other.  The result, he says, is that the understanding attempts to comprehend 
things in a specific manner: “This formalism takes itself to have comprehended and 
articulated the nature and life of a shape [Gestalt] when it has affirmed a determination of 
the schema to be a predicate of that life or shape.”4  Specifically, he characterizes this 
formalism as an approach which applies one or more terms from some chart or schema to 
a thing, and, in so doing, believes it has thereby grasped what the thing is.  These terms, 
he says, can be drawn either from abstract tables or schemas (as is the case with, e.g., 
subjectivity and objectivity), or from the realm of nature (as is the case with 
‘magnetism’).5  A simple example of the understanding’s formalistic approach – an 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Ibid. §59.   
4 Ibid. §50, translation emended.  
5 Hegel mentions these three examples in Phenomenology §50, along with several additional examples 
from the realm of nature: electricity, contraction, expansion, east, and west. 
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example which involves one ‘abstract’ predicate and one from nature – would be if 
someone were to apply the predicate ‘thinking’ to the subject ‘animal,’ and thereby 
believed that he had grasped what a human being is.6   
      Hegel begins his critique of such an approach by painting a few striking images of it:  
This method, which consists in taking the pair of determinations out of that universal 
schema and then plastering them onto everything in heaven and earth, onto all the 
natural and spiritual shapes and then organizing everything in this manner, produces 
nothing less than a ‘crystal clear report on the organism of the universe.’ This ‘report’ is 
like a tabular chart, which is itself a little bit like a skeleton with small bits of paper 
stuck all over it….in this ‘report,’ the living essence of what is at stake has been omitted 
or concealed.7   
Clearly, one of the problems Hegel sees in such a formalistic approach is that it does not 
do justice to the term taken from the chart or schema; instead, it unreflectively treats the 
term as something that both has no existence in its own right and is completely 
indifferent to the specific context into which it is placed.  Hegel further spells out this 
concern by means of an example:   
Even when the determinateness such as, for example, magnetism, is in itself concrete, 
that is, is actual, it is nonetheless downgraded to the status of something lifeless since it 
is merely predicated of another existence, and no cognizance is taken of the immanent 
                                                 
6 The initial example that Hegel himself uses of such a schema or table is the “triplicity” that he says Kant 
“rediscovered,” yet only in a “dead” and “unconceptual” form.  Hegel seems to have in mind The Critique 
of Pure Reason’s Table of Categories, where, under each of the four heading, there are three categories. 
(E.g., under Qualität are “Realität, Negation, Limitation.”)  Kritik der reinen Vernunft, s. 118-119.  Yet, as 
is clear from the rest of Phenomenology §50, Hegel is criticizing not only the Kantian schema, but also 
fixed schemas or tables of any kind. 
7 Phenomenology §51.  
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life of this existence, nor of how it possesses its indigenous and distinctive self-
production and exposition.8   
If natural determinations such as magnetism can be predicated of another existence in this 
way, it is no wonder that logical categories – e.g., quality, existence, necessity, 
universality – are generally viewed as lacking their own existence, as being scraps of 
paper that can be stuck onto any given surface, and as being dead, dry, and lifeless.  
Because the understanding views all predicates in this way, it attempts to comprehend 
things by applying predicates to subjects, i.e., lifting them from a chart or table and 
placing them into a particular context without any change being made to the predicate 
itself.  Thus, the process of predicate application entails that one pick a pre-defined 
predicate (e.g., ‘necessary’, or ‘universal’), attach it to some subject, and then 
comprehend the subject partially or wholly in light of this pre-defined predicate.  
      In Hegel’s view, however, a predicate in a philosophical proposition is not something 
that should be ‘applied’ to a subject at all, for it is not something at-hand which can be 
selected as a result of its appearing appropriate to the subject, and then simply attached to 
it.  If it were, this would mean that the predicate was completely indifferent to what it 
was being applied to, and for Hegel this is not something we can assume.  So, to use our 
example above about the definition of a human being, the understanding would take the 
independent predicates of ‘thinking’ and ‘animal’ and then would either apply one to the 
other or would apply both to whatever idea it already had of ‘human being.’  In either 
case, what is assumed is that neither predicate undergoes any essential change in being 
                                                 
8  Ibid. §53, translation emended. 
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combined with the other, and, in this way, they have been “downgraded to the status of 
something lifeless.”   
      From the above, a better picture has begun to emerge of one of Hegel’s main 
concerns with a formalistic approach to comprehension, viz., that it does not properly 
take into account the being of predicates themselves, or the possibility that a predicate 
having one determinacy in one context might have another one in another.  Clearly, this 
concern is relevant to the larger topic of this dissertation.  While we know that, e.g., 
Hegel refers to philosophical language as living, and while we know that he gives an 
account of the category of life in the Science of Logic, the attempt to comprehend his 
view of philosophical language by studying the ‘life’ chapter in the Logic and then 
applying it to philosophical language as one of its predicates would be a formalistic 
approach that, in his eyes, would end in failure.  
      In the Phenomenology’s Preface, Hegel offers a second critique of the formalistic 
mode of comprehension.  This critique follows directly out of the first, and helps to 
illuminate his view of both the proper mode of comprehension, and the philosopher’s role 
in doing philosophy.  According to Hegel, when the formalistic mode is used, the 
predicate is brought together with the subject not as a result of the nature of either of 
them in themselves, but rather through a movement external to both, viz., the 
understanding of the person doing the applying.  This ‘external’ movement has already 
been alluded to in the quotes above where Hegel talks about taking predicates out of a 
schema and “plastering” them all various subjects, such that they are like small bits of 
paper which are stuck onto the skeleton of the subject.  This last image helps reveal the 
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connection between Hegel’s first critique of formalism (viz., an injustice being done to 
applied predicates) and his second: the formalistic mode of comprehension views 
predicates as indifferent to their specific context and in this sense ‘lifeless,’ and as a 
result the movement which attaches the predicate to the subject must originate in some 
external source, namely, the understanding of the person doing the investigation.  In 
Hegel’s words, “The monochromatic nature of the schema and its lifeless 
determinations…are each and every one the result of the same lifeless understanding and 
external cognition.”9  We see, then, that the predicate here (e.g., ‘thinking’) is lifeless not 
only because it is indifferent to its context, but also because the movement which attaches 
it to the subject (e.g., ‘animal’) is brought about not by itself but by the understanding of 
the person doing the investigation.   
      In such a mode of application, a predicate and a subject are thought together not due 
to their own natures, but due to the contingent movements of the faculty of the 
understanding placing them together. This approach would be appropriate when dealing 
with matters that are themselves contingent, to what we earlier called ‘non-philosophical 
determinations.’  Applying a philosophical determination to a non-philosophical one – 
e.g., comprehending a bear standing in front of you in terms of the philosophical 
determination ‘animal,’ or determining the best way to reduce rising health care costs in 
the 21st-century by applying the philosophical determination ‘civil society’ – would not 
be problematic for Hegel.  These examples, like Hegel’s ‘direct or indirect taxation’ 
example mentioned above, are inherently contingent, cannot be known with certainty, 
                                                 
9 Phenomenology §51, translation emended. 
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and are not the subject matter of philosophy proper.  Thus, this sort of application is not 
what Hegel is criticizing here in the Phenomenology’s Preface.  What he is criticizing is 
the approach which applies philosophical determinations to other philosophical 
determinations.  For in his view, the contingency of this approach renders it inadequate 
for comprehending the universal determinations which are the purview of philosophy, 
determinations which, because of their living and self-ordering movement, are necessary.   
He clarifies this point by saying, “The understanding, which likes to put everything in its 
own little pigeon-hole, retains for itself the necessity and the concept of the content, 
which constitutes the concrete, the actuality, the living movement of the subject-matter 
[der Sache] which it [the understanding] puts in order [rangiert].”10  The “content” being 
spoken of here, i.e., the Sache, is what the understanding has under consideration (e.g., 
animal, or thinking).  As we will discuss in detail in Chapter 5, Hegel connects the 
necessity of such content with ‘living movement’ due to his view that philosophical 
determinations have necessary relations to each other, and that these necessary relations 
constitute the self-ordering of the determinations within the whole (i.e., within the 
Concept).  In the formalistic approach, however, the understanding retains this necessity 
and this ordering process for itself, taking them over as its own.  This act is most 
evidenced by the fact that, while the content has its own living movement, the 
understanding is what puts it in order (“rangiert”), i.e., what moves the predicate into a 
relation with the subject.11   Hegel states that if the understanding were to realize that it is 
                                                 
10 Phenomenology §53, my italics, translation emended.  
11 While trains had not yet come to Germany in 1807, some indication of what Hegel probably meant by the 
word “rangiert” is given by the fact that, today, it refers to the act of switching railroad cars onto different 
tracks.   
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not comprehending the actuality and movement belonging to the content itself, “it would 
refrain from schematizing, or at least it would know that it knows no more than what is 
made available through a table of contents.  A table of contents is all that the 
understanding offers, but it does not supply the contents itself.”12  In sum, then, the 
formalistic approach is only capable of engaging the matter at hand in an abstract and 
skeletal way, and its conclusions about the Sache have less to do with the Sache than with 
that which it has imposed onto it from its own self. 
    
       b.) The Beginnings of Hegel’s Response 
      Given that Hegel so soundly rejects the formalism of an ‘application’ mode of 
comprehension, what is his alternative view of comprehension?  And – to pose this 
question more specifically to this dissertation – what would be the proper mode of 
comprehension to use to comprehend Hegel’s view of philosophical language?  Several 
characteristics of this alternative mode of comprehension are apparent simply from the 
above sketch of the critique of formalism in the Phenomenology’s Preface.  Whereas the 
formalistic mode involves predicates being attached to subjects by a movement on the 
part of the investigator, an investigation proceeding properly has a different source of 
motion, viz., the content itself.  As Hegel says, “…the content shows that its 
determinateness is not first received from an other and then externally pinned onto it; 
rather, the content gives itself this determinateness, it bestows on itself the status of being 
a moment, and it gives itself a place in the whole.”13  In speaking of the content as being 
                                                 
12 Phenomenology §53. 
13 Ibid.  
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self-determining and, so to speak, ‘self-situating,’ Hegel is emphasizing the contrast with 
the way that the understanding took over for itself the content’s “necessity,” “actuality,” 
and “living movement.”14  Thus, in some as-yet unspecified way, proper comprehension 
allows the content to move and determine itself.   
      What such a ‘self-determination’ on the part of the content entails, however, is that 
proper comprehension allows the content to be the origin of the movement in 
comprehension itself.   Hegel refers to both of these movements when he says, “Science 
may organize itself only through the proper life of the concept. The determinateness 
which was taken from the schema and externally stuck onto existence is, in science, the 
self-moving soul of the content which has been brought to fruition.”15   So, the way in 
which science moves, i.e., the way in which thought and comprehension move, should be 
dictated by the way in which the content moves.  Instead of the movement of both the 
content and comprehension originating in comprehension, it should originate in the 
content.   
      At first glance Hegel might appear to be making a rather naïve point in all of this, 
e.g., ‘The object should determine the subject, not the other way around,’ or 
‘Comprehension must be passive, and must allow the content to be active.’  Certainly if 
this was all Hegel was claiming, he would be exhibiting a great deal of naïveté, and 
doubly-so in a post-Kantian environment.   However, given that Hegel specifically names 
Kant in his critique of formalism in the Phenomenology’s Preface, it is safe to assume 
that he is intentionally using anti-Kantian formulations to express what he is outlining 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
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here.16  More significantly, though, the exposition which follows the Phenomenology’s 
Preface is one whose stated aim is to give an account of what knowledge is, i.e., to gain 
knowledge of knowledge.  And as we know, Hegel believes that one of the major 
accomplishments of the Phenomenology is to show that the difference between subject 
and object, between comprehension and content, turns out to be no difference at all.   
      That aside, Hegel goes beyond making the shallow claim that comprehension must 
allow itself to be determined by the content, when he makes a more specific claim about 
how comprehension can actually accomplish this.  Namely, comprehension must be 
willing to ‘enter into’ what it is trying to comprehend.   This ‘entering’ metaphor forms 
the basis of the following paragraph, in which the understanding is contrasted with proper 
comprehension:   
Instead of entering into the immanent content of the subject-matter, the understanding 
always surveys the whole and stands above the individual existence of which it speaks, 
or, what amounts to the same thing, it does not see it at all.  However, to an even greater 
degree, scientific cognition requires that it give itself over to the life of the object, or, 
what is the same thing, that it have the inner necessity of the object before it and that it 
articulate [auszusprechen] this inner necessity.  Absorbing itself in its object, it forgets 
the former overview, which is only a reflection of knowledge out of the content and 
back into itself.17  
‘Standing above’ and ‘surveying’ the whole are clearly involved in any process of taking 
pre-determined predicates from a schema or chart and applying them to subjects.  
Because such an attempt stands at a distance from the object (from the Sache), it is not 
                                                 
16 see Phenomenology §50, where he criticizes Kant’s categories of the understanding.  
17 Phenomenology §53. 
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able to be guided by the object, by the necessity inherent in the object itself.  “Scientific 
cognition,” on the other hand, enters into the object, insofar as it does not bring in 
predicates from some external source, but rather follows the “immanent content of the 
subject-matter” and the “life” therein.  Instead of standing high above the content and 
giving an overview of it, proper comprehension is absorbed into the content in all its 
particularity, thus allowing itself to be moved and guided by the content’s specific 
actuality. 
      This very brief discussion of Hegel’s view of comprehension’s mode of proceeding 
is, to be sure, still quite abstract and even formalistic in nature.  To put some skin and 
muscles on this skeleton, let us consider how Hegel’s preferred mode of comprehension 
would play out with regard to our recurring example of the ‘human being.’  More 
specifically, let us consider how Hegel himself goes about thinking through and giving an 
account of what a human being is.18  Instead of trying to comprehend ‘human being’ by 
attaching the predicate ‘thinking’ (determined in some prior and independent manner) to 
the subject ‘animal,’ Hegel first thinks through what an animal is, on its own terms.19  
Before doing this he had thought through more simple natural determinations, e.g., space, 
time, matter, inorganic physics, plant, etc.  His thinking through of ‘animal’ involves 
                                                 
18 One might make the objection that, if Hegel uses a certain mode to comprehend content, then he himself 
is applying concepts to other concepts, and thus practicing a kind of formalism.  At least two points can be 
made in response.  First, the ‘formalism’ that might be involved in applying a certain mode of 
comprehension to content is qualitatively different from that involved in applying predicates to the content, 
insofar as the latter brings not just a form in from an external source but part of the content as well.  
Secondly, it turns out that, for Hegel, not even the form of comprehension is imported from an external 
source and applied to the content, insofar as the form (as Hegel discusses in the Preface to the Science of 
Logic) arises out of the content itself.  
19 This treatment is found in the third chapter of the third section of the Philosophy of Nature.  In the 
second chapter of this same section, he thinks through the determination ‘plant,’ which then leads him to 
the determination ‘animal.’ 
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discussions of ‘soul,’ ‘subjectivity,’ and how the animal is ‘for itself’ because it is has 
‘self-feeling’ (insofar as it can not only feel with its body but can feel its body, e.g., in the 
form of pain).  When he concludes his thinking through of what an animal is, he states 
that he has concluded the account of nature as a whole, i.e., the natural sphere, and the 
Philosophy of Nature comes to an end.  This occurs because what is still implicit within 
the determination ‘animal’ – and which demands to be further accounted for – is 
something qualitatively different from an animal and from nature in any of its 
determinations, i.e., is something which is ‘for itself’ in a qualitatively different way than 
anything in nature.20  And this is thus the point at which the Philosophy of Spirit picks up 
the thread, beginning as it does with a discussion of “Subjective Spirit” that involves the 
“natural soul” and then the “feeling soul,” a discussion which clearly has originated out 
of the account of the animal and yet is clearly dealing with an essentially different 
determination.  Later in the Philosophy of Spirit – with the accounts of ‘animal,’ the 
human ‘natural soul,’ and the human ‘feeling soul’ as the background – Hegel gives 
accounts of ‘self-consciousness’ and of ‘thinking.’ What is relevant to note for our 
purposes here is that, in Hegel’s view, these latter accounts spring out of, and only make 
sense in light of, the former accounts.  Thus, he comprehends what a human being is and 
what thinking is out of the determination ‘animal.’   
      To describe the above example in the language of the Phenomenology’s Preface, we 
can say that Hegel does not take predicates from some chart or pre-determined table and 
then attach them to ‘human’; rather, he allows the movement of the content to direct both 
                                                 
20 viz., in an infinite way. 
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itself and his comprehension.  And, clearly, the content here is not some initial 
abstraction plucked out of the air – e.g., some initial idea of ‘human’ to which he then 
attaches predicates; rather, the content involves not only the human but also the animal 
(and the plant, and inorganic physics, and the logical, etc.).  Because Hegel’s thinking 
‘enters into’ and has ‘given itself over to the life of the object,’ it is able to be guided by 
it.  Whereas the application model of comprehension stands above the idea of ‘human 
being’ and gives an overview of it by means of assigning predicates, Hegel’s thought – 
having ‘entered into’ the determination ‘animal’ – is moved by the internal necessity of 
that determination to think the spiritual determinations ‘natural soul,’ ‘feeling soul,’ etc., 
and then to think ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘thinking,’ eventually leading to a full 
determination of what a human being is.21 
      To sum up: rejecting the formalism of an ‘application’ mode of comprehension, 
Hegel claims that proper comprehension of philosophical determinations enters into the 
content and proceeds according to the movement intrinsic within that content.  In a very 
limited and incomplete way (due to both issues of space and issues of youth), this is the 
mode of comprehension I will attempt to use in providing an account of Hegel’s view of 
philosophical language.  The issue of how an account should proceed, however, has not 
been given a sufficiently detailed treatment in the pages above.  And while we have now 
looked briefly at an example of Hegel’s alternative method of comprehension in action, a 
very reasonable objection could now be made to both this method and to his critique of 
                                                 
21 The fact that thinking here is thinking about thinking is a good illustration of the quote from the 
Phenomenology’s Preface which we quoted in part above: “…scientific cognition requires that it give itself 
over to the life of the object, or, what is the same thing, that it have the inner necessity of the object before 
it and that it articulate this inner necessity....[] [as] sunken into the material and advancing in that material’s 
movement, knowledge returns back into itself….” Phenomenology §53, my underline.  
43 
 
formalism: Does not Hegel himself, in his own philosophical works, proceed precisely by 
means of applying certain concepts to certain content?  More specifically, does he not 
apply concepts that appear earlier in his system to concepts that appear later, in order to 
comprehend the latter?  Examples of this would seem to range from an application of the 
‘dialectical method’ (with its famous ‘three moments’) onto whatever subject-matter is at 
hand, to an application of categories from the sphere of logic to the spheres of nature and 
spirit.  Hegel response would be, in short, to claim that none of these practices involve 
application.  In order to see why, we need to get a better sense of how he conceives of his 
alternative mode of comprehension.  To this end, we will take up the theme in greater 
detail in the next chapter (Chapter 2), in terms of the idea of expression.  Then, to 
examine these same ideas concretely in action, in Chapter 3 we will do a close study of 
the Science of Logic’s proposition “being and nothing are one and the same.”  These two 
chapters will lay the groundwork for closing out Part I of this dissertation with a 
discussion of why the three-moment dialectical process does not fall prey to the critique 
of formalism.  
 
   2. Expression as Comprehension, and More  
 
       a. Two Kinds of Expression 
 
         One way to starting thinking through this alternate view of philosophical 
comprehension is to consider each philosophical determination to be the expression of an 
earlier one.  By ‘earlier’ I mean ‘earlier in the account.’ For example, since for Hegel 
‘being’ is an earlier determination than ‘essence,’  essence would be the expression of 
‘being’; and, since ‘animal’ is an ‘earlier’ determination than ‘human,’ ‘human’ would be 
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the expression of ‘animal.’  Therefore, to think an earlier determination and then to think 
a later one as an expression of the earlier one would be to comprehend the later one.  
Instead of applying the earlier determination to the later one, one thinks the later one out 
of the earlier one, as the expression of the earlier one.   
      As a point of comparison for this ‘thinking the later out of the earlier,’ it is helpful to 
note that the idea of expression which I am referring to here runs along the same lines as 
Hegel’s frequent locution, ‘A is the truth of  B.’  For example, he asserts in the Doctrine 
of Essence that ‘essence is the truth of being,’22 and that ‘appearance is the truth of 
existence.’23  I am thus claiming that one could legitimately re-articulate these two 
examples as ‘essence is the expression of being’ and ‘appearance is the expression of 
existence.’  But what does it mean for one thing to be the ‘truth’ and the ‘expression’ of 
another?   
      First, it is important to distinguish the meaning of the word ‘expression’ as I am using 
it here from its meaning in a more everyday sense.  To differentiate these two senses, I 
will call them ‘developmental expression’ and ‘static expression.’  A first difference 
between these two is that what I am calling ‘static expression’ refers only to the sphere of 
human expression, e.g., via language or painting or music.  ‘Developmental expression,’ 
on the other hand, includes those kinds of specifically human expression but also many 
others, such as the example regarding essence as the expression of being.  A second 
difference is that, in ‘static expression,’ the expression is an externalization of something 
already fully formed.  Thus, what is expressed is indifferent to its expression, i.e., is not in 
                                                 
22 SL 389. 
23 SL 496.  
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any way determined or altered by it, such that it remains ‘static’ in the midst of being 
expressed.  While an expression of this type is, of course, dependent for its own being on 
what is expressed, the inverse is not the case.  An example of this post hoc character of 
‘static expression’ is when someone explains to another person his position on an issue 
which he has explained in the same way on a previous occasion to someone else.  In such 
a situation, the speaker’s thoughts are already formed, and thus are the same after being 
expressed this second time as they were before.  The words of such an explanation – 
while receiving their own specific being from these thoughts – are not shaping the 
thoughts but are simply externalizing them, i.e., simply operating for communicative 
purposes.   
      By contrast, ‘developmental expression’ entails that what is expressed is not fully 
what it is apart from being expressed; rather, what is expressed is what it is only through 
being expressed.  We can illustrate this second sense of expression by imagining 
someone explaining his position on an issue to another person where the position is one 
he has never explained to anyone before, and which he – until the moment of speaking it 
– had not entirely formulated even to his own self.  Because the speaker’s thoughts are 
not fully formed when he begins to speak, the words of the explanation are both 
communicating and forming the thoughts, in their very being.  Thus, in ‘developmental 
expression’ of all kinds, both in the human realm and in others, what is expressed is not 
indifferent to, but rather dependent upon, the expression.  Put otherwise, the expression 
of the expressed is the development of the expressed; the expressed comes to be more 
fully what it is through the expression.  To better understand this developmental sense of 
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expression, we will now look in more detail at the connection between expression, 
development, and coming-into-being. 
       b. In-itself, For-another, For-itself 
      One of the most basic dynamics at work in Hegel’s logic is that, for something to 
become fully what it is, it must do so through something else, i.e., it must do so in and 
through an other.  One way that Hegel commonly talks about this early on in the Science 
of Logic is in terms of the three determinations of “being-in-itself,” “being-for-another,” 
and “being-for-itself.”24  He discusses the first two at length in his treatment of the 
relation between ‘something’ (Etwas) and ‘other’ (Andere), a treatment which claims that 
both something and other are what they are only in opposition to each other.25  That is, a 
something is a something only in contrast to (as other to) an other, and an other is an 
other only in contrast to a something.  So, while the designation ‘being-in-itself’ might 
appear to apply to solely ‘something,’ and the category of being-for-another solely to 
‘other,’ it turns out that both apply to both: ‘something’ is also being-for-another, and 
‘other’ is also characterized by ‘being-in-itself.’  It is with this as a backdrop that, later on 
in the Doctrine of Being, the more complex category of “being-for-itself” arises.  In this 
section, Hegel further explains how the ‘something’ that initially was merely ‘in-itself’ 
turns out also to be essentially ‘for-another,’ in that its ‘other’ turns out to be playing a 
role in determining what the ‘something’ is.  Furthermore, since the ‘other’ ends up being 
not only other to the ‘something’ but part of the being of that ‘something,’ the 
                                                 
24 SL 116-129; 157-186.   
25 Ibid., 116-122. 
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‘something’ engages in a “return into itself.”26 That is, the ‘something’ becomes what it 
is through the ‘other,’ and in so doing becomes for-itself.  As Hegel explains, what is for-
another becomes for-itself when it “transcends otherness”27 – when what was initially 
other turns out not to be so.      
      Later in the Science of Logic, in The Doctrine of Essence, this dynamic gains further 
complexity but also further clarity.  For, the relation between ‘something’ and ‘other’ can 
be recognized in the relation between ‘force’ (Kraft) and ‘expression’ (Äußerung), with 
expression being an expression of force insofar as it is the other of force.  Later still in 
the exposition, something similar to the dynamic between force and expression appears in 
the categories of ‘inner’ (Innere) and ‘outer’ (Äußere).28  What is relevant for our 
purposes here is that, in all three of these pairs of terms, the first term only is insofar as it 
is both unified with and present in the second term, its other.  At the end of the section 
entitled “On the Relation of Inner and Outer,” Hegel says that, with regard to ‘something’ 
(Etwas), “its appearance is not only the reflection into an other [Andere], but also into 
itself, and its externality [Äußerlichkeit] is thus the expression [Äußerung] of what it is in 
itself…it [‘something’] is nothing but this, to express [äußern] itself.”29  The connection 
in German between the nouns ‘expression’ – Äußerung – and ‘outer” – Äußeren – 
emphasizes a crucial point: the outer of an inner as the other of that inner is the 
expression of that inner.  Clearly, this expression is not an incidental one, but rather is 
one that makes it possible for the expressed to become fully what it is.  
                                                 
26 Ibid., 158.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 523-528.  
29 Ibid., 528.  
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      Additionally, in a more complex version of the ‘in-itself’ becoming ‘for-itself’ 
through its other, the inner becomes actual through its outer, as we see when Hegel 
defines “absolute actuality” as “the unity of the inner and the outer.”30  To put this 
dynamic in slightly plainer terms: in order for something to become actual, to become 
fully what it is, it must find expression in an other.  
      This dynamic as present within the logical sphere can be seen operating in similar 
ways in other spheres as well.  A helpful example from the human sphere is romantic 
love.  In the Philosophy of Right, one of Hegel’s descriptions of love reads as follows: 
“On the whole, love is the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not 
isolated as myself, but rather win my self-consciousness only through the renunciation of 
my being as myself, and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and 
of the other with me.”31  Similar to how Socrates32 and Aristotle33 claim that we can only 
come to know ourselves through seeing ourselves in other human beings, Hegel holds 
that we come to a consciousness of ourselves by seeing and finding ourselves in another, 
viz., in the one whom we love and who loves us.  In order for this to be accomplished, I 
must give up my isolated ‘in-itself’ status, and be willing to enter into a unity with an 
other in whom I can find myself.  In this other, my self is expressed, is externalized from 
me, and the result is that I see myself in this other, and see myself in a way that I never 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 529.  
31 Philosophy of Right, trans. Alan White (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), §158, Remark.   
32 e.g., Alcibiades I, in Socrates & Alcibiades: Four Texts, trans. David M. Johnson (Newburyport, MA: 
Focus Publishing Co., 2003), 132c6-133c7. 
33 e.g., "Direct contemplation of ourselves is impossible…. And so, just as when wishing to behold our own 
faces we have seen them by looking upon a mirror, whenever we wish to know our own characters and 
personalities we can recognize them by looking upon a friend; since the friend is, as we say, a 'second self' 
[hetero ego – “other I”]."  Magna Moralia, trans. G. Cyril Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), II.15 (1213a10-27).  
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could directly.  Furthermore, this increased consciousness of myself gained through the 
other constitutes a change in myself, and, specifically, a change in which I (as people 
often say) ‘become more myself.’     
      It is important to emphasize that this general dynamic of ‘becoming oneself in an 
other’ cannot take place if the ‘something’ is merely in an indifferent unity with its other.  
That is, the unity cannot be one in which the something stands in relation to its other yet 
maintains its independence over against it.  As Hegel says in the example of love, there is 
a need for a “renunciation of my being as myself.”  This point comes out more strongly in 
the further remarks he makes about the nature of love: “The first moment in love is that I 
do not want to be a self-subsistent person as myself and that, if I were, I would feel 
defective and incomplete.  The second moment is that I win myself within another 
person…while the other in turn attains the same in me.”34  So, as every good relationship 
counselor knows, what a person (traditionally, a man) might interpret as his ‘healthy self-
sufficiency’ turns out actually to be incompleteness, due to this person not losing himself 
in the other so that he might fully become himself.  Whether in love or in any other 
sphere, becoming oneself in an other involves externalizing oneself into an other in such 
a way as to genuinely lose one’s independence. 
      An expression, then, makes what is expressed more fully what it is.  What is in-itself, 
which initially appears to be what the thing at hand ‘really is,’ turns out to become what it 
is only through something other, i.e., only through being expressed in another.  In light of 
this we can say that an essential dimension of what it is to be an ‘expression’ is to be an 
                                                 
34 Philosophy of Right, §158, Remark. 
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other to the something that it is expressing.  The process of expression involves there 
being something other than what is being expressed, doing the expressing.35  Or, to put it 
the other way around, in order for something to be expressed, it must have an other, an 
other through which it is expressed.  
      From the above discussion, it is clear that what is merely in-itself is not expressed.36  
If what is in-itself were to be on its own terms, as opposed to becoming what it is through 
an other standing essentially over against it, then this in-itself would have no other which 
could function as its expression, which could be its expression, because to be such an 
expression requires the relation of ‘essentially standing over against.’ But in fact, for 
Hegel there simply is no such thing: there is nothing which is wholly and unqualifiedly 
in-itself.37  While we can look back and see in hindsight that something was in-itself, the 
very act of calling it such is a partial expression of it.38  For Hegel, nothing within the 
purview of philosophy completely lacks an other which in some way determines it; that 
is, nothing completely lacks an expression.39  Rather, there is only that which is partially 
in-itself, insofar as it is not fully expressed and thus not fully developed.  In the Science 
of Logic we see this over and over, such as in the transition from substance to the 
concept; as Hegel describes this transition, “The concept…has substance as its immediate 
                                                 
35 While the idea of a ‘pure self-expression’ might be seem to be a counterexample to this last claim, Hegel 
would argue that, when examined closely enough, such a phenomenon exists only in an equivocal way 
(e.g., what is expressed contains an other within it).   
36 A.V. Miller seems to agree with this point insofar as he often translates “an-sich” as “implicit” and “für-
sich” as “explicit.”  In my view, these rather free translation choices often significantly obscure Hegel’s 
meaning, but the general conceptual framework that seems to be driving these choices is one with which I 
am sympathetic.   
37 A helpful point of comparison here is Hegel’s critique of any kind of Ding-an-sich.  
38 provided that the expression is a ‘developmental’ one, and not a ‘static’ one.  That all philosophical 
language engages in ‘developmental’ expression – i.e., brings what it is naming more fully into being by its 
naming of it – is a claim that will be defended later in this dissertation.  
39 Not even nothing itself.   
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presupposition; substance is the in-itself which the concept is as manifested.”40  As the in-
itself comes into an explicit relation with its other, it becomes more fully what is in and 
through that other.   
~ 
      In light of the last several pages, a reasonable question to ask would be this: ‘If we are 
trying to understand expression as a mode of comprehension, why does the discussion of 
expression thus far sound much more like an ontological category?’  A first response to 
this would be that, for Hegel, one cannot account for the structure of thinking without 
also talking about the structure of being; this is so, he would say, both because thinking 
itself is and thus ‘has being’ (a less controversial claim), and because when thinking 
knows its own structure, it is also knowing the structure of being (a more controversial 
claim).  This is the reason this chapter is entitled “Expression as Comprehension, and 
More.”  For Hegel, the discussion of what it is to comprehend something is inseparable 
from ontology.   But even if we were to reject Hegel’s view on this matter, we could 
accept the possibility that the ‘ontological’ nature of expression has ‘epistemological’ 
implications.  After all, even someone subscribing to a representational model of 
epistemology might assent to the idea that we can orient our approach to knowing a given 
thing based at least in part on what the thing is (e.g., what sort of thing it is).41  In the 
                                                 
40 SL 577. 
41 It seems that one would have to know something about the thing in order to make a statement about “the 
best way of knowing it,” i.e., the best way of knowing it in full. (e.g., “this thing is a living thing; thus, if 
we cut it apart we won’t be able to study it qua living.”)  This situation, to be sure, leads to one of the 
biggest problems in philosophy, that of getting started without begging the question.  Hegel believes he has 
solved this problem in the Science of Logic, for in this work he claims that the form (or ‘method’) of 
thinking arises immanently out of its content (the ‘content’ here also simply being ‘thinking’).  
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next section, then, we will continue the ontological/developmental emphasis by 
examining another aspect of how the ‘in-itself’ develops by means of something which is 
other to it.   
       c. In-Itself vs. Posited: the Expression of the Idea  
        Hegel often speaks about a given determination becoming what it is by contrasting 
the ‘in-itself’ with what is ‘posited.’  The connection between something being posited 
and being expressed is an intimate one: in both, the ‘something’ becomes what it is 
through its ‘other.’  We have already seen how this was the case with expression, and a 
good way to see how this is so with positing is to return again to the Science of Logic’s 
section on ‘something’ and ‘other.’  Here, Hegel says, “Being-in-itself [Ansichsein]…has 
being-for-other [Sein-für-Andere] as its contrasted moment; but posited-being42 
[Gesetztsein], too, is contrasted with it.”  Then, referring to the term “posited-being,” he 
says that within it “indeed lies being-for-another [Sein-für-Andere]….”43  When 
something is posited, when it is gesetzt, it is ‘set’ or ‘placed’ or ‘laid’ down.  Thus the 
point that Hegel is making in the quote above is that whenever something is posited, it is 
precisely not ‘in-itself,’ because in being posited it is the ‘other’ of, and is dependent on, 
what is doing the positing: this is why he says that being-for-another ‘lies in’ posited-
being.   
      To give one example of this, Hegel says in the Science of Logic’s section on Measure 
that the “identity of quality and quantity present in measure is only in-itself at first, and 
                                                 
42 Instead of the usual translation of “positedness,” I choose to translate Gesetztsein as “posited-being” due 
to the fact that the usual translation – by omitting the ‘Sein’ that Hegel very intentionally placed in the word 
– gives the impression of a pure action/process, instead of signifying the process plus a result which Hegel 
has in mind with the word. 
43 SL 121.  
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not yet posited.”44  He then goes on to show how their identity in measure is, through the 
exposition of measure, posited and expressed.  Posited-being is a ‘being which is set 
down,’ and, since it involves being-for-another, it clearly contrasts with the merely 
implicit and merely ‘internal’ nature of the ‘in-itself.’  In being posited, something is no 
longer in-itself: it finds being-in-another, and is expressed in that other.   
      In his logical works, Hegel repeatedly emphasizes the distinction between what is in-
itself and what is posited, and he even places it at the very center of what it is to do 
philosophy.  In this striking passage from Science of Logic, he indicates how central he 
sees this distinction to be when he speaks of how its presence or absence allows us to 
distinguish true philosophy from all other attempts:  
In the different spheres of determination and especially in the progress of the exposition, 
or more precisely, in the progression of the concept toward the exposition of itself, it is of 
capital importance always clearly to distinguish what is still in-itself and what is posited, 
the determinations as they are in the concept and as they are posited, as being-for-
another.  This is a distinction which belongs only to dialectical development, which 
metaphysical philosophizing, under which critical philosophy also belongs, does not 
know.45   
The exposition of the concept is what Hegel considers the Science of Logic, the 
Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit to be, and his claim is that if we do not 
properly differentiate what is in-itself and what is posited, this exposition cannot be 
successful.  The reasoning behind his claim is that this exposition just is the positing, the 
                                                 
44 EL §108, Addition. 
45 SL 122.  
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setting forth, of all the determinations which at first are merely implicitly present in the 
concept.  
       In the Encyclopaedia Logic he describes this same manner of exposition when he 
says that “the whole course of philosophizing, being methodical, i.e., necessary, is 
nothing else but the mere positing of what is already contained in a concept.”46  This, 
then, is snapshot of Hegel’s view of how a philosophical exposition progresses: 
something that, in an earlier section, was only in-itself, i.e., only present in an implicit 
way, is later set forth in an other, i.e., is posited and expressed.47  The movement in 
which the in-itself of a less developed philosophical determination becomes expressed in 
the ‘other’ of a more developed determination is, then, a movement continually at work 
within Hegel’s philosophical exposition.   
      And while we have not invoked the word thus far, this movement that we have been 
discussing for pages and pages as ‘developmental expression’ is what Hegel refers to as 
Aufhebung.  For, the movement from ‘in-itself’ to ‘posited’ is a becoming: a passing 
away of a previous determination as that isolated (an-sich) determination, and the 
coming into being of a result.  As something posited, this result is something whose 
being is a carrying forward (albeit in an altered form) of what was present earlier.  Thus, 
Hegel’s point that Aufheben in the German language has a double sense – both “to cause 
                                                 
46 EL §88.  
47 To put all of this in Kantian terms, Hegel sees the exposition of the concept as involving (although not 
being limited to) a very, very long string of analytic judgments. 
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to cease, to put an end to” and “to preserve and to maintain”48 – is helpful here in 
understanding what happens when something is posited and expressed.49    
      But for Hegel this kind of expression is operative not only on the level of individual 
determinations, but also on the largest scale.  Most textbook accounts of Hegel mention 
something about his view that the Idea (i.e., the entirety of the logical sphere50) 
externalizes itself into Nature and then returns to itself by means of Spirit (i.e., the realm 
of human affairs).51  It is in this element of Hegel’s thought that the dynamic of 
something becoming what it is through an other is seen at its broadest and most 
comprehensive level: the Idea expresses itself in the other of Nature52 so that it can 
become itself through the realm of human things.  More specifically, Hegel’s claim is that 
the Idea ‘in-itself’ implicitly possesses the character of knowing itself, and thus fully 
becomes itself only when it actually knows itself.  To reduce it to a few sentences, the 
Idea’s activity of actually knowing itself takes place in this way: first, the Idea has an 
other (and thereby finds expression) in nature,53 one result of which is the existence of 
the animal organism; second, the human being, as containing the animal organism within 
itself in sublated form, gives rise to the whole realm of human things; finally, the most 
                                                 
48 SL 107. 
49 We will see in our discussion of reciprocity in Chapter 4 that when something is expressed, it not only is 
posited, but also posits. That is, it is posited in its expression, and it posits its expression.  
50 Insofar as the Idea is the last category in the Science of Logic, and insofar as each category contains in 
sublated form the categories that precede it, the Idea contains all of the determinations of the logical sphere.  
51 Here and below, when I capitalize the words “Nature,” “Spirit,” “Logic,” and “Idea,” I do so only in 
order to more clearly indicate that the meanings intended are those of Hegel’s technical senses of these 
terms, as opposed to their more everyday meanings (e.g., “the nature of X is that…”).   
52 Philosophy of Nature, §247. 
53 As Hegel puts it in the Philosophy of Nature:  “Nature has emerged [sich ergeben] as the idea in the form 
of otherness. Since the idea is thus as the negative of itself or is external to itself, nature is not external 
simply relative to this idea... rather, externality constitutes the determination in which nature is as nature.” 
§247, my translation.  
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developed dimension of this realm of human things is philosophy, and philosophy just is 
the activity of the Idea – as present and active within embodied human beings – actually 
knowing itself.  This view of the whole of things and of the structure and process of its 
becoming is, to be sure, grandiose and ambitious, but at this point we can see that it is 
merely a blown-up version of the same basic dynamic that we have been discussing 
above within the logical sphere, and with the example of romantic love.  While the Idea 
may not be in love with Nature, it nonetheless becomes fully what it is only through 
Nature, insofar as it is only able to knows itself because of Nature’s making possible both 
Spirit and philosophy.  
      Given Hegel’s view that the dynamic of ‘becoming actual through expression’ is 
present between the three spheres of Logic, Nature, and Spirit,54 we can now come to an 
important conclusion: for Hegel, everything in the realm of Nature and of Spirit is an 
expression of the Idea.55  As he puts it in the Logic, “…everything actual is, only insofar 
as it has the Idea within itself [in sich] and expresses it.”56  Clearly, the expression going 
on here is – to invoke the terminology we were using earlier – a developmental 
expression of the Idea, in that by expressing the Idea it is making the Idea more actual.  
To further this thought in light of the above discussions: everything in the realm of 
Nature and of Spirit is (initially, at least) an ‘other’ to the Idea which, to a greater or 
lesser extent, expresses the Idea, thereby contributing to it becoming what it is. 
                                                 
54 See Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III, §574-577.  Hereafter referred to as 
“Philosophy of Spirit.” 
55 It would also be just as correct to say that everything in Nature and Spirit is an expression of being.  For, 
given that being is the first category in the logical sphere, everything in that sphere is an expression of 
being.  (The Idea, insofar as it is the last category in the logic, is being’s fullest expression in that sphere.) 
56 SL 756. 
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      With all of this in mind, we can now make an ‘ontological generalization’ of no small 
importance: in Hegel’s view, to ask what something is is to ask about its specific ability 
to express the Idea.  Put otherwise: what something is, is its particular capacity of 
expressing the Idea.57  For example, Hegel sees a turtle as expressing the Idea better than 
a rock, human desire as expressing the Idea better than a turtle, ordinary language better 
than human desire, and music better than ordinary language.  This is a somewhat strange 
statement, so I should describe it with more specificity.  First, each of the determinations 
I have listed is something that is other to the Idea; because of this otherness, each is able 
to express the Idea.  In expressing the Idea, each of them contains the Idea in a form more 
developed than the Idea in-itself, i.e., the Idea as found at the end of the Logic.  Second, 
each of these determinations successively better expresses the Idea, i.e., better expresses 
what is implicit within the Idea.  What is implicit within the Idea is, among other things, 
the Idea coming to know itself, and as we discussed above, this takes place in its fullest 
form by means of a human being doing philosophy.  Thus, to put it crudely, a turtle better 
expresses what is implicit within the Idea than a rock because a turtle is more like 
philosophy than a rock is.58  Ordinary language better expresses what is implicit within 
the Idea than a turtle does because ordinary language is more like philosophy than a turtle 
is; similarly, music is more like philosophy than ordinary language is.59  All of these 
                                                 
57 What something is determines how well it is capable of expressing the Idea.  But it is just as true to say 
that what something is is determined by how well it is capable of expressing the Idea. 
58 I.e., a turtle – qua ‘animal organism’ (Philosophy of Nature §350-375) – is more like the determination 
‘philosophy’ (i.e., more like the Idea knowing itself, the full expression of the Idea) than a rock is, qua 
‘geological nature’ (Philosophy of Nature §338-342).  
59 I.e., music, qua ‘art’ (Philosophy of Spirit §556-553) is more like the determination ‘philosophy’ than 
language is (Philosophy of Spirit §457-460).  
58 
 
examples illustrate the larger point: that what something is has to do with its particular 
ability to express the Idea.60 
      Let us once again specifically connect all of this back to the larger question we are 
dealing with, viz., what the proper mode of comprehension is.  The approach of applying 
more general (earlier) categories to more specific (later) ones is based on the ontological 
assumption that earlier categories are complete in themselves, and not developed by later 
ones; it is for this reason that this approach attempts to simply ‘lay’ the earlier ones 
indifferently onto the later ones.  But, if the nature of philosophical determinations is 
such that each one is the expression of an earlier one, then in order to think a given 
determination, one would need to think it out of the ones that preceded it, i.e., out of that 
of which the determination is an expression.   
      In light of the entire discussion above, an objection similar to the one mentioned at 
the end of Chapter 1 could still justifiably be raised: ‘If this mode of comprehension as 
‘expression’ is valid across a whole range of circumstances and subject matters, is it not 
implied that we should apply this mode to all these various subject matters?  How does 
this mode of comprehension not fall prey to the same critiques which were leveled 
against comprehension as application?’  A good way of responding to these objections is 
to conclude the general overview that we have been engaged in thus far and look closely 
                                                 
60 To give a full account of the issue of various things expressing and thus developing the Idea, we would 
also need to raise the issue of history, along with the difference between development of the Idea in nature 
and in spirit.  For example, Hegel would claim that there is a difference between the way that space (Raum) 
developmentally expresses the Idea and the way that sculpture does.  For, space’s developmental 
expression of the Idea has always existed, and has always been constant; by contrast, sculpture in ancient 
Greek times was developmentally expressing the Idea in a different way than it did before or after.  E.g., 
several hundred years after the apex of Greek sculpture, what was advancing the development of the Idea 
historically was no longer sculpture but painting and music (the “Romantic” arts).  
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at a specific section of text to see how all this really works.  This is what we will do in 
Chapter 3, in taking up Hegel’s claim that “being and nothing are one and the same.”  But 
before leaving our current ‘overview mode,’ I would like to digress for a moment from 
the discussion of expression as comprehension and, in anticipation of Part III of the 
dissertation, make a few remarks about how language fits into the general picture of 
expression that we have been outlining. 
 
       d. An Aside on Language 
      Earlier we spoke of the difference between ‘developmental’ and ‘static’ expression, 
with the latter being the kind which merely externalizes what it expresses.  That is, in 
‘static’ expression what is expressed is not shaped or formed by its being expressed, but 
remains just as it was before being expressed.  Examples of this kind of expression can be 
found in the realm of language (e.g., telling 20 different people at a conference one’s 
academic affiliation and philosophical interests), or outside the realm of language (e.g., 
drawing the same crude image of the tri-partite soul on the blackboard that one drew the 
previous year to illustrate a point in Aristotle).  But in addition to ‘developmental’ and 
‘static’ forms of expression – both of which can operate in language and also in other 
arenas – there is, of course, the more everyday and familiar use of the word ‘expression.’  
This is linguistic expression, the type usually associated with reference, sense, meaning, 
etc. (a theme we will explore at length in Part III).   
      Leaving aside philosophical language for the moment, we can say that ordinary 
language has the ability to engage in all three of these types of expression. In a discussion 
above I used ‘ordinary language’ as an example of one kind of ‘developmental’ 
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expression of the Idea.  But ordinary language’s ‘developmental’ expression of the Idea is 
something quite different than a scenario in which someone develops a new idea about 
something (say, about how to make electric motors more efficient) through the process of 
dialoguing with a friend.  While both scenarios involve ordinary language engaging in 
‘developmental’ expression, what they are developmentally expressing and how they are 
doing so are of quite a different nature.  To better grasp this difference, let us take a step 
back for a moment and consider the relation between ordinary language’s 
‘developmental’ expression of the Idea and its ability to engage in any kind of ‘linguistic’ 
expression at all. 
      Both kinds – the ‘developmental’ expression of the Idea, and ‘linguistic’ expression 
in general (whether ‘static’ or ‘developmental’) – are involved in ordinary language.  
First, insofar as ordinary language is, it engages in the ‘developmental’ expression of the 
Idea; that is, ordinary language (like everything else that is) expresses the Idea in some 
fashion by its mere being, thereby allowing the Idea to become more fully what it is.  
Second, insofar as ordinary language refers, means, etc., it also engages in the ‘linguistic’ 
sense of expression.  But, these two senses of expression are more tightly linked within 
ordinary language than simply co-existing in the same entity.  For, the fact that ordinary 
language engages in ‘linguistic’ expression has to do with what it is; and, since what a 
thing is determines the kind of ‘developmental’ expression of the Idea in which it 
engages, this means that ordinary language’s ‘linguistic’ expression just is its particular 
manner of ‘developmental’ expression.  Because ordinary language engages in 
‘linguistic’ expression, it engages in a different kind of ‘developmental’ expression than, 
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say, a turtle does (which expresses the Idea not qua language, but qua animal).  Unlike a 
turtle, language’s ‘developmental’ expression involves ‘linguistic’ expression.  Put 
otherwise, ‘linguistic’ expression is one type of ‘developmental’ expression, the type in 
which ordinary language engages.  
      Philosophical language, too, engages in both types of expression: ‘linguistic,’ and 
‘developmental’ expression of the Idea.  However, the way that these two senses of 
expression interact in philosophical language is not the way that they interact in ordinary 
language.  And this provides us with a first opportunity to begin distinguishing the two 
kinds of language.  Ordinary language engages in a ‘developmental’ expression of the 
Idea qua ordinary language regardless of what it is expresses linguistically, and how it 
expresses it.  With regard to the ‘what’ (its content), it could be expressing meaning 
about the weather, a baseball game, a film, etc.  With regard to the ‘how’ (its form), 
ordinary language could be engaging in either a ‘developmental’ or a ‘static’ expression 
of its own content (viz., the speaker’s thoughts, about such things as the weather, 
baseball, or a film).  Regardless, it is still engaging in its specific kind of ‘developmental’ 
expression of the Idea, simply by being what it is, viz., something which expresses 
meaning by associating ideas with certain sounds in the air, marks on the page, etc.  For 
in general, and as we have already seen, something engages in its particular kind of 
‘developmental’ expression simply by being what it is, insofar as ‘being what it is’ is the 
means by which the thing allows the Idea to become more fully what it is.  And the being 
of ordinary language does not depend upon expressing any particular content in any 
particular way.  Thus, it engages in a ‘developmental’ expression of the Idea even when it 
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does not engage in developmental expression of its own content (viz., the speaker’s 
thoughts being expressed), and regardless of what that content is.  For, even if ordinary 
language is static with respect to the speaker’s thoughts, it is developmental with respect 
to the Idea.  This is the case because there is nothing within the being of ordinary 
language which entails that it express meaning in a way which develops what it is 
expressing, or that it express meaning about any particular topic; it does not need to do 
either in order to be ordinary language.  Provided that a given statement is engaging in 
some kind of ‘linguistic’ expression, its mode and its contents of expression are irrelevant 
to its status as ordinary language, and thus irrelevant to its ‘developmental’ expression of 
the Idea qua ordinary language.  Both the particular content and the particular form of its 
‘linguistic’ expression are irrelevant to its ‘developmental’ expression of the Idea.  
      Philosophical language, by contrast, only is philosophical language insofar as it 
expresses specific linguistic content, and insofar as it expresses its own specific content in 
a developmental manner.  That is, philosophical language engages in a ‘developmental’ 
expression of the Idea qua philosophical language only if its ‘linguistic’ expression is of a 
particular nature, viz., if it is expressing ‘philosophical determinations’ in a 
developmental fashion.  By ‘philosophical determinations’ I mean what I mentioned back 
at the very beginning of Part I, viz., the determinations which Hegel sees are necessary 
determinations of the Concept, which he gives an account of in the Encyclopaedia as a 
whole.61  For language to be ‘philosophical,’ it must be about these determinations – 
                                                 
61 e.g., not ‘bulldog’ but ‘animal,’ not ‘British constitutional monarchy’ but ‘the state.’ 
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about what Hegel sometimes calls ‘speculative content’62 – and it must develop these 
determinations through giving an account of them. Thus, these requirements with respect 
to its content and its form (the latter being its mode of expression) are features which 
distinguish philosophical from ordinary language.  And this clarifies the claim we made 
at the beginning of the previous paragraph, that the way ‘linguistic’ expression and the 
‘developmental’ expression of the Idea interact in philosophical language is not the way 
that they interact in ordinary language.  Because what philosophical language expresses 
‘linguistically’ (its content) and how it expresses it (its form) contribute to making 
philosophical language what it is, this means that its specific content and its specific form 
are what enable it to engage in its ‘developmental’ expression of the Idea qua 
philosophical language at all.  While this is not the case with ordinary language, both the 
specific content and the specific form of philosophical language’s ‘linguistic’ expression 
are constitutive of its particular ‘developmental’ expression of the Idea. 
      But the relation between philosophical language’s ‘linguistic’ expression and its 
‘developmental’ expression of the Idea is even closer still.  Above we mentioned that, for 
language to be philosophical, its ‘linguistic’ expression must have a specific form, viz., it 
must develop its content in its expression of it; additionally, it must have a specific 
content, viz., content which is ‘speculative,’ i.e., which consists of one or more of the 
philosophical determinations which constitute the whole.  But ‘the philosophical 
determinations which constitute the whole’ just are the determinations of the Idea.  This 
leads us to a significant conclusion.  Because philosophical language’s specific 
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‘linguistic’ expression is a ‘developmental’ expression of its own content, and because its 
own content just is the Idea, its specific ‘linguistic’ expression is a ‘developmental’ 
expression of the Idea.  In philosophical language, ‘linguistic’ and ‘developmental’ 
expression are one.   
                                                                    ~ 
      In the sections above, we have provided a critique of the view that philosophical 
comprehension takes place through the application of categories, and have offered the 
alternative claim that it takes place through thinking ‘earlier’ categories and then out of 
them thinking ‘later’ categories, with the latter expressing the former ‘in their truth.’  
Because this ‘expression’ mode of comprehension is the one Hegel subscribes to, and 
because this dissertation is an attempt to present a view of philosophical language 
consistent with his thought, Parts II and III of this work will, albeit in a limited and 
incomplete way, endeavor to use this mode of comprehension.63   
      But before moving on to Part II, we still need to respond to a serious objection to the 
expression mode of comprehension.  As mentioned above, this is the objection that this 
expression mode is self-contradictory insofar as it critiques the application mode and yet 
seems itself to be applied to the subject matter at hand, standing indifferently over against 
it.  Back at the end of Chapter 1 we raised the similar objection that the ‘triadic’ structure 
of Hegel’s philosophy (the ‘dialectical method’) seems to represent a form that is applied 
to whatever content is being dealt with at the time.  And now we could add to this the 
question, ‘Aren’t the dynamics present within expression – in-itself, for-another, etc. – 
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65 
 
indifferent to whatever they are operating within?’  To respond to these objections more 
fully, we will now conclude the high-flying overview that we have been engaged in thus 
far, and descend into a specific section of text at the beginning of the Logic to see what 
all this looks like at the ground level.  Our investigation of the proposition “being and 
nothing are one and the same,” and of why this proposition fails, will illuminate the 
fundamentally non-formalistic nature of Hegel’s thinking, and, along the way, also 
provide a few more insights into the nature of philosophical language. 
 
   3. Expression, in Action: “Being and Nothing is One and the Same”   
 
        “In representation, or for the understanding, the proposition ‘being and nothing are 
the same’ appears to be such a paradoxical proposition that it may perhaps be taken as not 
seriously meant.  And it really is one of the hardest propositions that thinking dares 
formulate….”64  In taking an in-depth look at this paradoxical and most challenging of 
propositions, we will focus on three main issues.  First, we will look at why Hegel claims 
that this proposition is unable to express its content, and, more specifically, why it is 
unable to express the movement present within it.  Second, we will investigate what is 
required beyond this proposition such that its content can be expressed.  Third, we will 
show why the proposition’s failure of expression leads to the coming into being of the 
triadic ‘form’ of Hegel’s philosophy, and why the particular manner in which it comes 
into being entails that it is not actually formalistic at all.  In addition to shedding light on 
the issues of formalism/application and expression, another advantage of taking a close 
look at this particular proposition is that it will gives us the chance to broach several 
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themes on language that will be taken up in more detail in the later parts of this 
dissertation, especially the question of the way in which philosophical language can be 
said to ‘move.’   
      a. Its Deficiency  
      In the Second Remark of the “Being” section, Hegel addresses the defectiveness of 
the proposition that being and nothing are one and the same.  Back in the First Remark, 
Hegel had described the unity of being and nothing in dramatic terms, calling it “the 
primary truth” which “constitutes once and for all the basis and element of all that 
follows,”65 and claiming that all the logical determinations that are yet to come are 
“examples of this unity.”66  Additionally, in the First Remark he had discussed why the 
proposition asserting the sameness of being and nothing is seen by ordinary 
consciousness to be completely implausible, and then he defended the proposition against 
these criticisms.  It is somewhat ironic, then, that Hegel begins the Second Remark by 
saying, in effect, that those who find this proposition implausible are correct in their 
assessment.  As he explains, “the expression of the result which arises out of the 
consideration of being and nothing, [as expressed] through the proposition ‘being and 
nothing are one and the same’ is incomplete.”67   
      The reason that this proposition is incomplete is that, while it expresses the sameness 
of being and nothing, it does not express their difference.  In Hegel’s words,  
                                                 
65 SL, 85, translation emended.  
66 Ibid. 
67 SL 90, translation emended.  “…der Ausdruck des Resultates, das sich aus der Betrachtung des Seins und 
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The emphasis is laid chiefly on their being one and the same, as in judgments generally, 
where it is the predicate that first states what the subject is.  Consequently the sense 
seems to be that the difference is denied, although at the same time it appears [vorkommt] 
directly in the proposition, for this enunciates both determinations, being and nothing, 
and contains them as differentiated.68   
Thus, insofar as the proposition asserts the sameness of being and nothing very clearly, it 
seems to exclude their difference.  Yet, their difference is nonetheless present in this 
assertion of their sameness, insofar as this assertion “contains them as differentiated.”   
      With respect to his claim that difference is implicitly present in the proposition, Hegel 
responds to a possible objection: “At the same time, it cannot be meant that abstraction 
should be made from them [being and nothing] and only the unity retained.  Such a 
meaning [Sinn] would self-evidently be one-sided, because that from which abstraction is 
to be made is equally present and named in the proposition.”69  That is, if someone 
claimed that the proposition abstracts away from the difference between being and 
nothing, and speaks only of their sameness, Hegel would point to the fact that the words 
“being” and “nothing” are uttered separately within the proposition, revealing that their 
difference has not been left out of the proposition but is included within it.  While the 
difference is not explicitly expressed, it is nonetheless present; in terms of the language 
of Chapter 2 above, the difference is in-itself but not yet posited.  Difference is tacit in the 
proposition, and Hegel says that this tacitness is the proposition’s deficiency: it does not 
fully express its content.   
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      The way that the sameness of being and nothing is asserted is a familiar one – viz., a 
sentence directly stating that something is the case.  We are also familiar with how a 
sentence can have a meaning present within it without directly stating it, e.g., one person 
cooks dinner for a friend, and the friend takes one bite and says, “Maybe I should cook 
next time.”  What is less familiar is a situation lacking in all social or emotional context 
in which a proposition with the basic form “A and B is the same” or “A is B” contains an 
implied, unexpressed meaning.  Additionally, the unexpressed meaning in the proposition 
about being and nothing is a meaning not just other than, but directly opposite to, the 
expressed meaning of the sentence, making the situation even more peculiar.  Thus we 
can ask: ‘What is the means by which the difference of being and nothing is present yet 
not asserted?’  
      In Hegel’s words, this difference “vorkommt,”70 a word that can mean either ‘appears’ 
or ‘occurs.’   So what exactly occurs when something “vorkommt” in a proposition, when 
something not expressed by the proposition is nonetheless present within it?  The answer 
to this question is the other side of the coin to a seemingly more apparent matter, viz., 
what happens when meaning is directly expressed by a proposition.   
      One approach to gain insight into these matters is to look more closely at the 
categories of activity and passivity present within Hegel’s descriptions.  This approach 
will be limited due to our having not yet worked out what these complicated terms might 
mean, or how they function within the Logic, but for the moment we can just take 
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Hegel’s words – and specifically, the verbs he uses – at face value.71  Given Hegel’s 
claim that difference merely ‘appears’ or ‘occurs’ in the proposition about being and 
nothing, it seems that the proposition is not active with respect to the expression of 
difference.  In terms of the language of Chapter 2 above, the difference is merely ‘in-
itself.’ By contrast, the proposition actively expresses sameness; in terms of Chapter 2, 
samenesss is ‘posited.’  For, as Hegel points out, propositions in general – language with 
the basic form of ‘A and B is the same’ or ‘A is B’ – actively assert the sameness of their 
elements, insofar as “the predicate …states what the subject is.”72  And this is just what 
we see in the proposition about being and nothing, insofar as it “enunciates [spricht aus] 
both determinations”73 and is thus active in its separate naming of them.  However, with 
respect to the difference of these two determinations, i.e., with respect to this one 
dimension of the relation between being and nothing, this proposition plays a passive 
role.  That it plays this passive role with regard to the difference of the two can be seen in 
Hegel’s statement that the proposition simply “contains [enthält] them as 
differentiated.”74   
                                                 
71 Taking the words ‘active’ and ‘passive’ at face value can only be a temporary measure because, in 
Hegel’s view, one of the main accomplishments of the Logic is precisely the overcoming of this distinction.  
Thus, if in our reading of the Logic were to continually associate activity with form (here, the form of 
proposition), and passivity with content (here, the proposition’s content), we would be misinterpreting what 
the Logic as a whole is doing.  For Hegel’s discussions of how the separation between activity/passivity 
and between form/content is overcome in the Logic, see, e.g., “The Relation of Causality,” SL 558-571; the 
discussion of speculative method at SL 838-840 and EL §238, Addition (see also his commentary on 
Aristotle at Lectures on the History of Philosophy Vol. 2, 164).  Another example of how this separation 
cannot be held fast is Hegel’s claim that the ‘content’ of the Logic is active insofar as it generates both 
itself and the developing ‘forms’ by which it is thought, ‘forms’ which were themselves previously 
‘content.’ (see, e.g., SL 27.) 
72 SL 90. More precisely, he is speaking about judgments in this quote, but the assertion applies to 
propositions as well, insofar as the two are formally identical: ‘A is B.’  
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid, translation emended, my italics. 
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      Further evidence for this proposition’s passivity with respect to the expression of 
difference is found in what Hegel says as he continues to develop this Second Remark:   
Now insofar as the proposition ‘being and nothing are the same’ enunciates the identity 
of these determinations, but, in fact [in der Tat…in the deed], equally contains them both 
as distinguished, the proposition contradicts itself in itself and dissolves itself [löst sich 
auf].  Bearing this in mind, we see that here a proposition is posited [gesetzt] which, 
observed more closely, has a movement through which it itself vanishes.  But with this 
there takes place [geschieht] in the proposition that which should constitute its actual 
[eigentlichen] content, namely, becoming.75 
From this quote we see that the ‘actual content’ of the proposition “being and nothing are 
one and the same” turns out to be the result of the combination of two meanings: the 
meaning which the proposition expressed (regarding sameness), and the meaning which it 
did not express (regarding difference). Thus, so long as the difference of being and 
nothing is not expressed, neither is proposition’s actual content, viz., becoming.  For only 
when the difference of the two is expressed along with their sameness can the proposition 
contradict itself, thus causing it vanish in the movement of its self-dissolution, into 
becoming.  To put this more concisely: no expression of difference, no expression of 
contradiction (with sameness); no expression of contradiction, no vanishing movement; 
no vanishing movement, no becoming.   
      Since this proposition fails to expresses the difference of being and nothing and thus 
fails to express contradiction, its complete content, becoming, is also not expressed.  This 
is clear from Hegel’s description of the proposition’s relationship to becoming, for he 
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uses the same kind of ‘passive’ language in this description as he used to describe the 
proposition’s relationship to difference: just as difference kommt vor (appears/occurs), 
becoming geschieht (takes place)76 within the proposition.  And, just as the proposition 
merely “contains [enthält]”77 the difference of being and nothing, Hegel says that the 
“proposition thus contains [enthält] the result [i.e., becoming]….”78  Yet, speaking of this 
result, Hegel goes on to add that the proposition just “is this in its own self.”79  We are 
thus presented a strange situation: it is possible for a proposition – a linguistic, expressive 
entity – to be unable to express its own self.   That is, Hegel is claiming that a proposition 
can contain contents which it itself is unable to express, and which thus remain merely 
implicit within it. 
      But Hegel’s account of why the proposition about being and nothing is unable to 
express itself fully does not simply describe this particular proposition; it describes all 
propositions asserting the sameness of two things.  For the basic dynamic is the same: a 
proposition fails to express itself when it fails to express both the sameness and the 
difference present within it, thereby failing to express its own contradiction and specific 
movement of dissolution contained within itself, which it itself is.  That Hegel would 
view his account of this dynamic here at the beginning of the Logic as having such far-
reaching implications should not be surprising.  As we mentioned above, Hegel describes 
the unity of being and nothing in the First Remark as “the primary truth” which 
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“constitutes once and for all the basis and element of all that follows,”80 claiming also 
that all the logical determinations which are to come are “examples of this unity.”81  
Through what we have seen thus far regarding the proposition about being and nothing, 
we have thus gained an initial insight into the proposition in general.  For we can now see 
that, on its own terms, the proposition in general is stillborn, incapable of expressing the 
movement within its own self, a movement which is more powerful and more fluid than it 
can live up to. 
 
      b. Its Expression  
      If the proposition “being and nothing are one and the same” is unable to express its 
own self due to its failure to express the difference and contradiction present within it, 
why does the Science of Logic not come to an end at its very beginning? The merely 
descriptive answer to this question is that, when we look at the exposition itself, we see 
that after the sameness of being and nothing is asserted in one proposition, their 
difference is asserted by a second proposition.  In this way, the difference implicit in the 
first proposition is asserted in the second.  But where does this second proposition ‘come 
from’?  In the Second Remark Hegel tells us that something else has stepped in to remedy 
the inadequacy of the first proposition with regard to its content: “…the fact to which we 
must pay attention here is the defect that the result is not itself expressed in the 
proposition; it is an external reflection with discerns it therein.”82  An “external 
reflection” takes over the active role which ‘should have been’ executed by the 
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proposition, taking on the role when it “discerns” both the difference and the becoming 
within the proposition.     
      A passage from the Encyclopaedia Logic version of this same Remark helps to 
further clarify what is lacking on the proposition’s part, and also alludes to what external 
reflection’s specific involvement is.  Hegel states: “Indeed, a speculative determination 
cannot be expressed correctly in the form of such a proposition; what has to be grasped is 
the unity in the simultaneously at-hand and posited [vorhandenen und gesetzten] 
diversity.”83  So while difference is indeed vorhanden and ‘in-itself’ in the proposition 
(insofar as it kommt vor), the fact that the proposition cannot express this difference 
means that it cannot setzen it, cannot posit it, cannot lay it down.  Three other significant 
points can be drawn from this passage.  First of all, we see here once again the intimate 
connection between ‘expressed’ and ‘posited’ that we discussed back in Chapter 2: to say 
‘what is expressed is expressed in its expression’ is to say ‘what is expressed is posited in 
its expression.’84  Secondly, Hegel is making a claim about all propositions, viz., that 
they are incapable of expressing both sameness and difference.  Due to their form, they 
express either one, or the other. Thirdly, the implication in this quote is that an activity 
other than, and external to, the proposition must come onto the scene in order to take the 
difference which is merely ‘at-hand’ in the proposition and posit it or ‘lay it down’ by 
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84 However, because in ‘developmental’ expression there exists a reciprocal relation between what is 
expressed and its expression, it is equally true to say, ‘what is expressed posits its expression.’  This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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actually expressing it.  This is precisely what external reflection does, as we saw Hegel 
describe a moment ago.85    
      But how does this ‘external reflection’ express what remains unexpressed in the 
proposition?  Here is Hegel’s description: “For the purpose of expressing the speculative 
truth, the deficiency [of the proposition] is complemented initially by adding the contrary 
proposition: being and nothing are not the same….”86  Thus the difference in the 
proposition ‘being and nothing are the same’ is posited and expressed not by itself, but by 
a second proposition, ‘being and nothing are not the same.’  This second proposition is 
laid down by external reflection after it discerns the difference as present but not 
expressed in the first proposition.  Because the first proposition was unable to 
‘express/press out/drück aus’ what is present within it, and what it implicitly is, external 
reflection and a second proposition must (so to speak) ‘pull out/zieh aus’ this meaning 
from it, from an outside position.  Or, to follow this last German verb into another of its 
meanings, we could say that external reflection must ‘undress’ the proposition, showing it 
for what it truly is.  And the reason it must do this is that the proposition is unable to 
undress itself. 
      Of course, for Hegel external reflection is not external to the Logic as a whole, but 
rather external to what it posits, which in this instance is the difference between being 
and nothing.  Such a manner of externality is what we see Hegel describe in the section 
on External Reflection in the Doctrine of Essence, when he says, “What external 
reflection determines and posits in the immediate are in this respect determinations 
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external to the immediate.”87  In the situation we are discussing here, the “immediate” is 
being and nothing, and what external reflection determines and posits in them is their 
difference.   
      However, while external reflection is what brings about thought’s movement from the 
sentence ‘being and nothing are one and the same’ to ‘being and nothing are not the 
same,’ this fact is not manifest in the actual exposition of the Doctrine of Being.  It is 
only in the Second Remark on Being – i.e., outside of the exposition proper – that Hegel 
is able to recognize and comment on external reflection’s role.  For, in the Remark he is 
speaking from the perspective of one who has already thought through the determination 
of external reflection itself, in the Doctrine of Essence.  From this vantage point, he thus 
possesses the larger perspective to comprehend what is going on ‘beneath the surface’ of 
the Doctrine of Being, viz., the “background”88 constituted by the Doctrine of Essence, 
which includes external reflection.   
      To shed a bit more light on external reflection’s expression of the difference of being 
and nothing, and on the difference between what is ‘present/in-itself’ vs. 
‘posited/expressed,’ we can take the whole the discussion above and situate it within a 
broader context.  The expression of the difference of being and nothing that finally does 
take place here in the Doctrine of Being (through the statement ‘being and nothing are 
not the same’) can be productively contrasted with the expression of the category of 
difference that takes place much later, in the Doctrine of Essence.  Hegel alludes to this 
contrast in the first remark on Becoming in the Encyclopaedia Logic:  
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But correct as it is to affirm the unity of being and nothing, it is equally correct to say that 
they are absolutely diverse too – that the one is not what the other is. But because this 
difference has here not yet determined itself, precisely because being and nothing are still 
the immediate, it is, as belonging to them, the unsayable….89    
In the phrase ‘being and nothing are not the same,’ the difference between being and 
nothing has been posited and expressed in a minimal sense; yet, nothing further can be 
said about this difference: it is the ‘unsayable.’  That is, if someone were to say, “OK, 
being and nothing are different; but, in what way are they different?” there could be no 
response provided at this point in the exposition.  The reason for this, Hegel says, is that 
“difference has here not yet determined itself.”  As we saw above, difference has not 
determined itself because it has been determined by an other, viz., by external reflection.  
And what Hegel is alluding to with the “here not yet” is that, at a later point, difference 
will determine itself.  Indeed, this is just what we see in the Doctrine of Essence, in the 
account of difference itself.  Here, identity and difference are shown to be inseparable, 
i.e., mutually determining and intertwined.  That is, they are intertwined not simply with 
respect to being and nothing (which are both ‘the same’ and ‘different’), but also with 
respect to themselves.  When we comprehend identity and difference themselves by 
thinking through the Doctrine of Essence, we can look back over our shoulder at the 
Doctrine of Being and see why we were unable to account for, or further describe, the 
difference of being and nothing.  Looking back, we can see why we were confused about 
how being and nothing could be both same and different, and we can see why – in light 
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of what was still in-itself and not yet posited – there was no way, at that point, for us to 
have been anything other than confused.  
 
      c. The Reach of “Being and Nothing is One and the Same”  
      From Hegel’s discussion of the proposition about being and nothing in the Second 
Remark, we have seen a concrete example of how something that was initially ‘in-itself’ 
– merely silently present – is posited and expressed.  We have also discovered something 
important about the nature of the proposition in general, with respect to its inability to 
express sameness and difference simultaneously.  Hegel makes several more statements 
in the Second Remark which go beyond the discussion of the particular proposition on 
which he is focusing, and provide insight into the proposition in general.  For example, 
after his initial comment about external reflection being that which expresses the 
difference of being and nothing, he says, “In this connection we must, at the outset, make 
this general observation, namely, that the proposition in the form of a judgment is not 
suited to express speculative truths; a familiarity with this fact is likely to remove many 
misunderstandings of speculative truth.”90 The ‘judgment,’ as Hegel reveals in the 
Doctrine of the Concept,91 is distinguished from the proposition by means of its content; 
in terms of form, however, it is the same as the proposition.92 Thus the limitations which 
apply to the form of the judgment also apply to the form of the proposition.  In the quote 
above, then, Hegel is attempting to help his readers avoid a common way of misreading a 
philosophical proposition.  A bit later, he calls a judgment “an identical relation between 
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subject and predicate,”93 and then says that “if the content is speculative, the non-
identical aspect of subject and predicate is also an essential moment, but in the judgment 
this is not expressed.”94  This statement, of course, describes exactly what takes place in 
the proposition about being and nothing, but it also asserts unequivocally that this 
inability to express both sameness and difference is not unique to that specific 
proposition, but instead characterizes all propositions which claim the identity of their 
parts.      
      To see another example of this phenomenon, we can look to the comments Hegel 
makes just before the beginning of the exposition proper in the Encyclopaedia Logic.  
Earlier we mentioned that language which is ‘philosophical’ is language whose content 
consists of determinations of the Concept, i.e., language which has ‘speculative content.’  
In following quote we see Hegel use this latter phrase, and we also find a helpful analysis 
of why a proposition with such content inevitably fails on its own terms:  
…the speculative…contains the very antitheses at which the understanding stops 
short…. For this reason, too, a speculative content cannot be expressed in a one-sided 
proposition. If, for example, we say that ‘the absolute is the unity of the subjective 
and the objective,’ that is certainly correct; but it is still one-sided, in that it expresses 
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only the aspect of unity and puts the emphasis on that, whereas in fact, of course, the 
subjective and the objective are not only identical but also differentiated.95   
Speculative content, then, is that which possesses a sameness and a difference of its parts. 
So, while the understanding is incapable of seeing the difference present with a 
proposition expressing identity, we cannot really blame the understanding for this, 
because the proposition itself fails to express the difference.  Its very form – ‘A is B’ – 
guarantees that it fails in this respect.  
      Thus far we have looked at several of Hegel’s direct comments in the Second Remark 
about the relation of ‘the speculative’ and the proposition.  By continuing to think about 
the failure of the proposition ‘being and nothing are one and the same’ to fully express its 
contents, we can arrive at several more conclusions about the proposition in general, and 
about philosophical language.  And – following not the ‘application’ but the ‘expression’ 
mode of comprehension – two points about philosophical language which we will now 
examine are not generalizations made from the failure of that specific proposition, but 
rather the results of this failure.   
      The first of these results can be formulated thusly: the failure of the proposition about 
being and nothing to express its contents is the cause of the failure of all philosophical 
propositions to express their contents.96  For, this proposition occurs at the very 
beginning of the Science of Logic, and this entails that everything in this work is 
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former failure – i.e., the reason why the proposition about being and nothing is unable to express the 
difference which it contains – has also to do with the nature of the copula, viz., the fact that ‘is’ does not 
express difference. 
80 
 
contained in and comes out of this proposition.97  Earlier we referred to Hegel’s 
characterization of the primacy of the unity of being and nothing in the First Remark, and 
it is worth quoting his words here in their entirety:  
Since the unity of being and nothing as the primary truth now constitutes once and for 
all the basis and element of all that follows, in addition to becoming itself, all further 
logical determinations – determinate being, quality, and in general all the concepts of 
philosophy – are examples of this unity.98    
The unity of being and nothing, as expressed within the proposition about their sameness, 
is present in all the determinations that come after it, thereby making up “the basis and 
element of all that follows.”  Given the place of the Science of Logic in Hegel’s thought 
as a whole, this “all that follows” could just as well be reformulated as ‘all’ – i.e., the 
subject matter of the rest of the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of 
Spirit.  If all these later determinations are “examples of” the unity of being and nothing, 
this means that this first unity is partially determinative of these later determinations, by 
virtue of the fact that it is present within them.99  Additionally, the fact that the unity of 
being and nothing is present in all that follows means that what takes place in the 
proposition containing this first unity also takes place in all the identity propositions that 
follow.100  Far from the proposition about being and nothing being just one example of a 
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‘identity/sameness.’  That they are not always interchangeable for Hegel is indicated at, e.g., SL 91; yet, in 
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philosophical proposition, we can see that something like the inverse is the case: each 
philosophical proposition is actually an ‘example’ of the proposition about being and 
nothing.101 
      In light of this, the fact that this particular proposition is unable to express the 
difference of its parts means that all the others are also unable to.  Put more specifically, 
the failure of the proposition about being and nothing to express the difference of its parts 
(and thus to express its own contradiction, dissolution, and movement of becoming) 
means that all further propositions claiming the identity of their parts – i.e., the 
propositions that express “all further logical determinations”102 – also are unable to 
express the difference of their parts and thus their own movement of becoming.  All 
propositions which claim the identity of their parts do so in the non-difference-expressing 
manner that they have inherited from the inadequate proposition about being and nothing.  
Thus the defectiveness of the proposition about being and nothing – viz., that it is 
something that it cannot express – is not just its own defect.  Because every philosophical 
proposition is an example of this proposition, every philosophical proposition also 
contains this defect.     
      There is a second significant result of the failure of the proposition about being and 
nothing, and it finally allows us to address more directly a possible objection to Hegel 
which we raised above.  This objection is that Hegel himself engages in the kind of 
                                                                                                                                                 
practice he does often treat them as such.  Here in this specific context we are justified in treating them as 
synonyms given Hegel’s own synonymous usage of the phrases “being and nothing are the same” and “the 
unity of being and nothing,” at SL 84-85.  
101 That is, each proposition is either an example of it, or of its opposite, “Being and nothing is not the 
same.” 
102 Just to list two examples: “Quantity is quantum.” SL 202.  “Essence is sublated being.” SL 394. 
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formalism and conceptual ‘application’ which he so strongly criticizes.  This second 
result of the failure of the proposition is actually itself the result of the first, but is even 
more far-reaching in scope, viz., the form of philosophical exposition as triadic.  Often 
described as Hegel’s ‘dialectic’ or ‘dialectical method,’ the three-sided form of logic is 
probably the most widely known and most widely misunderstood aspects of this thought.  
We should state here upfront that Hegel is very clear in asserting that this three-sided 
form constitutes not simply the ‘subjective’ activity of thinking and its expression, but 
also the very nature of reality.  As he asserts in his anticipatory remarks in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic, the form of “the logical [das Logische]” is what is three-sided, and 
what he means by “the logical” is explained by what he says next: “These three sides do 
not constitute the three parts of logic, but are moments of everything logically real, i.e., 
every concept or every truth in general.”103  However, because of the particular focus of 
our current examination, we will for now confine ourselves to discussing this triadic form 
simply in terms of its presence within a philosophical exposition.   
      A summary explanation for why the form of philosophical exposition is three-sided 
can be formulated in a series of statements: the failure of the proposition about being and 
nothing is the cause of the failure of every philosophical proposition asserting an identity 
(i.e., every identity proposition containing speculative content); the failure of every 
philosophical proposition asserting an identity is the cause of the necessity of a second 
proposition to follow the first, in order to negate the first by stating its unexpressed 
difference; this expression of difference creates a contradiction with the first proposition, 
                                                 
103 EL §79, translation emended.  
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thereby leading to the dissolution of both propositions and to the expression of their result 
in a third proposition.104  With all this in mind, it is evident that, had the first proposition 
not failed – i.e., if it had been able to also express the difference within it – then there 
would have been no need for a separate proposition to be made in order to express this 
difference.  In this non-existent scenario, the result would be that the ‘third’ proposition – 
the one expressing the result of the contradiction – would become the second, thereby 
making the form of philosophical expositions not triadic, but dyadic.  But as we have 
seen, this is not the case: identity is expressed in one proposition, and then difference in 
another, and then their contradiction in a third.  (This, of course, is not fully understood in 
the Doctrine of Being itself, but is more fully grasped in the Doctrine of Essence, when 
the first three determinations of reflection – ‘identity,’ ‘difference,’ and ‘contradiction’ – 
are exposited in precisely this order.)   
      To illustrate this by way of an earlier example, we can say that if the proposition ‘the 
subjective and the objective are the same’ expressed not just the identity but also the 
difference between the two, then this proposition on its own – without the proposition 
‘the subjective and the objective are not the same’ – would give rise to its own 
contradiction and dissolution, and thus to the (merely second) proposition, ‘The unity of 
the subjective and the objective is the absolute.’  But, because the proposition about being 
and nothing fails to express the difference of its parts, so likewise does this later identity 
                                                 
104 This third proposition is itself another identity proposition which does not express the difference within 
it, which means that it is also the first proposition in a new triad, insofar as there is the need for another 
proposition (a ‘second’) to follow it in order to express its difference.  
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proposition, as well as all the others, thereby necessitating a negating proposition and 
determining the form of philosophical exposition as triadic. 
      From this discussion of the origins of the three-sided form of philosophical 
exposition, it is clear that this form is not some sort of method which is ‘applied’ to the 
matter at hand, and which would therefore come from some external source.  Rather, the 
triadic form arises through the first part of logic’s exposition, through the abilities and 
inabilities of the language that is used, which is to say: the triadic form of philosophical 
exposition arises from the first moments of philosophical exposition itself.105 
      The importance of this form arising immanently can be seen by reflecting back on our 
earlier discussion of Hegel’s critique of the formalism of the understanding (Verstand) in 
the Phenomenology’s Preface.  As we saw, this approach is used by the understanding to 
try to grasp what a thing is by applying pre-determined predicates (e.g., subjectivity, 
magnetism) to it from a chart or schema.  In the process, such an applied term is 
“downgraded to the status of something lifeless since it is merely predicated of another 
existence, and no cognizance is taken of the immanent life of this existence, nor of how it 
possesses its indigenous and distinctive self-production and exposition.”106  As this quote 
makes clear, the formalistic approach does not examine the predicate itself as something 
with its own existence, but instead merely imports it as pre-determined from some 
external source and then applies it to the matter at hand.  In so doing, the question of the 
validity of this external source and its pre-determined terms is never addressed.107  
                                                 
105 While this is where the triadic form first appears, it is not posited until the Doctrine of the Concept, in 
the syllogism.  
106 Phenomenology §53, translation emended. 
107 This is part of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s categories of the understanding, as alluded to above at fn. 6.  
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Clearly, this description of the problems inherent in a ‘formalism of predication’ applies 
equally to the type of formalism in which a predetermined method is used to try to 
comprehend something.  But, this latter type of formalism is even more problematic than 
the first, given that the use of a pre-determined method of thinking obviously raises the 
question of what method of thinking was used in the pre-determination process itself.  It 
is thus no surprise that in the Phenomenology’s Preface Hegel specifically highlights the 
infeasibility of any triadic form which arises not from the living content of the matter at 
hand, but from some static and separate source: “Just as little is….the use of this form [of 
Triplizität] to be considered as something scientific when we see it reduced to a lifeless 
schema, to a mere shadow, and when scientific organization has been reduced to a tabular 
chart.”108  
      Due to this concern and this danger, Hegel insists in numerous places that the 
‘method’ or ‘form’ of his logic is something neither assumed nor brought in from an 
external source.  As he says in the Introduction to the Science of Logic, “…the exposition 
of what alone can be the true method of philosophical science falls within the treatment 
of logic itself; for the method is the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement 
of the content of logic.”109 Of course, simply saying that the method of logic is present 
within the logic itself does not make it so.  But from the paragraphs above, we can begin 
to see why Hegel would think that he had accomplished this.  As we observed, the triadic 
form of logic and of the exposition that expresses it is not a form brought in from an 
outside source and then applied to the content of the logic; rather, it comes into being 
                                                 
108 Phenomenology §50, translation emended.  
109 SL 53. 
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immanently, out of the content of the logic itself.  That is, the triadic form arises out of 
the failure of the proposition about being and nothing to simultaneously express both 
their identity and their difference.  And because this proposition and its failure arise 
directly out of the initial attempt to articulate being, we can sum up this entire discussion 
by saying that the triadic form arises out of the unsuccessful attempt to say what being is.   
     Of course, in Hegel’s view this attempt is only initially unsuccessful, and as the 
exposition proceeds, it becomes progressively less and less so.  For, the attempt to say 
what being is – this is the task of philosophy as a whole.   
~ 
      In this chapter on the failure of the philosophical proposition, we have provided a 
response to the possibility that Hegel’s mode of comprehension is itself formalistic, and 
have seen comprehension as ‘expression’ in action.  Specifically, we have seen how 
comprehending what ‘becoming’ is involves thinking it out of being and nothing, i.e., 
recognizing becoming as the expression of being and nothing.  This, then, is the root of 
Hegel’s radical anti-formalism, one which extends across the realms of logic, nature, and 
spirit, and which also entails that logical determinations should not be thought of as 
applying to the realms of nature and spirit.  Rather, logical determinations receive their 
expression and development in the determinations of nature and spirit, and to comprehend 
any of these determinations requires thinking them out of the earlier ones.   
      This mode of comprehension is the one that we will – in a very limited and 
incomplete manner – attempt to use in much of the rest of this dissertation.  Specifically, 
in Part II we will examine the themes of indifference, reciprocity, mechanism and life.  
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Then in Part III we will examine the themes of the understanding and reason by thinking 
them ‘out of’ those previous determinations.  Similarly, also in Part III we will attempt to 
think ordinary and philosophical language out of the determinations of the understanding 
and reason, focusing on how these two kinds of language go about defining words, using 
the copula, constructing sentences, and giving accounts.  Naturally, it is not actually 
possible to think the faculties of the understanding and reason ‘out of’ the logical 
determinations of mechanism and life, insofar as it involves skipping (among many other 
things) the entirety of a small book called the Philosophy of Nature.  Nonetheless, 
proceeding in this manner will provide the benefit of seeing the arc of a developmental 
expression of philosophical determinations.   
      In the pages above, we have had a glimpse into the nature of the self-movement of 
philosophy and its language, for we saw that the proposition about being and nothing is 
the source of its own contradiction, dissolution, and becoming.  But we have only 
scratched the surface of the nature of self-movement in general, and we have not given 
any consideration at all to its counterpart, the mechanism of externally-imposed 
movement.  In order to better comprehend these two, so as to better comprehend how 
they are expressed in the realms of thought and language, they deserve their own careful 
investigation.  So we will now give it to them.
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Part II. Mechanism and Life 
      In order to provide an account of philosophical language consistent with Hegel’s 
thought, it will be necessary to distinguish this language – the ‘language of reason’ – 
from ordinary language, the ‘language of the understanding.’  The primary way I will 
differentiate the two will be to focus on the different ways that they move.  As mentioned 
in this dissertation’s introduction, Hegel makes a distinction between “external, sensuous 
movement” and “internal, self-movement proper,”1 indicating that he views the familiar 
sense of ‘change in spatial location’ (i.e., locomotion) as only one of several kinds of 
movement.  While we will not be dealing with this ‘external’ kind of movement, the 
“internal self-movement proper” is the kind of movement that, as we will see, is involved 
in the operations of reason and its language.   
      There is a third kind of movement, then, which is involved in the operation of the 
understanding and its language.  Loosely speaking, this kind of movement occupies a sort 
of middle ground between the ‘external sensuous movement’ of locomotion and the 
‘internal self-movement’ involved in reason; for, the movement of the understanding is 
one whose origin of motion lies outside of itself (thus involving externality), yet which is 
a non-sensuous and non-spatial movement.  Because of its origin’s externality, the 
movement of the understanding resembles the movement of mechanism, and, as we will 
show, stands in contrast to the movement of reason, which is more akin to the movement 
of life.   
                                                 
1 SL 440. 
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      But what does it mean to say that thought is something that ‘moves’?  To start off, we 
can think of thought moving insofar as it changes from one topic to another.  For 
example, now I am thinking about needing to go buy milk, now I am thinking about what 
else I will buy at the grocery store, now I am thinking about buying various ingredients in 
order to make enchiladas, etc.  In addition to these sort of ‘associative’ movements, any 
act of inference would also be a movement of thought, one in which the various points 
which thought passes through would have a more direct logical connection.  
      As mentioned earlier, someone might object to this way of speaking about thought as 
‘moving’ by asserting that it is only metaphorical.  Hegel, however, claims that 
movement in the fullest and truest sense is in fact a movement of thought, specifically the 
self-movement of philosophical thought, i.e., of reason.  And insofar as philosophical 
thought only proceeds in and through philosophical language, this language is also 
characterized by this movement.  In Part III we will investigate both the language of the 
understanding and the philosophical language of reason; there, we will focus especially 
on how the relations between their elements – between their words, propositions, and 
combinations of propositions – result in these two languages moving and developing in 
very different ways: one of them moving in a manner contingent and externally-imposed, 
and the other moving in a manner necessary and immanently-arising.  To set the stage for 
this discussion, we will devote Part II to an examination of Hegel’s conceptions of 
mechanism and life. 
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      4. Two Kinds of Relations: Indifference and Reciprocity  
 
      An initial way to characterize the difference between mechanism and life is to say 
that the movement of mechanism has its origin in something other than it (i.e., external 
to), while the movement of life has its origin within life itself.  In the natural world, this 
difference would illustrated by a tractor being driven across a field, in contrast to a dog 
running across a field.  In order to comprehend the differences between mechanism and 
life, we must consider that which is determinative of their respective movements, viz., the 
relations present within each of them.  Put in the most schematic way: within mechanism, 
the relation is that of ‘whole and parts,’ which in turn possesses the relation of 
indifference; within life, the relation is that of ‘whole and moments,’ which in turn 
possesses the relation of reciprocity. 
      In Hegel’s discussion of the relation of whole and parts in the Encyclopaedia Logic, 
he states that the whole “consists of” the parts and that the parts are “what is 
independent.”2  On the next page he adds to this description and also links it up with 
mechanism by saying, “In its superficial form, this is just what the mechanical relation 
consists in: that the parts, as independent, stand over against each other and against the 
whole.”3  While the whole depends upon the parts, the parts are indifferent to each other 
and to the whole, having no need of them in order to be what they are.  For this reason, 
the relation of indifference is what is fundamental to the whole/part relation, and thus 
what is fundamental to the nature of mechanism.   
                                                 
2 EL §135.  
3 Ibid. §136, Remark, translation emended.  
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      As opposed to ‘whole and parts,’ the relation present within life is one which I will 
call ‘whole and moments.’  While Hegel himself does not use this phrase, it is a useful 
one in considering the relation present within the logical category of life.  Hegel 
sometimes illustrates this relation with examples of organic life in nature, where a 
‘moment’ is represented as a ‘limb’ or ‘organ.’  In a comment about the limitations of the 
whole/part relation, he says that “…the members and organs of a living body should not 
be considered merely as parts of it, for they are what they are only in their unity and are 
not indifferent to that unity at all.”4  Clearly Hegel is describing a relation that is 
qualitatively different from indifference, one in which the elements constituting the 
whole are not only dependent on each other but are just as dependent on the whole as it is 
on them.  As such, the relation standing at the root of the whole/moment relation is one of 
reciprocity.  In such a relation, the separation of the moments from each other and from 
the whole would bring about their passing away.  Hegel speaks of the violence of such a 
separation when he continues the aforementioned illustration about the living body:  
The members and organs become mere ‘parts’ only under the hands of an anatomist; but 
for that reason he is dealing with corpses rather than with living bodies. []…the external 
and mechanical relation of wholes and parts does not suffice for the cognition of organic 
life in its truth.5   
Being the corporeal version of a ‘moment,’ a bodily organ (say, the heart) is what it is 
only in its relation to the other organs and to the body as a whole.  When this relation is 
destroyed – e.g., by the body dying – the organ becomes a mere ‘part’ and is indifferent 
                                                 
4 Ibid. §135, Addition.   
5 Ibid., translation emended.  
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to that upon which it formerly depended (e.g., a dead heart is not fundamentally changed 
if it is removed from a dead body).  Thus a corpse – and all whole/part relations, whether 
in nature or not – consist of indifferent parts, while a living body – and all whole/moment 
relations, in nature or not – consist of moments which are reciprocally dependent on each 
other and on the whole.  With this basic difference between the indifference of 
mechanism and the reciprocity of life briefly sketched, we can now look more closely at 
the nature of indifference, since this relation will prove to be crucial not only for 
mechanism but also for the understanding, and for the language in which the latter 
operates.   
 
      a. Indifference: the Relation of Whole and Part     
 
      On the broadest of levels, we can begin by saying that indifference (Gleichgültigkeit) 
appears in a myriad of forms throughout nearly the entire course of the Science of Logic.  
In fact, the role that it plays in the Logic is so extensive that one of the most succinct 
ways of characterizing the text as a whole is to say that the Logic is the process of 
overcoming indifference.6  That is, as the text proceeds, it engages in a series of acts 
which overcome indifference in its various forms, acts which are progressively more and 
more successful.  To put this in terms of a topic examined in Chapter 2, we could say that 
as the Logic proceeds, what was initially in-itself is gradually and progressively posited, 
i.e., is no longer in-itself.  This process of overcoming the in-itself and indifference 
continues until the very end of the book, at which point indifference in the 
logical/ontological sphere is done away with entirely.  Characterizing this progressive 
                                                 
6 “The purpose of philosophy is…to banish indifference and to become cognizant of the necessity of things, 
so that the other is seen to confront its other.”  EL §119, Addition 1.   
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‘overcoming’ more specifically, but still very abstractly, we can say that indifference in 
its various forms is eliminated every time that which initially appeared to be indifferent 
ends up, through its own doing, not actually being so.   
      An example of this process, and one of the first major appearances of indifference in 
the Logic, can be found in the treatment of the ‘one and the many’ in the Doctrine of 
Being.  Here Hegel speaks of each of the many ones – e.g., the atomists’ atoms, or 
Leibniz’s monads7 – as being indifferent to all the other ones.  Yet, the many ones are so 
utterly indifferent to each other that even describing them as ‘indifferent to each other’ 
would be to go too far, insofar as this would be to say that they are in a relation to each 
other, even if this is simply the relation of indifference.  While the ones stand in a 
plurality, “…plurality appears not as an otherness, but as a determination completely 
external to the one….If plurality were a relation of the ones themselves to one another, 
then they would limit one another and would have, affirmatively within themselves, a 
being-for-other.”8  Thus, at this level – the level of, say, Lucretius’ atoms – entities are so 
indifferent to each other that to even call them such would be, in one’s characterization, 
to do away with the absoluteness of their indifference and externality, to abolish their ‘in-
itself’ character and to set up a ‘being-for-other’ relation.    
      However, there is nothing else to do but call them external to one another, and any 
attempt to give an account of one of them in a way that in no way involves the others 
ends in failure.  From this, it becomes clear that they are in fact in a relation of otherness 
to each other.  Thus in at least some way, the ones limit and define each other (e.g., ‘part 
                                                 
7 SL 166; SL 169.  
8 Ibid., 168, translation emended. 
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of what it is to be a one is to be among other ones which are external to it’), and they are 
therefore not fully external and indifferent to each other.  In short, what we learn is that to 
call any two logical determinations ‘completely indifferent’ to each other is to contradict 
oneself.9   
      To gain a fuller picture of the nature of indifference, we will now consider a few 
more of its manifestations in the Science of Logic.  We will do so only in an abbreviated 
way, with an eye to continue laying a foundation for grasping the whole/part relation 
which underlies mechanism, which in turn is the kind of movement determinative of the 
understanding and its language.   
      Indifference plays a particularly large role in Hegel’s account of quantity, as is 
evident from his initial definition of it: “…quantity is the determinateness which has 
become indifferent to being.”10  One instance of note is found in his account of number,11 
and another is found in his account of direct ratio.  Regarding the first, Hegel asserts that 
whereas a thing’s quality – its qualitative limit – makes that thing just the entity that it is, 
the quantitative limit of a thing, i.e., its magnitude, does not.  A thing and its magnitude 
stand in a relation of mutual indifference: the numbered is indifferent to the number that 
numbers it, and vice versa.  To use Hegel’s example, a field whose quality changes 
becomes something else, e.g., a meadow or a forest; but, if its quantity changes, it 
remains a field, simply a bigger or a smaller one.  From this example it is clear why 
                                                 
9 This echoes the opening moves of the Logic, where Sein, in being characterized as “pure indeterminacy,” 
is in this very act given a determinacy.  
10 SL 185.  
11 which he also at times calls ‘magnitude.’ 
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Hegel defines the determination of ‘magnitude’ as that which has “a permanent 
substratum of being [e.g., the field] which is indifferent to its determinateness.”12   
      A second instance of indifference within Hegel’s discussion of quantity is direct ratio; 
here, the indifference exists between numbers themselves, insofar as the ratio is 
indifferent to its various expressions.  For example, the ratio 1/2 (or its exponent, 2) can 
be expressed as 2/4, 4/8, 19/38, etc.  In each expression, the initial ratio (e.g., 1/2) is self-
standing, unchanging, and ‘in-itself.’  While any given expression of the ratio is not 
indifferent to the ratio, but rather depends upon it, the ratio is indifferent to and 
unaffected by its particular manner of being expressed.13  Thus, indifference can be seen 
as present here only on one side of the relation, but present nonetheless.   
      However, as we saw above with the ‘one and the many,’ the various forms of 
indifference present within quantity are gradually overcome, or rather, gradually 
overcome and undo their own selves.  Regarding the example of the field changing size, 
it turns out not actually to be the case that its quality of being a field is completely 
indifferent to its quantity; for, if a field were reduced to a 1 inch by 1 inch patch of grass, 
it would no longer be a field.  Clearly, there is a point at which the qualitative 
determination of a thing ceases to be indifferent (i.e., external) to its quantitative 
determination. That is, there is a point at which quality no longer stands over against 
quantity as self-subsistent and indifferent.  Such a transition takes place in section three 
of the Doctrine of Being, viz., in the section Hegel entitles ‘measure’: “Quantum is no 
longer an indifferent or external determination but as such is sublated and is quality, and 
                                                 
12 SL 186.   
13 cf. the idea of ‘static expression’ in Chapter 2, pg. 44. 
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is that by virtue of which something is what it is; this is the truth of quantum, to be 
measure.”14   As opposed to what we saw in the category of quantity, in the category of 
measure a change in quantity does lead to a change in quality.  In the example of the 
field, we saw such a disappearance of the indifference of quality to quantity, and we can 
see it even more plainly in Hegel’s example of water changing temperature.  The quality 
of water is often indifferent to its quantity of temperature, but when the temperature 
crosses either the freezing or the boiling point, this indifference is clearly eliminated 
insofar as the quality of the water itself changes.    
      Yet the pendulum swings back in the other direction, and indifference again rears its 
head when, at the end of the section on measure we find the category of ‘absolute 
indifference’ (absolut Indifferenz).  While indifference has been operative in (as an ‘in-
itself’) many previous categories – the one and the many, number, etc. – here it is finally 
thematized (posited and expressed) on its own terms, and in an absolute, i.e., unqualified 
form.  Hegel initially defines it as “the indifference which, through the negation of every 
determinateness of being, of quality, and of quantity, and…measure, mediates itself with 
itself to a simple unity.”15  What he means by this becomes clearer when he says, “Any 
determinateness it still possesses is only a condition [Zustand], i.e., a qualitative 
externality, which has the indifference as a substrate.”16  Here we see indifference in its 
purest form: it is that to which any determinateness whatsoever is wholly external, i.e., it 
is that which is undetermined and unaffected by anything other than its own self.  The 
                                                 
14 SL 323-24.  
15 SL 375, translation emended. 
16 Ibid., translation emended.  
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Science of Logic is an exposition in which the determinations of thought are often 
characterizations of their own selves,17 and here we observe a classic example of this: 
absolute indifference is what is absolutely indifferent to all else. 
      As Hegel points out, the fact that any and all determinateness is external to absolute 
indifference means that the latter is an “empty differentiation.”18  It is empty in the sense 
that, if we ask what its determinations are, if we ask what it is, the answer would simply 
be, ‘the negation of any determinateness, i.e., that which exists self-sufficiently apart 
from any specific determination.’  We can thus see that absolute indifference is a more 
complex version of the category of ‘being,’ the “pure indeterminateness and emptiness”19 
which opened up the Logic.  The difference between the two is that, while ‘being’ 
negates determinateness unqualifiedly and indeterminately, absolute indifference negates 
determinateness in a specific and determinate way, viz., by making it external to itself, in 
the way that accidents are external to a substrate.  This is important for several reasons.   
      First, absolute indifference shows itself to be self-refuting in the same way that being 
was: just as being turned out to not actually be pure indeterminacy, insofar as ‘pure 
indeterminacy’ is a determination, so absolute indifference turns out not to be the 
‘negation of any determinateness,’ insofar as this negation just is its determination, and 
not in fact external to it.20  And so, once again, the logical pendulum swings back away 
from indifference.  The second reason that absolute indifference’s echo of being is 
significant is that absolute indifference appears at the conclusion of the Doctrine of 
                                                 
17 this is just one of the many ways in which the Logic stands in the tradition of Plato’s Sophist, where, e.g., 
the category of ‘other’ is other to the same, and the category of ‘same’ is the same as itself.  
18 SL 375.  
19 Ibid., 82.  
20 However, this only becomes apparent in the Doctrine of Essence.   
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Being. That is, absolute indifference brings about the end of the Doctrine of Being, both 
in the sense of being its final determination and in the sense of being its completion.  The 
reason that absolute difference is the final determination of the Doctrine of Being is that, 
while it is a kind of repetition of the first determination (viz., being, as pure 
indeterminacy), it adds something which that first determination did not possess: a 
determinate negation of determinacy.  For this reason, absolute indifference marks the 
transition into the Doctrine of Essence, where we see that ‘essence’ is the substratum that 
is unaffected and independent from that which is external to it (traditionally speaking, its 
‘accidents,’ ‘properties,’ etc.).  That is, absolute indifference marks the coming into being 
of essence insofar as essence, in its initial form, is a determinate and complete 
indifference to something specific and determinate, viz., the unessential.   
      In our effort to comprehend the relation of whole and part that determines the 
mechanistic operations of the understanding, we have been investigating the nature of the 
indifference which underlies this relation.  We have also been observing how indifference 
tends to undo itself by revealing, on its own terms, that it is not indifferent to all others.  
This phenomenon gives us greater insight into why Hegel finds the formalistic approach 
to comprehension which we discussed in Part I to be so problematic.  Because this 
approach takes pre-set, pre-determined predicates from some table or schema and then 
applies them to the subject (e.g., animal, to human), it assumes that the predicates are 
indifferent to the subjects, in the sense that the former are not essentially changed or 
determined by their relation to the latter, but are merely joined to them in an external 
manner.  For Hegel, this is simply not a legitimate assumption to make, and the 
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problematic nature of this assumption is illustrated by the fact that the human’s 
‘animality’ is in fact not indifferent to its presence within the human, but is 
fundamentally changed by it.  As an example, we might think of how the so-called 
‘animal desires’ of humans can take forms that desires in lions or dogs or chickens could 
never take, e.g., the nature of the desire for food, viz., the near lack of desire, that an 
anorexic feels due to the influence of the advertising, fashion, and entertainment 
industries.   
      A final appearance of indifference in the Science of Logic which is significant for our 
purposes is found within the category of difference.  Despite its English etymology, 
indifference (Gleichgültigkeit or Indifferenz) is not the opposite of difference 
(Unterschied), yet the former can nonetheless be more clearly comprehended when 
considered against the backdrop of the latter.  In Hegel’s view, difference takes two 
forms, diversity (Verschiedenheit) and opposition (Gegensatz).  Put briefly, diversity is 
that kind of difference in which the differentiated elements do not depend on each other 
in order to be what they are.  For this reason, e.g., a giraffe and a lizard are not simply 
different but are also diverse, insofar as neither depends on the other to be what it is.  As 
Hegel says in his account of diversity, “what is differentiated subsists as the diverse over 
against the other indifferently, because it is identical with itself ….”21  In diversity we 
thus see independent self-subsistence – by now, a familiar marker of indifference – 
situated here in the context of identity and difference.  Thus, diversity is a kind of 
‘indifferent difference.’ While the wordplay only shows up in English (cf. the German 
                                                 
21 SL 418, my translation.    Diversity is that “in which each of the differentiated is for itself what it is, and 
is indifferent in its relation to the other, which thus is external to it.” EL §117, translation emended. 
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gleichgültig Unterschied), the coincidental implication is nonetheless apt: diversity is a 
difference that, for the things being differentiated, may as well not be a difference.  That 
is, when two entities are diverse, their difference from each other is irrelevant to the 
being of each.        
      Within the logical sphere, however, diversity and its particular kind of indifference 
refute themselves.  And because we are in the logical sphere, where determinations are 
often thought by means of their own selves, the diverse terms being dealt with here are 
identity and difference themselves.  As Hegel says, the reason that identify and difference 
are indifferent to each other and self-standing is that, for each of them, “identity 
constitutes its ground and element….”22  Yet, if difference is self-standing only insofar as 
it is self-identical, this means that it depends on identity, and thus is not self-standing.  
And it is not simply dependent on any old thing – it is dependent on identity.  The result 
is that difference does not actually stand in a relationship of indifferent difference (viz., 
diversity) to identity; rather, it stands in a relationship of dependent difference, and this is 
the second kind of difference: opposition (Gegensatz).  In opposition, the two that are 
different are what they are directly in terms of being different from each other.     
      We have seen once again, then, how a form of indifference – here, diversity – refutes 
its own self.  Indifference shows up in many further forms in the Science of Logic, as well 
as in the Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit, but our short discussion of it 
above is sufficient for our later purposes, viz., for seeing how it operates within thought 
and language.  We should now turn to the category that stands over against indifference, 
                                                 
22 SL 418. 
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that of reciprocity.  From the above treatment of indifference we have already seen 
inklings of reciprocity, e.g., as with the oppositional relation of identity and difference.  
So our discussion of the category of opposition provides a helpful entry point for an 
explicit treatment of reciprocity, i.e., of the kind of relation which underlies the 
whole/moment relation operative within the category of life. 
      b. Reciprocity: the Relation of Whole and Moment  
 
      In some of the forms of indifference above, both elements in the relation were 
indifferent to each other (e.g., the many ‘ones’).  In other instances, only one of the 
elements was indifferent to the other, with the other depending on the first (e.g., a ratio 
and its expression).  By contrast, it is also possible for two elements to be in a relation 
which we might call ‘two-way dependence.’  Just such a relation is what we saw in the 
category of opposition (Gegensatz), where each side of an opposition is constituted by 
being the other of what opposes it, and thus each is determined through the other (e.g., 
hot and cold, identity and difference, diversity and opposition themselves, etc.).  A 
reciprocal relation has some resemblance to the relation of opposition, but there is an 
important difference; in the former, the elements are not simply what they are through 
negating their opposite, but rather through each one explicitly being both the cause and 
the effect of the other.  As Hegel says of reciprocity in the Encyclopaedia Logic, “The 
determinations that are maintained firmly as distinct in reciprocity are…in themselves the 
same; the one side is the cause, original, active, passive, etc. just as the other is.”23  If we 
ask which side of the relation is the cause and which is the effect, the answer is ‘both,’ for 
                                                 
23 EL §155, translation emended.  
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each side is simultaneously the cause and the effect of the other.  Neither is ‘primary,’ for 
both are at the same causal level and each is dependent on the other.  This, in outline 
form, is the relation of reciprocity.   
       With this in mind, it is evident that whenever we saw indifference being in some way 
overcome in our discussions above, the relation of reciprocity was closer and closer to 
coming on the scene.24  For example, the many ones in ‘the one and the many’ were seen 
to be not in fact indifferent, but rather each determinative of the other.  The same can be 
said of identity and difference, which initially stood in a relationship of diversity but 
which then showed themselves to be mutually dependent (thereby bringing the 
determination ‘opposition’ into being).    
      We are thus now in a good position to make a closer investigation of reciprocity, and 
also of the relation of ‘whole and moment.’  In thinking these relations through, a helpful 
metaphor to use once again is that of a body and its heart, which, when separated by an 
anatomist, each become something other than they formerly were.  Looking to the Logic, 
we see that reciprocity comes onto the scene when causality has been thought through in 
its entirety.  To use the language discussed in Chapter 2, causality is expressed in 
reciprocity; that is, reciprocity is the truth and the expression of causality, insofar as it 
reveals what was implicit within causality.   For, Hegel’s claim is that if we look at 
causality closely enough, we will see it transform into reciprocity.  And this is what we 
do see, when we consider the nature of cause and effect.   
                                                 
24 that is, closer and closer to coming into being as an explicit, posited determination of thought.   
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      In Hegel’s words, cause and effect are “not only distinct, but are just as much 
identical too, and this is even registered in our ordinary consciousness, when we say that 
the cause is a cause only because it has an effect, and the effect is an effect only because 
it has a cause.”25  At first glance, the relation of dependence between cause and effect 
might seem to lie only on one side, with effect depending on cause, and cause being 
indifferent to and independent from effect.  Yet when we consider that a cause is a cause 
only insofar as it has an effect, we can see that cause turns out to be dependent on 
effect.26  Thus, each is dependent on the other.  This ‘seemingly one-way but actually 
two-way dependence’ is a familiar phenomenon for readers of Hegel, as seen, e.g., in the 
relation of ground and grounded (in the realm of logic), and in the relation of master and 
slave (in the realm of spirit).   
      With all this in mind, it is a bit easier to interpret Hegel’s more technical but also 
more revealing description of the reciprocal relation of cause and effect:  
The effect [Wirkung] is diverse from the cause; as such the effect is posited-being 
[Gesetzsein].27  But posited-being is equally reflection-into-self and immediacy, and the 
action [Wirken] of the cause, its positing [Setzen], is simultaneously presupposing 
[Voraussetzen], insofar as the diversity of the effect from the cause is held fast.28   
The reason why Hegel emphasizes that the effect is diverse from the cause is illuminated 
by considering the German words at play here: while a cause’s action (Wirken) is not 
                                                 
25 EL §153, Addition.  
26 Naturally, we are here simply talking about cause and effect qua cause and effect.  When dealing with, 
say, material things, such as a carpenter and a house, we could make the same reciprocal analysis of cause 
and effect, but we would need to be more specific.  For example, it would not be true to say that the house 
is both the effect and the cause of the human who is this carpenter, but it would be true to say that the house 
is both effect and the cause of the human qua carpenter of this house. 
27 see Chapter 2, fn. 42.  
28 EL §154, translation mine.  
104 
 
something distinct from it, a cause’s effect (Wirkung) is.  The cause posits the effect, and 
the effect is a “posited-being” insofar as it is something with its own distinct identity and 
“reflection-into-self,: something that is other than the cause.  But as soon as we recognize 
the effect as something other than the cause, standing over against it, we recognize that 
the cause’s causing (i.e., positing) of the effect entails that the cause is caused by (i.e., 
presupposes) the effect.   For, as we saw above, the cause is only able to be a cause when 
it has an effect.  If we were approaching these matters in the mode of ordinary 
consciousness, we would want to say merely that the cause posits (setzt) the effect, and 
that the effect presupposes (setzt voraus) the cause (i.e., posits the cause as logically in 
advance [im voraus] of it).  This is the usual, everyday idea of cause and effect.  
However, given that each of them is both the cause and effect of the other, this means 
that the cause not only posits but also presupposes the effect, and that the effect not only 
presupposes but also posits the cause.  This is why Hegel says in the quote above that the 
cause’s “positing [Setzen], is simultaneously presupposing [Voraussetzen]…”29  In light 
of this mutual acting and being acted upon, we can see why Hegel would say that 
“causality has passed over into the relationship of reciprocity [Wechselwirkung].”30  So 
long as the two sides are maintained as distinct, “the one side is the cause, original, 
active, passive, etc. just as the other is.”31  The relation of causality has passed away, and 
given way to reciprocity; that is, reciprocity is the expression of causality, insofar as 
reciprocity posits and makes explicit what was in-itself and implicit within causality.   
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., §154, translation emended.  
31 Ibid., §155, translation emended.  
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      The category of reciprocity allows us to clarify two points made back in Chapter 2.  
In the first part of that chapter, we spoke about ‘static’ expression as a kind of expression 
in which the expression depends on the expressed, but the expressed does not depend on 
the expression (e.g., telling someone your academic affiliation.)  We also spoke about 
‘developmental’ expression, where the expression depends on the expressed and the 
expressed depends on the expression, insofar as the expressed becomes fully what it is 
only through the expression (e.g., essence as the expression of being; clarifying a thought 
in your own mind by expressing it to a friend, etc.).  In light of what we have discussed 
so far in this chapter, it is clear that ‘developmental’ expression contains a reciprocal 
relation between what is expressed and its expression: each is the cause and the effect of 
the other.   
      A second, related point from Chapter 2 is also clarified through the lens of 
reciprocity.  When we spoke about the relation of ‘expression’ and ‘positing,’ it was not 
always clear just what this relation was.  For, one can say, ‘when A is expressed in B, A 
is posited’; but, it seems one can also say, ‘when A is expressed in B, B is posited.’  
Looking to an example of this will be helpful.  In reference to Book One and Book Two 
of the Logic, one might say, ‘when Being is expressed in Essence, Being is posited.’ This 
captures the synonymous nature of ‘expressed’ and ‘posited’ that we noted back in 
Chapter 2.  But one might also say, ‘when Being is expressed in Essence, Essence is 
posited.’  For given that Essence comes-into-being out of Being, it would seem that 
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Essence is ‘laid down,’ ‘set down,’ gesetzt.32   So, which of the two formulations is 
correct?  Both are.  In light of the category of reciprocity, we can see that there is no 
conflict between the two formulations: when Being is expressed in Essence, Being is 
posited and Essence is posited.  Being is posited by Essence insofar as Being becomes 
more fully what it implicitly was when it becomes Essence; Essence is posited by Being 
insofar as Essence is a development out of Being, i.e., insofar as thought had to think 
through Being in order to arrive at Essence.  Thus, Being and Essence each posit (setzen) 
and presuppose (voraussetzen) each other.33  So, to return to (and to rephrase) the larger 
point we are working with here: ‘when A is expressed in B, A and B are posited, because 
they are reciprocally related.’34  
      After this brief account of the relation of reciprocity, we are now in a better position 
to grasp what Hegel means by a ‘moment,’ and how it differs from a ‘part’ (the latter 
being characterized by indifference).  To do so, we will consider once more the transition 
from causality to reciprocity.  In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel describes causality as a 
“straight-line progression from causes to effects and effects to causes.”35  Placed within 
the largest context, such a progression would entail that everything that is could be traced 
from, or traced to, something like a First Cause.  With reciprocity, however, Hegel says 
                                                 
32 In Hegel’s initial (pre-reciprocal) description of cause and effect, he says that cause posits the effect (EL 
§154).  This makes it clear that relation of cause to effect is one of positing.  And since being in some sense 
is the ‘cause’ of essence, being in some sense posits essence.  
33 Back in Chapter 3 we noted Hegel’s claim in the Second Remark on Being that ‘external reflection’ – a 
determination in the Doctrine of Essence – is what discerns the difference implicit within the proposition 
‘being and nothing are one and the same.’  We also noted that this is a clear instance of Hegel’s claim that 
the Doctrine of Essence is the “background” of the Doctrine of Essence, working silently and behind the 
scenes all along.  This strange situation becomes slightly clearer now that we recognize that being and 
essence are in a reciprocal relation, each being both the cause and the effect of the other. 
34 Applying the same dynamic to another example, we can say that ‘when the Idea is expressed in Nature, 
both the Idea and Nature are posited, each positing and presupposing the other.’ 
35 EL §154, Addition, translation emended. 
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that this straight-line progression is “bent around and back upon itself.”36  Yet it would 
be a mistake to think that, within this ‘circle’ of causality, we should simply trace the 
relation of one cause to another cause; instead, Hegel says, “the development of this 
relation [of one cause to another], the reciprocity, is…itself the alteration of the 
distinguishing, now not of causes but of moments….”37  What Hegel is stating here is 
that, when we comprehend what is implicit within the relation of cause and effect (effects 
being themselves the cause of causes, etc.), we change the way that we go about 
distinguishing them: we set them over against each other no longer as causes, but as 
‘moments.’  And as we will see, while moments have a ‘closer’ relation to each other 
than causes, this does not mean that they morph into each other in an undifferentiated 
way.  They are still distinguished from one another, but now as something called 
‘moments.’   
      The above quote also illuminates a claim that Hegel makes on a much broader scale: 
that, contrary to the ‘straight-line’ model of causality with its self-standing First Cause, 
the logical sphere is not independent and self-standing over against the realms of nature 
and spirit. Rather, the three are moments of the whole: they posit and presuppose each 
other.  Uncovering some of the ways in which philosophical language not only 
presupposes but also posits all three of these realms will be one of our goals in Chapter 7. 
      Coming back down to the smaller scale, though, we need to discuss in more detail 
what a moment is.  A helpful way to start thinking about what Hegel means by this term 
is to compare it with an idea used by his ancient Greek counterpart.  In On the Soul, 
                                                 
36 Ibid., translation emended.  
37 Ibid., translation emended. 
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Aristotle speaks of parts that are “separable only in definition.”38  He invokes this same 
idea in the Nicomachean Ethics, when he asks if the rational and non-rational elements of 
the human soul are distinguished “as everything divisible into parts are,” or, instead, “are 
they two in definition [in logos], and inseparable by nature, as the convex and the 
concave are in a surface?”39  Aristotle is implicitly asserting here that something can be 
separable only in definition/speech, and inseparable by nature.  This idea is quite similar 
to Hegel’s idea of a ‘moment.’ Both are referring to that which we can isolate in the way 
that we speak about it, but which, if isolated ‘in reality,’ would cease to be the thing it 
is.40  By looking at the larger context of Aristotle’s quotes above, it seems that one of his 
reasons for calling attention to these two ways of separating things is a concern that, since 
we are able to separate certain things in speech, we might erroneously believe that these 
things can also be separated in reality and remain what they are.  Hegel shows a similar 
concern in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, when working out the relation of 
the true to the false: 
It is precisely for sake of pointing out the significance of the moment of complete 
otherness that their expressions [viz., the expressions ‘the false,’ and ‘the true’] must no 
longer be employed in the instances where their otherness has been sublated. []…the 
expression of the unity of subject and object, of the finite and infinite, of being and 
thought, etc., has a certain clumsiness in that ‘subject’ and ‘object,’ etc., mean what they 
                                                 
38 On the Soul, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, IA: The Peripatetic Press, 1981), 413b15. 
39 Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, 2nd edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999), 
1102a30-33. 
40 This statement will need to be refined when dealing with language more explicitly, i.e., when language 
itself is the ‘reality’ of which we are speaking.  
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are outside of their unity, and therefore in their unity, they are not meant in the way their 
expression states them….41 
If two entities enter into a relation of such a kind that it changes what the two entities are, 
there would clearly be a problem with using the same words to signify the two entities in 
the relation that were used to signify them when not in the relation.  Like Aristotle, Hegel 
recognizes that some relations are constitutive of their relata, and thus recognizes that our 
speaking and thinking about such relata should be done with this fact very much in mind. 
      To name the relata in such a ‘constitutive relation,’ the German language had a word 
readily available for Hegel’s usage: ‘das Moment.’  And as a language with gendered 
nouns, German has the means to clearly distinguish das Moment from the temporal sense 
of the word, ‘der Moment.’42  Naturally the English language has no such distinguishing 
resources, and the fact that English translations of Hegel use ‘moment’ for ‘das Moment’ 
has no doubt led untold numbers of readers into prolonged fits of despair.  Yet to be fair 
to the translators, it is difficult to know which single word in English would actually 
capture the meaning of das Moment.  Fortunately, though, a word whose meaning cannot 
be grasped through a single translated word can be grasped through multiple translated 
words.43  
      As a preface to looking at Hegel’s specific meaning of das Moment, it is useful to 
consider the Duden Wörterbuch’s entry for the word: “1. crucial or determining 
circumstance, aspect.   
                                                 
41 Phenomenology §39, translation emended. 
42 but, unfortunately, not in the dative case, or when paired with certain indefinite articles.   
43 Evidence for this is that a word can be defined by means of multiple words in the original language.  
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2. (Physics) product of two magnitudes, one of which is usually a force (e.g., force x 
lever).”44  While neither of these standard definitions constitutes Hegel’s meaning of the 
word, his direct reference to them clarifies the way in which they inform his own 
definition.  In the Remark on Aufheben in the Science of Logic, he states, “In the case of 
the lever, weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account 
of the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something real, 
such as a weight, and something ideal, such as a merely spatial determination, a line.”45  
In the lever, a mechanical moment (e.g., weight, which is ‘real’) combines with 
something else in contrast to it (e.g., distance, which is ‘ideal,’ and also a mechanical 
moment); yet despite this contrast, the two nonetheless have the same effect with respect 
to the ‘end product.’ The fact that each of the two contributes in an essential way to the 
result of their combination connects with the first Duden definition of ‘determining 
aspect’ (as opposed to, say, a non-determining, nonessential aspect); and, even though 
Hegel’s description of the moment in a lever is somewhat different from the second 
Duden definition,46 he is clearly drawing from the same set of terms.     
      Despite the irony of using a mechanical analogy to talk about what is (in a logical 
sense) utterly non-mechanical, Hegel’s own definition of a moment bears certain 
similarities to the description of the lever.  His most direct statement of his own definition 
in the Remark on Aufheben reads as follows: “Something is only sublated insofar as it 
enters into unity with its opposite [Entgegengesetzten]; in this more specific 
                                                 
44 1. ausschlaggebender Umstand, Gesichtspunkt  2. (Physik) Produkt aus zwei Größen, deren eine meist 
eine Kraft ist (z.B. Kraft × Hebelarm). 
45 SL 107, translation emended.  
46 That is, he speaks of it not as a product of two entities but as an entity which is united with another 
entity, thus resulting in a product. 
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determination as something reflected, it can be fittingly named a moment.”47   We can 
see, then, that a moment is a.) what enters into unity with its opposite, and b.) what is 
therefore sublated.  We can also infer from this that, in order to be a moment, something 
must have an opposite. 
      Furthermore, when a moment enters into unity with its opposite, there is a result.  
Thus, like the mechanical moment, a logical moment involves the unification of two 
contrasting entities resulting in a ‘product,’ a product to which each of the two entities 
essentially contributes.  And of course it is no accident that Hegel chooses to speak 
directly about what a moment is here in the Remark on Aufheben.  For, to comprehend 
what a moment is requires a consideration of the nature of Aufhebung, and vice versa.  
Back in Chapter 2 we spoke briefly of this topic in relation to ‘developmental 
expression’; for, both a moment and ‘developmental expression’ involve a movement 
from something being ‘in-itself’ to being ‘posited,’ a process of becoming in which a 
previous determination passes away as an isolated (an-sich) determination and a result 
comes into being. In light of what we have discussed thus far in this chapter, the nature of 
Aufhebung – particularly its two-sided nature – begins to become more transparent.  In 
terms of the two meanings that the word combines – “to cause to cease, to put an end to” 
and “to preserve, to maintain”48 – we can now see that the ‘ceasing’ dimension takes 
place because the determination as isolated and indifferent turns out not actually to be so, 
but rather is reciprocally related to something else (viz., to something entgegengesetzt).  
That is, what was initially an indifferent ‘part’ – what, on its own terms, was a self-
                                                 
47 SL 107.  
48 Ibid., 107.  “aufhören lassen” and “aufbewahren, erhalten.” 
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standing whole – becomes a moment.  Thus, qua self-standing, i.e., qua part, the 
determination is ‘caused to cease.’  However, because it nonetheless contributes to the 
larger whole of which it is a moment, it is not done away with completely, but rather in 
its contribution to this larger whole is ‘preserved and maintained.’  Thus the first 
dimension of Aufhebung occurs when an indifferent and self-standing part is revealed not 
to be so, i.e., is revealed to be a moment, and the second occurs when this part-turned-
moment continues to contribute to the being of the new, larger whole.     
      To gain a more nuanced grasp of this process, let us examine the section on 
Becoming in the Science of Logic.  The first part of this section is entitled “Unity of 
Being and Nothing,” with the second part entitled “Moments of Becoming.”  Simply 
from this progression of titles we can see Hegel attempting to address the concern he 
expressed in the Phenomenology’s Preface about speaking of moments as being in a 
‘unity,’ saying that “the expression of the unity of subject and object…has a certain 
clumsiness in that ‘subject’ and ‘object,’ etc., mean what they are outside of their unity, 
and therefore in their unity, they are not meant in the way their expression states 
them….”49  Looking to the text of the section “Moments of Becoming,” we see Hegel 
addressing this concern further, as he works through how to speak about moments in their 
relations without, through this very speech, portraying them as something other than what 
they are.  He states, “Becoming, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, is the unseparatedness 
of being and nothing; [it is] not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing, but 
rather as the unity of being and nothing it is this determinate unity, or that in which both 
                                                 
49 Phenomenology §39, translation emended.  
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being and nothing is.”50  If a unity could be abstracted away from its constitutive 
elements, this would mean that these elements could be properly thought apart from the 
unity, and thus would have the status of being ‘parts.’  The fact that this is not the case 
with being and nothing is indicated by Hegel when he says that being is (i.e., is what it is) 
and nothing is only in the unity.  Exercising particular care in choosing his words, he 
emphasizes this point by stating, “…insofar as being and nothing is each unseparated 
from its other, it is not.  Thus they are in this unity…”51  In isolation from each other – 
linguistically speaking, as ‘singular’ – being and nothing are not what they are, but rather 
are what they are only as united, i.e., as ‘plural.’ Hegel emphasizes this with his stressed 
use of the grammatical singular in reference to each of them – “it is not” – and with his 
stressed use of the plural – “they are in this unity.”   
      Picking back up on that sentence, Hegel finishes the paragraph by saying, “Thus they 
are in this unity, but as vanishing (Verschwindende), only as sublated (Aufgehobene).  
They sink from their initially imagined self-subsistence into moments, still differentiated 
but simultaneously sublated.”52  And then on the next page, “…becoming as such is only 
through their differentiation.”53  From these quotes we see the specific way in which the 
dual-sided nature of Aufhebung – a bringing-to-an-end and a preservation – is essentially 
intertwined with the dual-sided nature of what a moment is.  What it is to be a moment is 
to have been brought to an end as independent, insofar as it loses its former independence 
within a larger whole (as we see happen with both being and nothing, in becoming); yet, 
                                                 
50 SL 105.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid., 106, translation emended. 
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the other side of the nature of a moment is to be also preserved within that whole, insofar 
as the moment contributes a continuing differentiation in the whole.  Such a preserved 
differentiation is what we see in becoming, insofar as it has the determination of coming-
to-be (a movement from nothing to being) and ceasing-to-be (a movement from being to 
nothing).  One might be tempted to say that, when parts lose their self-subsistence within 
a unity, this unity is then an undifferentiated unity, a ‘pure one’; but, this is precisely is 
not the case due to moments, which are non-self-standing and yet maintain differentiation 
within the whole.  This is what Hegel means when he says that “what is sublated is 
simultaneously something preserved; it has lost its immediacy but is not for this reason 
annihilated.”54  A moment is what is sublated, and what is sublated is what joins with its 
opposite: what both determines and is determined through its opposite.  So, it has “lost its 
immediacy” due to mediating and being mediated by its opposite.  This reciprocal 
determination, however, does not reduce either of the moments to nothing.  Rather, the 
result of the two moments – i.e., what comes into being through their sublation – “has the 
determinateness out of which it originates still within itself,”55 namely, the 
determinateness of the two moments.  In light of this, we see Hegel addressing, at least 
partially, his concern about improperly naming being and nothing by using the same 
words to name them outside of their unity as in their unity.  In short, we no longer refer to 
them as ‘being’ and ‘nothing,’ we refer to the two together as ‘becoming.’ 
      To see a more concrete example of how an Aufhebung’s result – a whole with its 
moments – preserves its moments within itself, we can look to the manner in which 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 107.  
55 Ibid., my translation.  
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becoming itself becomes.  As mentioned several times above, the determinations in the 
Logic are involved in thinking the other determinations in the Logic.  This is so because, 
in this work, thought is thinking through the different possible determinations of its own 
self, i.e., is thinking through its own self.  Thought is an activity: things are happening 
within thought, and thought is thinking about them.56  Thus, thought does not import any 
of its various contents or its various forms from outside of itself (i.e., from outside of the 
Logic).  Rather, as Hegel mentions several times in the Science of Logic’s Introduction, 
the forms of thought are the content of thought.57  That is, the progression of the Logic is 
a continuous oscillation of some specific content of thought becoming some specific form 
of thought,58 and of some specific form becoming some specific content.59  For this 
reason, all of the various determinations of thought are thought by means of other 
determinations of thought.  This is, in part, what Hegel means when he says that in the 
logical sphere, the Idea is ‘within itself’ or ‘at home’ with itself, a point which becomes 
clearer when we contrast it with his claim that, in the sphere of nature, the Idea is 
‘outside itself.’60      
      A further dimension of logic’s ‘being within itself’ involves specific thought 
determinations being thought in terms of their own specific selves. To list a few 
                                                 
56 e.g., after the differentiation of the thought determination ‘identity’ and the thought determination 
‘diversity,’ thought recognizes that they are in a relation of opposition; in this recognition, thought is 
thinking ‘opposition,’ and the thought determination ‘opposition’ has therefore appeared.  Ibid., 424.  
57 Ibid., 43, 49-50. 
58 e.g., after ‘Dasein’ is thought through in Chapter One of “Quality”, ‘Fürsichsein’ is thought in terms of 
Dasein, in Chapter Two.  Ibid., 158.    
59 e.g., in the Doctrine of the Concept, the form of the Concept thinking itself becomes the content of it 
thinking itself, in the transition from ‘The Syllogism’ to ‘Mechanism’ (i.e., from the section “Subjectivity” 
into the section “Objectivity”). 
60 To illustrate this further, we can note that the self-reflexive, ‘within itself’ dynamic of the logical sphere 
exemplified in fn. 59 above simply does not occur in the natural sphere.  E.g., the determination ‘plant’ is 
not a form of thought which then becomes the content of thought in a later determination.  
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examples: ‘difference’ is that which is different from identity; ‘something’ (Etwas) is 
itself a something, a something which is contrasted over against an ‘other’; ‘other’ is that 
which is other than ‘something’61; and, at the culmination of the Logic, the Idea is 
thought through its own self.62  While this phenomenon takes place throughout the 
Science of Logic, it is not posited and accounted for until the Doctrine of the Concept, 
where one sees that, and how, the universal (via its differentiation in the particular) 
becomes the individual.  Nevertheless, it is a regular occurrence throughout the work that 
a determination is thought in terms of its own specific self. 
      Let us now relate this ‘self-reflexivity’ of the logical sphere to the issue of becoming, 
i.e., to the double determination of ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be.  First, we note that it 
was due to being and nothing ceasing to be the self-standing parts which they initially 
were that becoming itself came into being.  Furthermore, becoming not only comes into 
being; it also itself ceases to be, i.e., ceases to be what it is in its isolation.  This is what 
we observe in the third and final part of the section on Becoming, “Sublation of 
Becoming [Aufheben des Werdens].”  Here Hegel explains that, first of all, becoming 
“rests on the difference between” being and nothing (as we have already seen in some 
detail); yet, secondly, becoming is also “the vanishing of being in nothing and of nothing 
in being….”63  That is, when we fully grasp what being and nothing are as moments of 
becoming, we can no longer distinguish them as being and nothing.  “Their vanishing,” 
                                                 
61 SL 116-122. 
62 Ibid., 825.  To be precise, the Idea is not actually thought in terms of its own self (as is the case, e.g., with 
‘Etwas’); for, to speak of ‘the Idea of the Idea’ would be precisely to introduce the differentiation within the 
Idea that was overcome through the first two chapters of “The Idea,” viz., the chapters “Life” and “The Idea 
of Cognition.”  
63 SL 106.   
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says Hegel, “is therefore the vanishing of becoming or the vanishing of vanishing itself.  
Becoming is an unstable unrest which collapses into a restful result.”64  Thus, after 
becoming becomes by coming-into-being, it becomes again by vanishing, i.e., by ceasing-
to-be. (And the “restful result” here is, of course, Dasein, ‘determinate being.’65) 
      This conceptual self-reflexivity at work within becoming is captured nicely in the 
double genitive of the title that Hegel uses for the final section on becoming, “Sublation 
of Becoming.”  The objective genitive signifies that becoming is being sublated: 
becoming ceases to be self-standing, and becomes a moment within Dasein.  The 
subjective genitive signifies that becoming is enacting its sublation: the ceasing-to-be of 
becoming and the coming-to-be of Dasein are possible only as a result of the two sides of 
becoming itself, viz., ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be.  The fact that becoming both is 
sublated, and sublates, along with the fact that both becoming and Aufhebung are so 
similarly double-sided,66 reveals the intimacy of these two determinations.  For Hegel, 
Aufhebung is the inner activity of becoming, its beating heart.   
      Yet in all of this, we still have not fully addressed what becomes of the moments of 
becoming.  First, as we have already seen, being and nothing as isolated ceased to be, and 
yet were preserved within becoming as its two moments, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.  
Second, in the sublation of becoming, being and nothing as those two specific moments 
also cease to be.  Hegel describes this process in detail in the Remark on Aufhebung, and 
also speaks directly to the issue of the changing meaning of being and nothing:  
                                                 
64 Ibid., my translation.  
65 This is a premonition of what will occur in the Doctrine of Essence, when contradiction – which turns out 
to be the means by which all Aufhebung and all becoming have been taking place – collapses into ground.   
66 in becoming, ‘ceasing-to-be’ and ‘coming-to-be’; in Aufhebung, ‘caused to cease’ and ‘preserved within 
a new result.’  
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The more precise meaning and expression which being and nothing receive, now that 
they are moments, is to emerge in the observation of determinate being, in which they 
are preserved.  Being is being and nothing is nothing only in their differentiation from 
each other; but in their truth, in their unity, they have vanished as these determinations 
and are now something other.67   
Clearly, the phrase “in their differentiation from each other” is referring to the two as 
moments of becoming.  But, now that becoming has been sublated, they have vanished 
even as those two moments.  Resuming the above quote, Hegel sums up this two-step 
process one more time, ending the Remark on Aufhebung and the entire chapter on being 
by stating the following: 
Being and nothing are the same, but just because they are the same they are no longer 
being and nothing and have a different determination; in becoming they were coming-
to-be and ceasing-to-be; in determinate being, as a differently determined unity, they 
are again differently determined moments.  This unity now remains their foundation, 
out of which they no longer proceed in the abstract meaning of being and nothing.68  
After having become coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, being and nothing – as both 
essentially altered and yet preserved – are again essentially altered and yet preserved in 
Dasein (‘determinate being’).  In the new unity of Dasein, “they are again differently 
determined moments” (which, we later learn, are the moments of ‘something’ and 
‘other’). 
      Throughout the entire Science of Logic we continue to see the effects of being and 
nothing as, in the form of different moments in new unities, they continue to shape 
                                                 
67 SL 107-8, translation emended. 
68 Ibid., 108, translation emended.  
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thought’s determinations.  And of course the same can be said for these later moments as 
well, such as ‘something’ and ‘other,’ which are also brought to an end and yet whose 
influence continues to be present, insofar as their ceasing-to-be contributes to the specific 
nature of the result that come-to-be.  When a new immediate determination – e.g., 
finitude – comes into being and then comes face to face with its opposite – e.g., bad 
infinity – it turns out not to be immediate, not to be indifferently self-standing, but rather 
to be a moment of its opposite, and vice versa.  Staying with this particular example, we 
can note that Hegel’s description of finitude and bad infinity equally applies to every 
moment and its opposite: “Therefore in each lies the determinateness of the other…”69  
To reference another example, we see this description of the reciprocity of moments in 
the two moments of difference, diversity and opposition: “they are sides of difference, 
one determined only through the other, and therefore only moments…”70  And finally, to 
take an example from the Doctrine of the Concept:  
…the moments of the Concept cannot be separated; the determinations of reflection are 
supposed to be grasped and to be valid each for itself, separated from the one opposed to 
it; but since in the Concept their identity is posited, each of its moments can only be 
grasped immediately out of and with the others.71 
Thus, in thinking through the Concept, one is thinking through the determinations of 
reflection (from back in the Doctrine of Essence) now as moments and in their genuine 
unity.    
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70 Ibid., 431, my translation.  
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      With this, our investigation of Hegel’s view of a ‘moment’ is adequate for the tasks 
ahead. In this chapter thus far, we have been investigating two pairs: indifference and 
reciprocity, and ‘part’ and ‘moment.’  To close out this section, it seems appropriate to 
note what kind of relations exists within these pairs themselves, i.e., to note the relation 
between indifference and reciprocity, and between ‘part’ and ‘moment.’  It is not difficult 
to see that the relation in both pairs is one of reciprocity, such that, within each pair, each 
side is a moment.  To spell this out in self-reflexive terms: 1.) indifference is not 
indifferent to the ‘indifference-reciprocity’ relation; 2.) reciprocity is reciprocally 
involved in the ‘indifference-reciprocity’ relation; 3.) ‘part’ is a not a part (but rather a 
moment) of the ‘part-moment’ relation; 4.) ‘moment’ is itself a moment of the ‘part-
moment’ relation.   Given that ‘part’ and ‘indifference’ are posited (i.e., explicitly 
expressed) earlier in the Logic than ‘moment’ and ‘reciprocity’ are,72 what these four 
self-reflexive descriptions illustrate more broadly is something we have spoken of several 
times in the pages above: that the progression of the Logic is the decreasing of 
indifference and the increasing of reciprocity, and that the work as a whole enacts the 
overcoming of indifference.  Said otherwise, the work as a whole involves indifference 
undoing its own self, for it is its own negation.  This can be seen now even more clearly, 
given that indifference turns out to be not even indifferent to reciprocity.  
~ 
                                                 
72 Because the account given of a moment very early on in the Logic is located in the Remark on 
Aufhebung, not in the body of the exposition, it is an account given with the advantage of having already 
gone through the Logic, and thus is not genuinely comprehensible in terms of the exposition leading up to 
this Remark.  For example, he refers to a moment as “something reflected [ein Reflektiertes],” and the issue 
of reflection does not arise until the Doctrine of Essence.  It is thus not a surprise that the category of a 
‘moment’ does not receive a systematic exposition until the section on Reciprocity, toward the end of the 
Doctrine of Essence.   
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      We are now a step closer to the task of looking at Hegel’s view of the languages of 
the understanding and of reason, and, specifically, at the way in which they move.  As 
another orienting step before doing so, we will now look at the kinds of movement 
present within mechanism and life.  In the context of our discussion of indifference and 
reciprocity, the movements of mechanism and of life – one whose origin lies outside of 
itself, and one whose origin lies within itself – can be better comprehended. 
 
5. Two Resulting Kinds of Movement: Mechanism and Life  
     a. Mechanism: Externally-Imposed Movement 
 
      In an Addition to the section on mechanism in the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel says 
that, although he draws the word ‘mechanism’ from the realm of nature, he is re-
appropriating the word for the realm of logic to describe what is solely a logical 
determination.73  What then does he mean by ‘mechanism’ in the logical sphere?  One 
part of what he means is related to a topic we have discussed above, viz., causality.   
     Above we saw how, in the initial causal relation, cause and effect are distinct entities 
(as Hegel calls, them, “substances”), with the effect being dependent on the cause for its 
being but not vice versa.  This relation of causality is one that Hegel associates closely 
with ‘mechanism.’  In his account of reciprocity – viz., the determination which causality 
becomes – he makes a specific note of how the reciprocal relation is not present in 
mechanism, because mechanism involves a relation that is still merely causal.  
Specifically, this causal relation of distinct entities is one that is finite, and external: 
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In finite causality it is substances that are actively related to each other.  Mechanism 
consists in this externality of causality, that the reflection of the cause in its effect in itself 
is at the same time a repelling being, or that, in the identity which the causal substance 
has in its effect with itself, it [the causal substance] equally remains something 
immediately external, and the effect has passed over into another substance.74  
For Hegel, what is finite is what has an other; as he puts it, “…a finite being is one that 
relates to an other.”75  Thus, because cause and effect stand over against each other as 
separate substances – repelling and external to each other – the relation of causality is 
‘finite.’  This finitude of the causal relation involves an externality of causality simply 
due to the fact that the cause, as a substance separate from the substance of the effect, is 
external to the effect.  More specifically, the action (Wirken) that the cause has on the 
effect (Wirkung) is given by the cause to something external to it and, likewise, is 
received by the effect from something external to it.  This dynamic – the externality of 
causality – is what Hegel is associating here with mechanism.     
     He continues the above quote by saying, “Now in reciprocity this mechanism is 
sublated; for, it contains first the vanishing of that original persistence of the immediate 
substantiality….”76  This, of course, is what we saw in our discussions above: initially, 
the cause seems to be self-standing and indifferent to the effect, and it is an ‘immediate’ 
substance insofar as its being is not mediated by its relation to the effect (to which it is 
indifferent).  However, the cause’s immediacy and indifference vanish when we realize 
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that its being is mediated by the effect, that it is only able to be a cause insofar as it has 
an effect.  This vanishing, he says, is the sublation of mechanism. 
      While Hegel makes these brief comments about mechanism here in the section on 
reciprocity, he does not give anything like a full account of it until the beginning of 
Section Two of the Doctrine of the Concept, “Objectivity.”  Because of the great 
complexity of the section on mechanism, to even summarize it in an intelligible way 
would require an extensive discussion of Section One, “Subjectivity,” which consists of 
the enormously complex chapters on the concept, the judgment, and the syllogism.  Thus, 
in what follows, we will only examine a few points about mechanism, ones that are 
relevant for the larger purposes of this dissertation.  As a brief background for that brief 
treatment, we should first say a few words about the “Subjectivity” section of the 
Doctrine of the Concept. 
      Speaking at the broadest level, the “Subjectivity” section deals with the subjective or 
formal side of the concept’s thinking of its own self.77  This formal dimension can be 
seen by looking at the basic outline of the section as a whole: the chapter on “The 
Concept” consists of the universal, the particular, and individual; the chapter on “The 
Judgment” consists of various kinds of judgments, i.e., various ways of combining (by 
means of the copula) the universal, the particular, and individual; and, the chapter on 
“The Syllogism” consists of various syllogisms, i.e., various ways of combining the 
various kinds of judgments.  The very last form of the syllogism, the “Disjunctive 
Syllogism,” marks the end of the “Subjectivity” section.  With this final syllogism, all 
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possible form determinations of the concept are accounted for.  Or, better put, this final 
syllogism contains all possible form determinations of the concept, as its moments.  In 
Hegel’s words, it is the “totality of form determinations.”78  He goes on to say that, in 
light of the coming-to-be of this totality, “the formalism of the syllogistic process, and 
with it the subjectivity of the syllogism and of the concept in general, has sublated 
itself.”79  The consummation of the syllogism, therefore, marks the transition to 
“Objectivity,” for the unified totality of the form of the concept thinking itself passes over 
into – itself becomes – the content of the Concept thinking itself.   
      As is always the case in sublation, the sublation of the syllogism and thus of the 
whole “Subjectivity” section leads to a result, a result which is characterized by 
immediacy (insofar as it does not have anything standing over against, through which it 
could be mediated).  Hegel says, “As objectivity is the totality of the concept returned 
into its unity, something immediate [ein Unmittelbares] is thereby posited that is in and 
for itself….”80  This immediate result, constituting the first determination of the 
“Objectivity” section, is mechanism.  And, in Hegel’s first in-depth description of 
mechanism in the Science of Logic, it starts to become clear why, as mentioned above, he 
has plucked this particular word from the realm of nature and redefined it for the realm of 
logic.  In the introduction to the mechanism section, he says, “what are differentiated [die 
Unterschiedenen] are complete and self-subsistent objects which consequently, even in 
their relation, comport themselves to each other only as self-subsistent things and remain 
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external to one another in every combination.”81  Once again, then, we see that the 
elements within mechanism do not depend on each for their being, but rather in their 
mutual externality are self-standing.  Still in this introductory section, Hegel goes on to 
speak, not of the relations between the various self-subsistent entities, but of the relation 
of these entities to the totality:  
This is what constitutes the character of mechanism, namely, that whatever relation 
occurs between the things combined [den Verbundenen], this relation is one extraneous to 
them that does not concern their nature at all, and even if it is accompanied by a 
semblance of a one [Schein eines Eins], it remains nothing more than composition 
[Zusammensetzung], mixture, heap [Haufen], etc.82  
The self-subsistent entities are external to each other, and also external to the relation of 
the whole.   Despite the fact that their ‘gathered-together-ness’ might suggest otherwise, 
this whole – this ‘totality,’ as he has called it earlier – is not actually a ‘one.’  Rather, it is 
a Zusammensetzung – literally a ‘setting together’ – and a Haufen, which might also be 
translated as a ‘cluster.’  In the Encylopedia Logic he refers to this kind of whole as an 
“Aggregat,” saying that “its activity [Wirksamkeit] upon another remains an external 
relation.”83  Thus mechanism lacks an actual ‘oneness,’ and, furthermore, any effect it 
has on another will be inessential to that other.  Furthermore, this lack of oneness 
strongly implies that mechanism’s own principle of organization is just as extraneous to it 
as it is to both its own elements, and its effects.  
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      This is in fact just what we find Hegel describing in part one of the section on 
mechanism, entitled “The Mechanical Object.”  Here, he says that the object “…points 
through its own self outside and beyond itself to other objects for its determination; but to 
these others it is in the same manner indifferent…. Consequently, a principle of self-
determination is nowhere to be found…”84  The relation of indifference between the 
elements and the whole of a mechanism entails that the whole ‘points’ beyond itself to 
others for the cause of its organization and determination.  To explain why it is also 
indifferent to these ‘others’ would require a much longer discussion of mechanism than 
we have space for here (including Hegel’s comparison of the mechanical object to the 
Leibnizian monad); what is important for our purposes is to note that mechanism lacks a 
principle self-determination.  That is, it is not the source of its specific structure and 
organization.  Like a ‘heap’ – say, a heap of sand – the principle of its determination is 
external to it, i.e., other than it.    
      While the way that mechanism appears in the realms of nature and spirit is not the 
same as its logical determination, in his Remarks on the latter Hegel provides some 
helpful examples of mechanism from nature and spirit:  
Just as pressure and impact are mechanical relationships, so we [can] know mechanically 
as well, by rote, inasmuch as the words remain without meaning for us and external to 
sense, representation, and thought; the words are in like manner external to themselves: 
they form a meaningless sequence.85 
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Mechanical memory, which marks the transition from language to thought in the 
Philosophy of Spirit, consists of words being recited which are indifferent both to the 
speaker and to each other.  If one is singing a song in a foreign language, or reciting by 
rote a poem one has memorized (i.e., without any consideration for the actual meanings 
of the words), the relation of the words to each other and to the person is an external one.  
Additionally, the act of putting the words together in these instances does not contain its 
own principle of determination, as it would if the speaker were forming the words on the 
basis of her comprehension of their meanings.  Instead, its principle of determination lies 
in something other than itself, viz., in the reproduction of the relations of mere sounds.    
      Hegel provides a further example of a mechanical relation in the realm of spirit when 
he speaks about ‘piety’ – what Kant would refer to as heteronomy.  Piety, Hegel says, is a 
mechanical action “inasmuch as what a person does is determined for him by ceremonial 
laws, or by a director of conscience, etc., and his own spirit and will are not in his 
actions, so that they are external even to himself.”86  In this example, the action is 
mechanical insofar as it is external to the actual personhood – the spirit and the will – of 
the actor, with their particular movements originating instead from a source outside of 
themselves and outside of the actor.  The externality of the source of determination is 
what is crucial; it is, as we saw above with logical mechanism, what makes mechanism a 
mere Zusammensetzung, a Haufen, a heap.  And mechanism’s lack of self-determination 
is what stands most in contrast with the logical determination Hegel calls “life.” 
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      b. Life: Immanently-Arising Movement  
 
      Earlier in this chapter we made reference to the first two sections of the Doctrine of 
the Concept: “Subjectivity” (the formal side of the Idea thinking its own self: the concept, 
the judgment, the syllogism), and “Objectivity” (the content side: mechanism, chemism, 
teleology).  The third section, called “The Idea,” consists of the determinations “Life,” 
“The Idea of Cognition,” and “The Absolute Idea.”  Life, then, is the first determination 
of the Idea, and as such, it is the result of the sublation of the sections on “Subjectivity” 
and “Objectivity.”  That is, the first two sections of the Doctrine of the Concept cease-to-
be, and what comes-to-be – i.e., the result – is the determination Hegel calls life.  Life 
therefore contains the “Subjectivity” and “Objectivity” sections as its moments, and, as 
the first determination of “The Idea,” life is the immediate Idea.  To start to fill out this 
very abstract initial description of life, let us turn to an analogy with nature that Hegel 
himself uses.  
      Near the beginning of the Logic’s chapter on life, Hegel differentiates the logical 
determination of life from life as it is found in nature and as it is found in spirit.87  Given 
the subject matter of the Science of Logic – the Idea thinking itself88 – it is no surprise 
that Hegel does not see the logical determination of life as referring to or describing life 
in the natural or the spiritual realms.  Nonetheless, he sees a certain similarity between 
the three, and in the Logic he focuses specifically on the similarity between logical and 
natural life.  He says, “In nature, life appears as the highest stage, a stage that nature’s 
externality attains by withdrawing into itself and sublating itself in subjectivity.  In logic 
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it is simple being-within-itself [Insichsein], which in the Idea has attained an externality 
that genuinely corresponds to it….”89  Hegel is stating here that both natural life and 
logical life come-to-be when what is ‘inner’ and what is ‘outer’ attain a genuine unity.  In 
the Philosophy of Nature, this is first seen in the determination ‘plant,’ with the ‘inner’ 
being ‘the organic’ and the ‘outer’ being ‘the organism.’  In Hegel’s words, 
“…subjectivity, according to which the organic is as singular, develops itself in an 
objective organism….”90  In the Science of Logic, an analogous process brings about the 
logical determination of life; as we saw in the quote above, ‘simple being-within-itself’ 
attains an externality appropriate to it.  Thus, Hegel uses the word ‘life’ to designate the 
Idea in its immediacy because, like natural life, logical life is a reciprocal relation of its 
mutually constitutive moments.  Additionally, both kinds of life involve the realization of 
subjectivity (in logic: the concept; in nature: the organic) within objectivity (in logic: 
externality; in nature: the organism).   
      Hegel further describes this process within the logical sphere by saying, “…the 
concept that earlier appeared on the scene as a subjective concept is the soul of life itself; 
it is the urge that mediates for itself its reality throughout objectivity.”91  This “subjective 
concept” which is the “soul” of life is the Doctrine of the Concept’s section on 
“Subjectivity,” which, he says, “mediates for itself its reality” through the section called 
“Objectivity.”  That is, the subjective (formal) concept, which resulted in objectivity (as 
we saw in the discussion of mechanism), now comes into an immediate unity with 
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objectivity (i.e., the content of the concept).  The result is the Idea in its immediacy, i.e., 
life, and this is why Hegel calls the Idea “the objective or real concept.”92  
      But what does Hegel mean when he speaks of the subjective concept as being the 
“soul” of life?  As with the term ‘life’ itself, with the word ‘soul’ Hegel is taking a word 
that is more familiar in other contexts and reappropriating it for a logical one.  In the 
Encyclopaedia Logic he does the same thing with ‘body’ as well, “The concept is 
realized as soul, in a body.”93  He goes on to describe the way in which the concept is 
realized in objectivity, claiming that each of them is what it is through the other.  
Speaking of this unification, he says that “the body expresses no differences within itself 
other than the determinations of the concept.”94  He picks this theme up again when he 
says that “all of the body’s members are mutually both means and purposes for each 
other…and…life, while it is the initial particularizing of the members, becomes its own 
result….”95  Clearly, ‘body’ and ‘soul’ – by which he here means ‘objectivity’ and ‘the 
subjective concept’ – are moments within life, standing in a reciprocal relation (as 
opposed to the indifference of mechanism and its parts).   
      In an initially confusing move, Hegel compares the relation between the soul 
(subjective concept) and the body (objectivity) of logical life not to the relation between 
soul and physical body, but to the relation between the members of the physical body.  
Perhaps he does this because an audience in a largely Christian culture might assume that 
the relation of a physical body to its human soul is one of indifference (on the side of the 
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soul, at least).  Whatever the case, the analogy is largely the same one we examined at the 
beginning of this chapter, where Hegel speaks of the difference between studying a 
corpse and a living body.  There we saw him claim that the dissection of the physical 
body turns its members and organs into “mere parts,” and that “the external and 
mechanical relation of wholes and parts does not suffice for the cognition of organic life 
in its truth.”96  In the section on life in the Encyclopaedia Logic, he again takes up the 
analogy of the physical body to shed light on life in its logical determination, speaking of 
how a moment of what is living is reduced to a part when separated from the whole: “The 
single members of the body are what they are only through their unity and in relation to 
it.  So, for instance, a hand that has been hewn from the body is a hand in name only, but 
not in actual fact, as Aristotle has already remarked.”97   
      As we will see in our treatment in Part III of the faculty of the understanding, the 
attempt to comprehend what is living by (mentally) separating it into parts guarantees 
that we will comprehend neither the members of the whole nor the whole itself.  Hegel 
continues the quote above about the severed hand by saying, “From the standpoint of the 
understanding, life is usually considered to be a mystery, and in general as 
incomprehensible.  But here the understanding only confesses its finitude and nullity.  In 
fact, life is so far from being something incomprehensible [ein Unbegreifliches] that, in 
fact, we have in life the concept [der Begriff] itself before us, i.e., the immediate Idea as 
the existing concept.”98  The finitude of the understanding (i.e., its having an other) leads 
                                                 
96 Ibid., §135 Addition, translation emended.  
97 EL §216, Addition.  
98 Ibid., translation emended.  
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it to attempt to comprehend things in terms of causality (i.e., causes and effects as 
separate from each other) and in terms of mechanism.  Understandably, the understanding 
is thus unable to comprehend the reciprocal relations characterizing life (whether in 
nature or in logic), viewing it instead as a mystery.    
      In his discussions of the non-mechanical nature of life, Hegel further specifies the 
difference between the two by contrasting mechanism’s relation to its concept with life’s 
relation to its concept.  In this very fertile passage he asserts that, with regard to the 
objective moment within life,  
the earlier determinations of the object – the mechanical or chemical relation, and still 
less the abstract relations of reflection of whole and part, etc. – do not pertain.  As 
externality, it is indeed capable of such relations, but to that extent it is not a living being; 
when the living thing is regarded as a whole consisting of parts, or as a thing operated on 
by mechanical or chemical causes, as a mechanical or chemical product…then the 
concept is regarded as external to it and it is treated as a dead thing.  Since the concept is 
immanent in it, the purposiveness of the living being is to be grasped as inner….99  
The objectivity present in life was formerly characterized by mechanism (as we saw in 
the section “Objectivity”), and thus at that point it was something dead.  That is to say, 
the concept was external to it – an important characteristic of mechanism that we are now 
able to see better in hindsight.  Additionally, we can now give a more specific description 
of the process which we described above as the ‘subjective concept uniting with 
                                                 
99 SL 766, translation emended.  
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objectivity’: this process involves the concept – as formerly external to100 objectivity – 
becoming immanent within it.   
      But we need to say more about this objectivity in which the concept becomes 
immanent.  For it is through the specific character of its objectivity – i.e., of its 
‘externality’ – that Hegel distinguishes logical life most clearly from life as found in 
nature.  Speaking of natural life, he says that it “possesses a determinateness of its 
externality...through its presuppositions which are other formations of nature….”101  
Then, speaking of logical life, he says, “The idea of life for itself is free from this 
presupposed and conditioning objectivity….”102   So, with life in nature, the externality 
within which a concept becomes immanent is one which already had a certain 
determination before this unison.  For example, the material which becomes the stalk and 
leaves of a plant is material which already had a chemical determination (e.g., as 
nitrogen, oxygen, etc.).  Of course, since a plant is a living thing with members and not 
parts, the determinateness that a plant receives from other elements of nature (e.g., the 
nitrogen from the soil) is changed by its relation to the ‘subjectivity’ immanent in the 
plant.  But the fact remains that the plant has received something pre-formed and pre-
given from outside itself, something which did not originate in its own self, and which it 
thus presupposes.  With logical life, by contrast, its subjectivity has generated its 
objectivity, a point which we saw above in our treatment of mechanism.  The result is 
that logical life does not presuppose its objectivity, in the sense of receiving it from an 
                                                 
100 i.e., other than it. 
101 SL 763.  
102 Ibid. 
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external source.  The objectivity (body) of logical life is more appropriate to, and more at 
one with, its subjectivity than any given body and soul in nature can possibly be.  For, 
logical life is not conditioned by anything other than and external to itself; rather, it is a 
self-standing unity whose moments are wholly appropriate to each other because one has 
sprung out of the other.103   
      Above we mentioned that, for the logical category of life, Hegel borrowed the word 
‘life’ from the realm of nature.  However, the difference between natural and logical life 
described in the previous paragraph leads us now to a surprising conclusion.  As we saw, 
the unity of body and soul which the word ‘life’ signifies in nature is fulfilled to an even 
greater degree in logical life.  For, unlike natural life, the objectivity of logical life has 
originated directly out of its subjectivity, making their unity in logical life a more perfect 
one than could ever exist in nature.  We can thus now see that, while the word ‘life’ is 
drawn from natural life, it turns out to be more fitting to logical life.  Said otherwise, 
logical life is more properly life than natural life.    
 
        i. Contradiction, Movement, Self-Movement   
 
      Having sketched out the logical determination of life, we are now in a position to talk 
in more detail about three aspects of this determination which will be most relevant for 
our treatment of philosophical language.  These dimensions are the interconnected 
themes of contradiction, movement, and self-movement.  To relate them in an initial and 
schematic way: contradiction is what drives all movement, and contradiction itself turns 
out to be logical self-movement.  
                                                 
103 This is a good illustration of the fact that the realm of logic – unlike that of nature or spirit – is ‘within 
itself.’  
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      Before fleshing this formulation out, a bit of review is in order.  As we saw briefly in 
our introduction, Hegel frequently describes logic as living and as self-moving.  Speaking 
of logical determinations in general, he says that “their self-movement is their spiritual 
life, and is that through which philosophy constitutes itself and of which it is the 
exposition.”104  Conversely, he describes traditional, formal logic as being “a disordered 
heap of dead bones.”105  Logic in the past, he says, has generally been formalistic and full 
of “empty, dead forms of thought,”106 thus making his own description of logic as living 
seem rather counterintuitive.  The forms of thought (i.e., ‘categories’) in formal logics are 
“empty” insofar as they do not inherently contain content, but rather are applied to things 
and thereby ‘filled’ with content.  That is, they are applied to content to which they are 
external and indifferent.  Additionally, the categories of formal logics are indifferent to 
each other; in Hegel’s words, they “are accepted in their unmoved fixity and are brought 
only into an external relation with each other.”107   Because the ‘soul’ and the ‘body’ of 
formal logics are not reciprocally constitutive – both at the level of the forms themselves, 
and in the application of the forms to external content – the result of such logics is a 
‘thinking’ that is mechanistic and dead.  By contrast, we have seen that logic in Hegel’s 
sense of the word is living insofar as its forms are thought in terms of each other, making 
it both its own form and its own content.  In his words,  
What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists 
independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it….on the contrary, the 
                                                 
104 SL 28.  
105 Ibid., 31.  
106 Ibid., 761.  
107 Ibid., 52. 
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necessary forms and self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth 
itself.108   
Because the content of logic is its own forms, logic has a soul and a body which – as 
moments – reciprocally determine one another such that the result is something living.   
      Despite the fact that life only receives a full account – i.e., is only fully posited – 
toward the end of the logic, it has been present as a not-yet-posited ‘in-itself’ from the 
beginning.  Of course, every determination in the Logic (aside from ‘being’) is present 
from the beginning as a not-yet-posited in-itself.  But it is helpful to note how this is the 
case with life in particular: the reciprocal determination of form and content has been 
occurring from the beginning, playing itself out in the regular alternation of certain 
content giving rise to certain forms and those same forms giving rise to other content.  
This process of ‘X giving rise to Y’ involves what we described in Chapter 2 as “X being 
expressed in Y,” and what we described in the discussion on Aufheben above as “X 
becoming Y” (with X being sublated, and Y being the posited result).  In one sense, then, 
it is correct to say that Aufhebung is what drives the logic, i.e., what drives the continual 
becoming taking place within the logic, as thought moves from one determination to 
another.  But in another sense, this is a very incomplete description, for we cannot fully 
comprehend what Aufhebung and becoming actually are without recognizing what they 
become, i.e., without recognizing the role that contradiction, self-movement, and life 
implicitly play within them.  
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      Hegel brings all of these topics together in several paragraphs of the Introduction to 
the Science of Logic.  After stating that the dead bones of formal logic need to be 
“quickened by spirit,” he says that “the method [of philosophical science] is the 
consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic.”109  Clearly, 
this self-movement must have some close connection with Aufhebung, given that the 
latter has arisen explicitly within the logic, and is involved with the logic’s internal 
becoming.  But what is this connection?  We can start to see its outlines in this extremely 
illuminating passage, where Hegel reveals more about how Aufhebung is rooted in 
contradiction:  
All that is necessary to achieve scientific progress…is the recognition of the logical 
principle that the negative is just as much positive, or that what is self-contradictory [das 
sich Widersprechende] does not dissolve [sich auflösen] into a nullity, into abstract 
nothing, but essentially only into the negation of particular content, in other words, that 
such a negation is not all negation [alle Negation] but the negation of a determinate 
subject matter [bestimmte Sache] which dissolves, and thus a determinate negation, and 
therefore the result essentially contains that out of which it results….110 
When two opposing determinations dissolve and thus cease-to-be qua indifferent parts 
(e.g., being and nothing, or cause and effect), they are the “particular content” and 
“determinate subject matter” which is being determinately negated.  And, instead of 
going into nothing, the dissolution of the opposing determinations leads to a result which 
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contains them as moments (e.g., the result of ‘becoming,’ or of ‘reciprocity’111).   This is 
a helpful elucidation of our previous discussion of Aufhebung, but not much more than 
that.  What the passage above adds to our discussion is a specification of the way that 
contradiction is at work in Aufhebung.   
      The relation of causality [Kausalitätsverhältnis] is a good place to look for an 
example of how contradiction drives Aufhebung.  Earlier we saw that cause and effect 
standing over against each other as separate substances are sublated, with the result being 
‘reciprocity.’  Now we can describe this act of sublation in more detail.  In its third and 
final section, the relation of causality appears in the form of “Effect and Counter-Effect,” 
and here it becomes entirely evident that having an effect is what allows the cause to be a 
cause, which means that the cause is dependent on the effect and that the effect is not 
merely secondary to the cause.112  Thus, cause and effect are interdependent, i.e., they are 
                                                 
111 More accurately, it is ‘the relation of substantiality’ and ‘the relation of causality’ (which includes 
‘cause and effect’) which are sublated into reciprocity, but we did not go into this level of detail in our 
discussion of reciprocity above.   
112 SL 566.   In fn. 26 above we noted that this analysis seems counterintuitive if we try to apply it to the 
example of a carpenter and a house, without distinguishing between the human, and the human qua 
‘carpenter of this house.’   
What we have discussed in between that footnote and this one allows us to get a better handle on why the 
Logic’s logical determinations and ‘everyday’ logical determinations can be so very different, and why the 
Logic seems so utterly foreign upon first approaching it (and many hundreds of times afterward).   
In general, it seems that we humans tend to derive (usually unconsciously) our ‘everyday’ or ‘common 
sense’ logical determinations #1) by abstracting from our experiences with the workings of everyday 
objects, and #2) by often conflating what a given object is (or is doing) in the mode of a logical 
determination with what that object is as a whole.  So, e.g., we might derive our view of cause and effect 
from our experiences with things like “carpenter and house” and “mother and child.” And, since we see 
(correctly) that the house did not cause the human who is the carpenter to be, and that the child did not 
cause the woman to be, we assume (falsely) that an effect is not the cause of a cause.  For, we fail to see the 
house is the cause of the human qua ‘carpenter of this house,’ and the child is the cause of the woman qua 
‘mother of this child.’   
A primary reason, then, why the Logic is so foreign to everyday consciousness is that it is ‘within itself,’ 
i.e., it consists of thought thinking itself, which means that its forms are its contents.  One result of this is 
that – in contrast to the carpenter who is a cause – the logical determination ‘cause’ has no dimensions to 
its being other than its simply being a cause.  Thus – and again in contrast to the carpenter who is a cause – 
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each other’s mutual cause and effect.  However, because the relation of causality had 
presupposed113 that cause and effect are (independent) substances, the newly discovered 
interdependence of cause and effect reveals that they are not actually substances, and thus 
cannot be something like ‘parts,’ but rather are moments (i.e., still differentiated, yet 
having their being only through each other).  Thus, in terms of the block quote in the 
paragraph above, the relation of causality is “what is self-contradictory [das sich 
Widersprechende],” because it has made directly opposing claims about what a cause is 
and what an effect is.   
      Retracing the above block quote a bit further in terms of our example of causality, we 
see that the relation of causality, as self-contradictory, “does not dissolve into a nullity, 
into abstract nothingness.”  If it had, then the Science of Logic would have come to its 
conclusion at the end of the section on causality,114 because we would have been 
delivered back to its first pages, where abstract nothing appears.  That is, if the negation 
within causality’s self-contradiction were the sort of negation seen when +1 and -1 negate 
each other, abstract nothing would be the result.  Instead, what is negated and done away 
with is this: cause and effect in the form of mutual cause and effect which are nonetheless 
still separate substances.  The specific negation of the relation of causality, then, is a 
‘determinate negation,’ one that leads not to nothing, but to a positive result, viz., to 
reciprocity.  Causality has been sublated, and has become reciprocity, because of 
                                                                                                                                                 
the fact that ‘effect’ is the cause of the logical determination ‘cause’ means that ‘effect’ is the cause of its 
entire being, clearly revealing that the independence of ‘cause’ from ‘effect’ has been done away with. 
113 from “The Relation of Substantiality,” the previous section. 
114 If contradiction led to a nullity, the Logic would have ended with being and nothing.  
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contradiction.  And such is the case whenever Aufhebung and becoming occur: they occur 
through contradiction.  
      In a Remark on “Quantitative Infinity,” Hegel emphasizes the role of contradiction in 
all becoming.  He begins by mentioning how Kant solves certain antinomies in the 
Critique of Pure Reason by asserting that the contradictions in question are located not in 
the world but only in consciousness.  In an extremely amusing passage, Hegel then says 
that this attempt to ‘save’ the world from contradiction by pushing all contradiction over 
into the realm of human thought reveals that Kant had an “excessive tenderness for the 
world.”115  Having thus implied that he too has tenderness for the world, simply not an 
“excessive” one, Hegel goes on to make this dramatic claim: “…the so-called world…is 
never and nowhere without contradiction, but it is unable to endure it and is, therefore, 
subject to coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.”116   He refers to the world as “so-called” here 
in order to include what Kant means by ‘world,’ but the point relevant for our purposes is 
his claim that the world, as containing contradiction that it cannot endure, is therefore 
subject to coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be.  That is: what cannot endure contradiction, 
becomes.  And, as Hegel indicates in the Encyclopaedia Logic, contradiction is not only 
ubiquitous, but also contains the moments which lead to Aufhebung: “There is nothing at 
all anywhere in which contradiction – i.e., opposed determinations – cannot and should 
not be exhibited.”117  Becoming, as we saw back in Hegel’s Remark on Aufheben, takes 
place when something “has entered into unity with its opposite.”118 Contradiction also 
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consists of opposed determinations, i.e., determinations in a relation not of diversity 
(indifferent difference) but opposition (mutually constitutive difference).  This intimate 
connection between becoming and contradiction is hinted at even by the Logic’s table of 
contents, in its listing of the opening determinations of the Doctrine of Being and of the 
Doctrine of Essence: being, nothing, becoming; identity, difference, contradiction. 
      Thus, contradiction was ‘present within’ becoming from the beginning, but was not 
able to be accounted for until much later in the Logic.  That is, contradiction was ‘in-
itself’ and implicit in becoming all along, but only later – after identity and difference had 
been accounted for – could it be posited.   Thus we could say that contradiction is the 
determination ‘becoming’ made more transparent.  And this is just what we would 
expect, insofar as the Doctrine of Essence (where contradiction is found) consists of the 
Doctrine of Being in a recollected (erinnert) and mediated form.119  That is, the Doctrine 
of Essence was, all along, the “background”120 of the Doctrine of Being, such that the 
exposition of essence is “the completed return of being into itself.”121 In the same way 
and for the same reasons, contradiction was, all along, the ‘background’ of becoming.  
That is, contradiction was taking place back in becoming, something we can see in 
hindsight once we comprehend contradiction in the Doctrine of Essence.  But, back at the 
beginning of the Doctrine of Being, thought did not have the resources available to it in 
order to think this contradiction, in order to make contradiction explicit to itself and thus 
to think it as a determination of its own self.  
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      But an important qualification must be made.  Saying that contradiction plays an 
implicit role in becoming should not be taken to mean that contradiction was present in 
becoming as fully formed.  For – as is the case with all logical determinations122 – 
contradiction is not fully what it is until it is posited.  Thus, while it is not incorrect to say 
that ‘contradiction is implicit in becoming,’ we can avoid the possibility of 
miscommunication by also saying that ‘becoming is implicit contradiction.’ This is, in 
fact, to say the same thing.  
      Having briefly discussed contradiction’s relation to becoming, we are now in a better 
position to address its relation movement, to self-movement, and to life.  And this means 
we should now speak directly and in some detail about an issue central to this 
dissertation, viz., what exactly Hegel means when he talks about ‘movement’ within 
thought.  This issue is particularly challenging given that the Logic contains no logical 
determination entitled “Bewegung,” either as a chapter, a section, or even a sub-section.  
Where does he account for the nature of this ‘logical movement’ about which he speaks?  
To what does this phrase even refer?  I believe that what Hegel means in the Logic by the 
word ‘movement’ is what he means by the word ‘becoming.’ In what follows I will 
present a number of passages in support of this interpretation.   
      In the section “With What Must Science Begin?” Hegel makes the claim that 
beginning a scientific (i.e., presuppositionless) investigation with something that is 
mediated would not be a proper beginning, insofar as something about the specific nature 
of this mediation would have to be presupposed.  Thus, science must begin with what is 
                                                 
122 as we saw back in Chapter 2, section c. 
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immediate, i.e., what is abstract, as opposed to beginning with something concrete (ein 
Konkretes), because what is concrete contains mediation.  He then says,  
The expression and exposition of such [i.e., of something concrete] is…a mediated 
movement which begins from one of the determinations and advances to another…. 
Thus, what such an exposition begins from is not the concrete itself, but only the simple 
immediacy from which the movement goes forth.123   
Clearly, this “simply immediacy from which the movement goes forth” is the 
“indeterminate immediacy” with which Hegel begins the Logic and which he gives the 
name ‘being.’124  Thus, the movement that goes forth from being – the movement of the 
exposition – is nothing other than becoming itself.   
      This same point can also be seen in the introductory note to the chapter on Being, in 
which Hegel states that the chapter will consist of sections on quality, quantity, and 
measure.  First he emphasizes that this division is simply preliminary, insofar as it has not 
yet been shown to be true.  For as he says, these determinations in the chapter on being 
“…first have to arise from the movement of being itself, and in so doing define and 
justify themselves.”125 As the opening pages of the actual exposition indicate, the 
“movement of being itself” is, quite simply, becoming.   
      So let us look once again to these opening pages of the exposition.  In the first section 
on becoming, entitled “The Unity of Being and Nothing,” Hegel states that being and 
nothing are the same (viz., they are both indeterminate immediacy); he then says that, 
because of their sameness, they have passed over into each other while nonetheless still 
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125 Ibid., 79, translation emended. 
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being differentiated in thought (as revealed by the fact that we have said ‘they pass into 
each other’).  In reference to being passing over into nothing and vice versa, he says, 
“Their truth is thus this movement of the immediate vanishing of one into the other: 
becoming, a movement in which both are differentiated, but through a difference which 
has equally immediately dissolved.”126  As we discussed in Chapter 3, what is happening 
in this quote is this: within thought, being becomes nothing and nothing becomes being; 
with these ‘becomings,’ the logical determination ‘becoming’ has thus been posited.  
Equally, though, ‘movement’ has been posited in the Logic, as the above quote makes 
clear.  Thus, unless we wish to claim that two determinations arise out of being and 
nothing’s passing into each other, it seems Hegel is using the words ‘movement’ and 
‘becoming’ synonymously here.   
      Hegel connects becoming and movement in a similar way in the Second Remark after 
the section on becoming.  Speaking of the proposition ‘being and nothing are the same,’ 
and of how it expresses their sameness but contains them as different, he says, “we see 
that here a proposition is posited which, observed more closely, has a movement through 
which it itself vanishes.  But with this there takes place in the proposition that which 
should constitute its actual content, namely, becoming.”127  Although neither are 
explicitly set forth by the proposition itself, the proposition “has” a movement within it, 
and becoming “takes place” within it: the movement implicit in the proposition is the 
becoming implicit within it, and vice versa.  
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      As we saw back in Chapter 3, this movement/becoming is explicitly set forth when 
the proposition about being and nothing is combined with the proposition ‘being and 
nothing are not the same.’  In this context, Hegel says, “the determinations which are 
expressed in the two propositions [viz., the sameness, and the difference of being and 
nothing] are supposed to be in a complete union – a union which can only be stated as an 
unrest of incompatibles, as a movement.”128  The unrest of incompatibles which 
movement is – this is clearly also what becoming is.  Calling movement an unrest of 
incompatibles also makes a direct connection between movement and contradiction.  
Contradiction, consisting of the opposed determinations of identity and difference, is the 
fuller account of what such an unrest of incompatibles actually is.129  That is, it is a fuller 
account of what movement is, in the same way that it is a fuller account of what becoming 
is.  This is the case, I would argue, because movement simply is becoming. 
                                                 
128 Ibid., 91.  
129 More accurately, contradiction consists of the opposed determinations of ‘the positive’ and ‘the 
negative.’  As we mentioned above, the category of opposition comes onto the scene in the form of the 
opposition between identity and difference.  For reasons too involved to discuss here, Hegel comes to call 
these terms within opposition ‘the positive’ and ‘the negative.’  Simply in an everyday sense, we can see 
that these two terms – like identity and difference – are in a relation of opposition, possessing an internal 
and co-constituting relation of difference.  But now we notice something strange about the positive and the 
negative.  If the positive and the negative are what they are only through each other, this means that the 
positive contains the negative within itself, and the negative contains the positive within itself.  But when 
we step back, we realize that the larger situation is this: the positive depends on something other than it for 
its being (viz., the negative), and the positive does not depend on something other than it for its being, 
because the negative is not other to the positive, but rather an essential part of it.  The same can be said for 
the negative: it both depends on its other (the positive) for its being, and it does not depend on its other for 
its being, for it does not truly have an other external to it, given that its other has proven to be an essential 
dimension of it.  Put otherwise, the positive and the negative are each dependent on each other as an other, 
insofar as each excludes the other; and, they are each independent of each other – “self-subsistent” (SL 431) 
– insofar as each includes the other, because this ‘inclusion’ makes it such that each has no other upon 
which it could possibly depend.  At this point we might be thinking to ourselves with no small degree of 
frustration, “What?  The positive and the negative each exclude each other, and include each other?  That is 
an outright contradiction!”  To which Hegel would respond, “Yes, exactly!”  Or, to be more precise, he 
would say, “This is not just a contradiction, it is contradiction itself.  We have now encountered and 
experienced contradiction in its own being, and grasped it for what it is.”   
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      Let us look at two more brief passages on this theme, from the beginning of the 
Doctrine of Essence.  In his introductory remarks on the relation of the Doctrine of 
Essence to the Doctrine of Being, he says, “Essence comes out of being; it is in this 
respect not immediate in and for itself, but rather a result of this movement.”130 The 
language of ‘result’ is of course familiar to us as connected with Aufhebung and 
becoming, and the ‘movement’ referred to is the movement from being to essence.  That 
is, it is the movement of being becoming essence: being (taken as a whole, in the 
Doctrine of Being) ceases-to-be, and essence comes-to-be.  Hegel makes a similar point, 
but now from a wider perspective, when he says, “Essence stands between being and the 
concept and constitutes the middle of these two, and its movement constitutes the 
transition from being to the concept.”131  The ‘movement’ of essence from the Doctrine 
of Being to the Doctrine of the Concept takes place through the coming-into-being and 
the ceasing-to-be of the various determinations of essence, from Schein all the way to 
Wechselwirkung.  Thus this ‘movement of essence’ is essence as a whole coming-to-be 
fully what it is (in Wechselwirkung), and then ceasing-to-be when it passes over into the 
Doctrine of the Concept.   
      At this point a somewhat obvious question stands before us: if Hegel means 
‘movement’ when he says ‘becoming,’ why does he not simply say ‘becoming’?  
Although there are likely multiple reasons, two possibilities come to mind.  The first 
stems from a consideration of where in the Logic he uses the word ‘movement’ most 
often: he uses it with great frequency in the Preface, in the Introduction, and in the 
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various introductory sections and remarks scattered throughout the work, and he uses it 
with much less frequency in the exposition proper.  That is, he uses the word much more 
frequently when he is describing the Logic from a bird’s eye (i.e., non-scientific) view 
than when he is describing the Logic up close and in detail, accounting for the coming-to-
be and ceasing-to-be of specific logical determinations.  One reason for this, I believe, is 
that the word ‘movement’ is most often associated with spatial movement, and the 
connotation of spatial movement – much more than ‘becoming’ – suggests that what is 
moving is in some sense enduring in the midst of change.  So, for instance, when he talks 
very broadly about the ‘movement of being’ or the ‘movement of essence’ (in the sense 
of the whole Doctrine of Being, and the whole Doctrine of Essence, respectively), the 
word ‘movement’ works to communicate that being and essence are in some sense 
enduring in spite of various becomings taking place within them.132  The same could be 
said with his talk of the ‘movement of the exposition’133 in the Logic’s Introduction, and 
of the ‘movement of the concept’ toward the Logic’s very end.134  So while he could have 
spoken of, e.g., the ‘becoming of the exposition,’ this would have been a less 
immediately clear way to talk about how the exposition as a whole involves one 
determination, and then another, and then another, etc.  This is not to imply that 
‘becoming’ could not also be used in all of these various cases, but it seems that Hegel 
often uses the word ‘movement’ when he is making generalizations about the overall 
structure of the Logic.  
                                                 
132 which is true, insofar as ‘Being’ and ‘Essence’ (understood as referring to Book One and Book Two of 
the Logic) refer to a particular way in which the determinations within each of the books relate to each 
other: in the former, as immediate, in the latter, as reflected. 
133 SL 77.  
134 Ibid., 826.  
148 
 
      A second factor that might have motivated Hegel to use the word ‘movement’ as a 
synonym for ‘becoming’ has to do with a preparation for speaking about later 
determinations.  Specifically, he might use the word ‘movement’ early on in the Logic 
because he is laying the terminological groundwork for his account of self-movement in 
the “Reflection” section of the Doctrine of Essence.  The German language does contain 
the (less-commonly used) term Selbstwerden, but if Hegel had used this word in the 
section on “Reflection,” he would not have laid the terminological groundwork for 
talking about life in the Doctrine of the Concept.  For, another element of ‘life’ – one 
which we will examine in a moment – is self-movement.   
      As a small step toward returning explicitly to the issue of ‘life,’ we should now 
consider more closely the relationship of contradiction and self-movement.  Earlier we 
saw how contradiction turns out to have been implicitly present within becoming, i.e., 
implicitly present all along in the Logic, despite the fact that only in the Doctrine of 
Essence does the Logic have the resources to explicitly account for and posit 
contradiction.135  Contradiction is the ‘truth of’ and expression of becoming: what 
becoming was ‘in-itself,’ contradiction is as posited.136  A further significance of this 
point is that, if I am correct in claiming that ‘movement’ means ‘becoming’ in the Logic, 
contradiction would be the ‘truth of’ movement as well.  And this is what Hegel does 
seem to assert in several comments in Third Remark of the section on contradiction, 
comments which also further illuminate the relation between becoming and contradiction.   
                                                 
135 viz., the resources of ‘identity’ and ‘difference.’ 
136 On the ‘small scale,’ determinate being (Dasein) is the truth and expression of becoming, insofar as this 
is the determination which follows becoming. So, I say ‘contradiction is the truth of becoming’ in a sense 
similar to the one which Hegel uses when he stands back from the exposition as a whole and (with the 
benefit of hindsight) says, ‘essence is the truth of being.’  
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      In this Third Remark Hegel states, “External, sensuous motion itself is contradiction’s 
immediate determinate being,” and a few sentences later he adds, “….movement is 
existent [daseiende] contradiction itself.”137  This, of course, is a reference to movement 
within space (and, incidentally, it is the basis for his claim that Zeno was right to say that 
movement involves contradiction, but wrong to conclude that there is therefore no 
movement).  After calling spatial movement ‘existent contradiction,’ he says, “Similarly, 
internal, actual [die innere, die eigentliche] self-movement, impulse [Trieb] in 
general…is nothing else but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, 
within itself [in sich selbst] and the deficiency, the negative of itself.”138  Since what 
comes after the copula in this sentence is a definition of contradiction, we can rephrase 
the quote as such: ‘internal, actual self-movement is nothing else but contradiction.’  If 
contradiction is self-movement, then it is self-becoming; thus, my claim that 
‘contradiction is the truth of becoming’ can be rearticulated as ‘self-becoming is the truth 
of becoming.’  Put otherwise: becoming ‘comes into’ its truth – i.e., is expressed, posited, 
and becomes more fully what it is – when it is reflected back upon itself.  And this is just 
what occurs in contradiction.  Thus, Hegel’s claim that contradiction is self-movement 
reaffirms our previous claim that contradiction is the truth of movement, and – what is 
the same – the truth of becoming.   
      This conclusion also makes a great deal of sense in light of the larger structure of the 
Science of Logic.  We noted above that the Doctrine of Essence consists of the Doctrine 
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of Being in a recollected (erinnert) form,139 i.e., Essence is the “return of Being into 
itself.”140 Hegel refers to this explicitly self-reflexive nature of essence when he says, 
“Essence is reflection, the movement of becoming and transition that remains internal to 
itself....”141  Said otherwise, Essence is Being reflected into itself.  And one of the ways in 
which this is true is with respect to our current discussion: the determination 
‘contradiction’ – as self-becoming – is the determination ‘becoming’ reflected into itself. 
      The idea that contradiction is self-becoming has another important connection to the 
overall structure of the Logic.  For the Logic to genuinely consist of the Idea thinking 
itself, and thus to genuinely be ‘within itself,’ its movements (its becomings) cannot take 
place as a result of something ‘outside’ itself, i.e., as a result of something other than 
itself.  Yet the account of the determination ‘becoming’ at the beginning of the Logic 
does not specify what the ultimate cause of becoming is – it simply remains silent on the 
matter.  Thus, in order for the Logic to establish itself as truly ‘within itself,’ it has to 
establish that the becoming which takes place within it takes place due to what is internal 
to itself.  This is just what contradiction as self-becoming begins to establish.  Throughout 
the Logic, thought is becoming its various possible determinations not because some 
external force is causing it to do so, but rather because thought, of its own accord, is 
actively thinking through itself.  Put otherwise: thought is not merely moving, but self-
moving.  
                                                 
139 Ibid., 389.  
140 Ibid., 390.  
141 Ibid., 399.  
151 
 
      To complete our sketch of contradiction as logical self-movement, we should now say 
a few words about the role that contradiction plays in logical necessity.  Earlier in this 
chapter we discussed the difference between the two kinds of difference, diversity 
(Verschiedenheit) and opposition (Gegensatz).  Two things that are diverse are ‘merely 
different,’ with no inherent connection between them (e.g., a bird and a desk); they are 
thus indifferent (gleichgültig) to each other.  Two things that are opposed, however, have 
an inherent connection (e.g., hot and cold), insofar as they are defined through each 
other; they are thus reciprocally constitutive of each other.  Contradiction, as we have 
seen, involves opposed determinations,142 and these are the very opposed determinations 
which unite as moments when Aufhebung occurs.  Clearly, in order for becoming, 
Aufhebung, and contradiction to occur at all in the Logic, the determinations involved 
must not be diverse from each other, but opposed.  Said otherwise, they must not be mere 
‘parts,’ but moments.  It is difference as opposition which leads to contradiction, and 
therefore to logical self-movement.  In a very lucid passage, Hegel speaks of this 
connection between opposition, contradiction, self-movement, and life:  
Thinking reason…sharpens, so to speak, the blunt differences of what is diverse 
[Unterschied des Verschiedenen], the mere manifold of pictorial thinking, into essential 
difference, into opposition.  Only when the manifold elements [die Mannigfaltigen] have 
been driven to the point of contradiction do they become active and lively towards one 
another, receiving in contradiction the negativity which is the indwelling pulsation of 
self-movement and liveliness [Lebendigkeit].143  
                                                 
142 EL §89, Remark.  
143 SL 442, translation emended.  
152 
 
Opposition leads to contradiction and self-movement, and also makes life possible within 
an exposition.  
      Furthermore, difference as opposition leads logical self-movement to go down a 
specific ‘path.’  As we saw back in Chapter 3, regarding the origins of the Logic’s triadic 
form, the unfolding of the Logic involves a repetition of this basic process: two 
determinations are initially separate and independent; then they become related as 
moments; then they vanish into a result; then the result, upon being observed more 
closely, is seen to imply a determination separate and independent from it; then the 
process begins again.  If the pairs of determinations were merely diverse (verschieden, 
like a bird and a desk), the self-movement of Aufhebung and contradiction would not 
occur, nor would the movement be a necessary one, i.e., following a particular path.  But 
because all of the differences involved turn out to be what Hegel refers to in the above 
quote as “essential differences” (i.e., oppositions), the self-movement of the Logic 
proceeds in a necessary manner.  Self-movement, then, inherently involves movement 
which is necessary, insofar as a.) self-movement takes place only through oppositions 
(which constitute contradiction), and b.) a string of oppositional pairs can only lead down 
one path.  Above, we mentioned Hegel’s discussion in “With What Must Science 
Begin?” about science needing to begin with what is abstract (i.e., what is immediate, 
viz., being), in order to avoid the presuppositions that come with what is concrete (i.e., 
what is mediated).  Once the exposition has begun, however, it is “a mediated movement 
which begins from one of the determinations and advances to another,”144 a clear 
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reference to the movement through oppositions.  The way that oppositions – and the 
moments they make possible – bring about the necessity of the Logic’s self-movement is 
addressed in the following passage: 
The relation contained in something concrete, in a synthetic unity, is necessary only 
insofar as it is not just found but is produced, through the movement proper to the 
moments [durch die eigene Bewegung der Momente] returning into this unity – a 
movement which is the opposite of the analytic procedure, of an activity external to the 
subject matter [Sache] itself and which belongs [only] to the subject [Subjekt].145   
Whether we translate ‘eigene’ as ‘proper to’ or ‘appropriate’ or ‘own,’ it is clear that the 
movement of the thought thinking itself is movement belonging to and springing from the 
moments due to their relation of essential difference, i.e., opposition.  It is also clear that 
the relation of opposition is what makes the movement of the exposition a necessary one.  
By contrast, when the determinations of an exposition are merely diverse from each 
other, i.e., merely ‘parts,’ then the movement of that exposition can be neither a self-
movement nor a necessary one.  Said otherwise, an exposition whose individual 
determinations are in a relation of mechanism will be a contingent one which is not self-
moving, i.e., one whose origin of movement is external to itself.   
      In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel further clarifies the point that 
diversity – inessential difference  – leads to a contingent and mechanistic exposition, 
while the essential difference of opposition leads to a necessary and a living exposition.  
In this specific passage he is speaking of the operations of formal mathematics, which 
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deals with “magnitude alone, the inessential difference”146; however, any exposition 
proceeding according to inessential differences could be described in the same way:  
Precisely because it does not move itself, what is dead does not make it all the way to the 
differences of essence, nor to essential opposition or disparity, and thus not to the 
transition of one opposition into its opposite, nor to qualitative, immanent self-
movement.147 
Because opposition is what leads to immanent self-movement, any investigation which 
attempts to proceed according to inessential differences will be a dead one.  That is, it 
will be unable to move of its own accord, because the source of self-movement just is the 
essential difference of opposition.  Any exposition proceeding in such a matter will be a 
contingent one, and its movements will come from outside of itself.  Speaking of the 
“fixed, dead propositions” of formal mathematics, Hegel says that “one can call a halt to 
any of them, but the next begins anew on its own account without the first itself having 
moved on to another and without any necessary connection arising out of the nature of 
the thing at issue.”148 
      So now back to life.  Clearly the self-movement of contradiction is intimately 
connected with the logical determination of life.  To close out our treatment of life, we 
should thus articulate this connection more precisely.  In Remark 3 on contradiction in 
the Science of Logic, Hegel gives us a helpful clue when he says that “contradiction is the 
root of all movement and livingness [Lebendigkeit]; it is only insofar as something has a 
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contradiction within it that it moves, and has an urge [Trieb] and activity [Tätigkeit].”149  
This Trieb – sometimes translated as ‘impulse’ or ‘desire’ or ‘instinctive urge’ – plays a 
prominent role in the Logic’s treatment of life.  As mentioned above, life is the first stage 
of “The Idea,” and “The Idea” is the final section of the Doctrine of the Concept and of 
the Logic as a whole.  This means that life is the first stage of the Idea finally fully and 
explicitly coming to think itself, for life is the unifying of first two sections of the 
Doctrine of the Concept – “Subjectivity” and “Objectivity.”  As such, the section on life 
consists of the subjective concept attempting to forge a complete unity with ‘the object.’   
      It is within this context that Hegel refers to the subjective concept as the “soul” of 
life, as its “self-moving principle”150 and its “urge.”151  More specifically, he says that, in 
the relation of the subjective concept to objectivity, the former is “the urge to sublate this 
separation.”152  That is, it is the urge to sublate the difference of subject and object, such 
that the Idea can think itself without this separation.  This sublation begins to occur in 
life, and the ‘inwardizing’ that this sublation effects helps us better grasp why Hegel 
describes life as “internal purposiveness,” as opposed to the external purposiveness of 
mechanism.153  As we saw earlier, within mechanism “the concept is regarded as external 
to it and it is treated as a dead thing.”154  That is, the ‘urge’ of the movement of 
mechanism is external both to it and to its indifferent parts, while the urge of life is 
immanent in it, such that its purposiveness is also inner.  Speaking of the relation of the 
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subjective concept to its objectivity, Hegel says that the former “essentially relates itself 
to it [objectivity] through its own self – thus it is its own end [Selbstzweck] and urge.”155 
What all of these passages point to is that the self-movement of contradiction which 
propels the Science of Logic forward in a necessary manner finds its even fuller and more 
transparent expression in the urge immanent within life.  In the way that contradiction is 
the truth and expression of becoming, life is the truth and expression of contradiction.  
For, in the form of the subjective concept, the urge of life has itself as its goal; its goal is 
its own realization in and through a sublation of the difference between it and objectivity.  
Thus the Idea – and also the faculty of reason, as we will later see – is living insofar as its 
movement is based on the transition from opposite, to opposite, to result, and back again.  
That is, it is living insofar as its process of becoming fully itself is of its own accord, and 
insofar as its movements are self-movements, originating necessarily from – and only 
being directed toward – its own self. 
~ 
 
      Here in Part II we have focused on the way in which the determinations ‘part’ and 
‘indifference’ find a particularly clear expression in the determination ‘mechanism,’ and 
how the determinations ‘’becoming,’ ‘reciprocity,’ moment,’ ‘self-movement,’ and 
‘contradiction’ find a particularly clear expression in the determination ‘life.’  However, 
the reality is that every determination in the Logic is an expression of all earlier ones, 
insofar as each later determination contains each earlier one as one of its moments.  What 
it is to be a determination in the Logic is to be a determination which thought necessarily 
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passes through; thus, each earlier determination plays a role in the coming-to-be of later 
ones.  So, e.g., even though in the pages above we have contrasted mechanism and life, 
the progression of the Logic makes it very clear that life would not be possible without 
mechanism: life is the unity of “Subjectivity” and “Objectivity,” and the latter could not 
be without mechanism.  For, mechanism is taken up into life, in the same way that we 
saw indifference (as reciprocally related to reciprocity) being taken up into reciprocity.  
In Part III, we will see something similar, as we observe the understanding being taken 
up into reason, and ordinary language being taken up into philosophical language.
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Part III. Philosophical Language 
      “Knowing what we say is much rarer than we think, and it is with the greatest 
injustice that the accusation of not knowing what one says is taken to be the most 
severe.”1  With this statement, Hegel is stating that the meaning of a person’s words 
might exceed their intentions, that the reference might exceed the one doing the referring.  
This possibility is, in his view, partially explained by the fact that the expression of words 
always involves the expression of concepts, and in many cases the concepts expressed are 
not the ones which the speaker intended to express.  In fact, though, Hegel’s claim is 
much stronger: all human beings except those who have thought through the totality of 
philosophical determinations do not fully comprehend the words that come out of their 
mouths.  To grasp why Hegel would hold such a position requires a grasp of how he 
views the language of philosophy.   
      At this point it would be helpful to do a brief review of the previous two parts of this 
dissertation.  In Part I, we looked at Hegel’s critique of the mode of comprehension 
which proceeds by applying predicates or categories to the subject matter.  We then 
looked at his own mode of comprehension, one which proceeds by following the 
determinations which lead up to the subject matter, and which then comprehends the 
subject matter as the ‘expression’ of those prior determinations.  In contrasting these two 
modes, we saw Hegel describe the application mode as ‘standing above’ the subject 
                                                 
1 G.W.F. Hegel, “Solgers nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel,” in Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche 
Kritik, Jahrgang 1828, Erster Band, hg. Societät fu ̈r wissenschaftliche Kritik zu Berlin (Stuttgart: J. G. 
Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 1828), 848.  Translation mine.  I am grateful to John McCumber for directing 
me to this passage through the epigraph of his The Company of Words: Hegel, Language and Systematic 
Philosophy (Evanston, IL: Northwest University Press, 1993).  
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matter and surveying it from a distance, while the proper mode of comprehension ‘enters 
into’ and ‘gives itself over to’ it.2  In Part II, we followed, in a very abstract and 
schematic fashion, a number of logical determinations – becoming, indifference, 
contradiction, etc. – which ended up being expressed in mechanism and life.3  Now, in an 
even more abstract fashion, we will attempt to follow those two determinations into their 
expressions in the understanding, reason, and ordinary and philosophical language.  This 
approach will, of course, only vaguely resembles the sort of systematic mode of 
comprehension that we looked at in Part I; nonetheless, highlighting how earlier, sublated 
determinations continue to make their presence felt in later determinations can give us a 
better context for looking into these later determinations.  And while it is true that every 
philosophical determination is always the expression of all earlier determinations, it is 
also true that oftentimes a certain earlier determination will make, so to speak, a 
‘reappearance’ in a later one in a way that is particularly illuminating (as we have already 
seen with, e.g., contradiction and life).   And so we turn now to an investigation of the 
understanding and of ordinary language, an investigation guided by the fact that the 
logical determination of mechanism finds particularly vivid expression in the realm of 
spirit in these two determinations.  
 
6. Ordinary Language  
 
      What I am referring to as ‘ordinary language’ is the kind of language which is guided 
primarily by the understanding.  As we will see, the language of philosophy also involves 
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the understanding in an essential way, but ordinary language – in its defining of words, in 
its relating of those words, in its relating of sentences, etc. – is dominated through and 
through by the understanding.  And because this faculty is the power of abstraction, and 
its primary logical category is that of formal identity, it is not surprising that the sort of 
language which is the expression of this faculty is also characterized by these qualities.  
Thus, as a preparation for coming to better grasp the nature of ordinary language – but 
also the nature of philosophical language – we will now consider the way in which the 
understanding operates.  
     a. Understanding: Thought as Mechanistic  
          i. Finitude and Gegenstände  
 
      One way that the understanding is an especially clear expression of mechanism is that 
this shape of consciousness is the sort of thing that it is through its having objects.  That 
is, the understanding has Gegenstände, things that ‘stand over against it,’ of which it is 
conscious.4  A result of this that is especially relevant for our discussion is that the 
understanding is characterized by finitude.  Back in Chapter 5 we spoke briefly of 
finitude with regard to causality, and because the relation of causality also helps 
illuminate the understanding, this discussion is worth recapping here.  As we saw, 
causality involves entities that are distinct substances (viz., the cause, and the effect), and 
because they are distinct the cause acts on the effect from ‘outside’ of it.  This externality 
of cause and effect from each other entails that they are finite, for Hegel holds that what 
is finite is what has an other.5  That is, when something has an other, there is a limit 
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[Grenze] between the two, and what has a limit is finite.  Clearly, then, the fact that the 
understanding is defined in part by having objects which stand over against it means that 
these objects are ‘others’ to it, and that it is characterized by finitude.   
      The finitude of causality characterizes the understanding in two ways: understanding 
functioning a cause, and understanding functioning as an effect.  We have already seen an 
excellent example of the understanding operating finitely as a cause back in our 
discussion of Hegel’s critique of formalism in Chapter 1.  There we saw that, instead of 
following the self-movement and the self-ordering of the subject matter (Sache) where it 
leads, the understanding itself takes over the ordering role, attaching external predicates 
to the Sache and arranging the latter how it sees fit.6  The understanding, then, is the 
cause, and its conclusions about the Sache are the effect, with the two standing in an 
external and finite relation.   
     The understanding operates as an effect in a closely related way.  Because it attempts 
to grasp matters that are external to and other than it, it is influenced by various external 
elements.  For example, when the understanding chooses predicates from a schema or 
chart and then applies them to its object of investigation, this schema or chart is acting as 
a cause on the understanding, insofar as the understanding is being affected in its 
conception of things by this schema or chart.  The same dynamic is at work when the 
understanding is influenced by anything which is other to itself.   
                                                 
6 Phenomenology §53. Naturally, the understanding believes it is arranging the Sache correctly, but Hegel 
says that the conclusions which it comes to about it say more about the understanding that they say about 
the Sache.    
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      But the understanding in its mode as ‘cause’ and the understanding in its mode as 
‘effect’ cannot be strictly separated from one another.  For example, the particular way in 
which the understanding decides to arrange the Sache (e.g., ‘human being’) in its attempt 
to comprehend it would be influenced by the schema or chart that it draws from to guide 
its arranging activities (e.g., Kant’s categories, or some chart with the categories ‘animal’ 
and ‘thinking’).  That is, the understanding acting as a cause would act in the particular 
way it does because of how it had been affected by something. This, of course, 
immediately raises the problem of beginnings, i.e., of how one should get started in one’s 
investigations without begging the question.  The finitude and the causal mode of the 
understanding – an extension of the fact that it has objects (Gegenstände) – entails that it 
cannot overcome this problem.   
      The finitude of the understanding exhibits itself not only in the understanding being 
‘other than’ its effects and its causes, but also in a third way: its view of the relations 
within its objects.  For, it views the elements within its objects not as moments but as 
parts, not as reciprocally-related but as indifferent to each other, as standing over against 
each other, and thus as finite.  Hegel’s discussion of the whole/part relation in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic, which we have referred to several times, also addresses the 
operation of the understanding.  After presenting the body/corpse metaphor, Hegel states 
that “the external and mechanical relation of wholes and parts does not suffice for the 
cognition of organic life in its truth,” and then continues on by saying,  
This is the case to a much higher degree with the application of the part-whole 
relationship to spirit and to the configurations of the spiritual world.  Even if in 
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psychology one does not speak expressly of ‘parts’ of the soul or of the spirit, 
nonetheless the representation of that finite relationship [of part and whole] underlies the 
treatment of this discipline from the point of view of the understanding, and the various 
forms of spiritual activity are enumerated one after another and are only described in 
their isolation, as so-called particular powers and capacities.7 
The idea that the soul has parts which can be isolated from each other is an idea which 
assumes the differentiations within the soul to be finite ones, standing over against each 
other indifferently.  Hegel claims that this view of the soul stems from approaching the 
soul from the perspective of the understanding, i.e., from the perspective of that faculty 
which, by its very nature, sees parts even where there are moments, indifference even 
where there is reciprocity.   
      Since the understanding views the determinations which it comes across as separate 
from (other than) itself and separate from each other, it is not surprising that Hegel often 
describes the understanding as operating ‘mechanically.’  One such description appears in 
an Addition in the Philosophy of Nature, where he is discussing various processes of 
animal digestion. After some very amusing remarks about the chemical content of horse 
dung and tiger urine, he says,  
The understanding will always adhere to mediations as such and view them as external 
relations, mechanically and chemically comparing what is nonetheless entirely 
subordinate to free liveliness [Lebendigkeit] and self-feeling.  The understanding wants 
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to know more than speculation and looks down from on high at it; but the former 
always remains in finite mediation and cannot grasp liveliness as such.8  
Because it assumes that the relations within and between things are external ones, the 
understanding tries to grasp things in terms of finite interactions.  One result is that – as 
we noted back in Chapter 5 – it is unable to comprehend life.  And it is unable to do so 
regardless of whether the life in question is logical, natural, and spiritual.  Like the 
anatomist standing over the dismembered body, confused about why it does not move, 
the understanding’s finite, mechanical, and formalistic approach ensures that it will never 
comprehend what is living.  
      At the beginning of this section we noted that the understanding ‘is what it is by 
having objects.’  In the meantime we have seen how this translates into the understanding 
operating in a mechanical fashion.  But we have not yet addressed this question: why is 
this faculty defined by having objects?  Hegel sheds light on this in a well-known passage 
from the Preface to the Phenomenology, where his main topic is the nature of analysis.  
The kind of analysis he is dealing with involves representations being broken up into 
their constituent parts, and here he identifies what is responsible for this ‘breaking up’: 
“The act of separating is the force and labor of the understanding, the most astonishing 
and the greatest of all the powers or, rather, that which is the absolute power.”9  Applying 
this to our discussions above, we can see why the understanding is finite, why it has 
objects, and why – within and amongst its objects – its sees only finite relations.  As a 
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separating force, it separates its objects from itself, itself from its objects, its objects from 
each other, and the elements within objects from the objects’ other elements.  
      This ‘separating’ aspect of the understanding further illuminates its formalistic 
approach which we discussed back in Part I.  When that which it is trying to comprehend 
has been reduced to indifferent parts, these parts are not in a relation of opposition, but in 
a relation of diversity.  As we saw in Chapter 5, the nature of becoming, contradiction, 
self-movement, and life are all dependent on the relation of opposition, of ‘essential 
difference.’  It is thus no wonder that Hegel asserts that the formalistic approach is unable 
to enter into the self-moving, self-ordering life of the Sache: the Sache of the 
understanding has no self-movement.  Rather, it is dead and inert, and as a result the 
understanding must itself take on this ordering role.  In the “Force and the 
Understanding” section of the Phenomenology, Hegel is discussing how the 
understanding forms laws of nature out of its own self; while the context here is 
somewhat different than the treatment of formalism in the Preface, his point nonetheless 
reveals the same principle at work: “…within this tautological movement, the 
understanding steadfastly insists on its object’s unity at rest, and the movement just takes 
place in the understanding itself, not in the object.”10 
      At this point we are able to be more precise about the understanding’s connection to 
mechanism, i.e., its connections to the relation within which a collection of indifferent 
parts possesses a principle of determination which is external to it.   One way the 
understanding does so is with respect to itself, and another way is with respect to the 
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objects it is attempting to grasp.  It does so with respect to itself insofar as its own 
movements over various subject matters are not necessary but rather contingent, thus 
indicating that these movements are dictated by what the understanding happens across or 
arbitrarily encounter in its particular experiences.  Hegel describes this in the 
Phenomenology’s Preface as follows:  
Having the knowing subject apply the one unmoved form to whatever just happens to be 
on hand and then externally dipping the material into this motionless element contributes 
as much to fulfilling what is demanded as does a collection of purely arbitrary 
impressions about the content. Rather, what is demanded is for the shapes to originate 
their richness and determine their distinctions from out of themselves.11  
Clearly, that the understanding goes about its movements based on “whatever happens to 
be on hand” means that its movements are not self-determined.  Its movements are not 
necessary ones, but rather are contingent, uncertain, and dictated by something external 
to it.  
      Another way that the understanding illustrates mechanism is with respect to its 
objects.  Strictly speaking, its objects – as separated off from their contexts by the “most 
astonishing and the greatest of all the powers” – are inert, dead, and not moving.  But, in 
an exposition undertaken by the understanding in an attempt to account for something, 
the movement of mechanism appears quite clearly.  For, the movement of that exposition 
– i.e., the transition from one determination to the next – is one externally-imposed by the 
understanding itself.  Hegel speaks of something similar in his Remark on the principle of 
sufficient reason in the Science of Logic, referring to Leibniz’ own critique of a 
                                                 
11 Ibid., §15.  
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mechanical mode of arranging what one is trying to comprehend: “But Leibniz opposed 
the sufficiency of ground mainly to causality in its strict sense as the mechanical mode of 
action.  Since this is an altogether external activity…the determinations posited by it are 
externally and contingently conjoined….”12  Thus, while an exposition produced by the 
faculty of the understanding might have the appearance of a living and self-moving unity, 
it is in fact only a reconstructed corpse, one whose ordering and whose movements arise 
not from within itself but from the external hand of the understanding. 
   
      ii. Its Fundamental Category: Formal Identity 
      Above we mentioned that the understanding operates according to the categories of 
diversity (as opposed to opposition) and indifference (as opposed to reciprocity).  The 
reason it does so is this: its most basic assumption is the category of formal identity.  In 
the Philosophy of Spirit Hegel refers to formal identity as the understanding’s 
“principle,”13 and in the Philosophy of Nature as its “ground category 
[Grundkategorie].”14  It must be emphasized the kind of identity which underlies the 
operation of the understanding is formal identity, i.e., abstract identity.  For, the concrete 
identity which is grasped in the Logic when formal identity is seen to contain difference 
within it is something which the understanding is unable to recognize.   
      To describe the difference between abstract and concrete identity, we can trace the 
way in which the former gives way to the latter.  In its abstract shape, identity is 
                                                 
12 SL 446.  
13 Philosophy of Spirit §573, Remark.  
14 Philosophy of Nature §246, Addition. 
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characterized as “inward reflection”15 and “relation to self.”16  The result of this complete 
‘inwardness’ of formal identity is that “otherness and relation-to-other has vanished in its 
own self into pure equality-with-self.”17  Putting it in Greek terms, formal identity could 
be described as what is auto kath auto, ‘itself the same as itself,’ for it does not contain 
otherness within itself in any essential way.  Identity is, in its own self, and is not 
constituted by an other. But while identity is a wholly self-standing ‘relation-to-self’ in 
which otherness has supposedly been banished, the description of identity as ‘relating 
itself to itself’ reveals that otherness has not been banished.  For, the very act of using the 
word ‘itself’ twice reveals that some sort of distinction is being drawn.  As Hegel puts it, 
identity is “a distinguishing of itself from itself.”18  Thus, difference has appeared on the 
scene, and has done so in and through identity.19  Furthermore, when the relation between 
identity and the newly-appeared difference is considered, difference appears in a specific 
form: “Identity falls apart within itself into diversity….”20  But – as we noted back in 
Chapter 4 – one soon realizes that the relation between identity and diversity is itself not 
one of diversity, but rather one of opposition: the two are what they are through each 
other.  And now identity is no longer being thought abstractly and formally, but 
concretely, i.e., together with what essentially constitutes it.   
                                                 
15 EL §113.  
16 Ibid., §115.  
17 SL 411. 
18 EL §116, Addition.  
19 More specifically, identity contains reflection, as seen by the descriptions of identity as ‘relating to itself’ 
and ‘identity-with-itself’ (SL 411). Reflection contains negativity (insofar reflection is a movement back 
and forth between two opposing elements), and difference just is this negativity within reflection (SL 417).  
20 SL 418.   
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      The understanding, however, cannot grasp this concrete identity, for reasons 
addressed above: its operation as a separating power cannot grasp the fact that identity 
‘in its truth’ is in a relation of dependent opposition with diversity.  Thus, it views 
identity abstractly, cut off from diversity.  Because it sees identity as merely ‘relation to 
self,’ it sees it as that in which otherness has vanished.  It is this view of identity – formal 
identity – which undergirds the understanding in its entire approach to knowing.  And as 
we will see in the next section, one significant result of this is that, when the 
understanding sees the statement “being and nothing are one and the same,” it reads the 
copula in terms of formal identity.  
      The fact that formal identity is wholly indifferent to others helps to clarify what we 
saw earlier about the understanding, viz., that it views things not in terms of moments but 
in terms of parts.  The fact that the understanding views things through the lens of formal 
identity means that it cannot properly comprehend opposition and reciprocity, which 
means that it also cannot comprehend the very basis of self-movement, contradiction, and 
life.  As mentioned above, the understanding deals only with dead and lifeless objects, 
and one reason why this is so is that its fundamental principle, formal identity, is itself 
inert, still, unopposed, lifeless.  Viewed as they are through the lens of formal identity, 
the understanding’s objects cannot be self-moving.  For, contradiction – the inner 
negativity which makes self-movement possible – can only be comprehended when one 
has seen the incompleteness (the abstractness) of formal identity, which allows one to 
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move on to concrete identity, to opposition, and then to the relation of identity of 
difference as contradiction.21  In Hegel words,  
Abstract identity is not as yet a livingness, but the positive, being in its own self a 
negativity, goes outside of itself and undergoes alteration. Something is therefore alive 
only in so far as it contains contradiction within it, and moreover, insofar as it is this 
power to hold and endure the contradiction within it….22 
The positive which is “in its own self a negativity” is a reference to contradiction, and 
this is what enables something to ‘go outside of itself’ and ‘undergo alteration.’  As we 
said in Part II, contradiction is what drives becoming, and it itself is self-becoming.  But 
abstract identity, as the ‘positive’ which is wholly indifferent to its negative (viz., 
difference), does not allow for such living self-becoming.  Hegel’s description of formal 
identity in this passage applies equally well to all the objects of the understanding: “For 
as against contradiction, identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of 
dead being.”23   
      In this same passage Hegel stresses the consequences of the difference between 
formal identity and contradiction by connecting the former with all non-philosophical 
approaches to knowing the world.  He states, “But it is one of the fundamental prejudices 
of logic up to this point and of ordinary thinking [gewöhnliche Vorstellen] that 
contradiction is not so characteristically essential and immanent a determination as 
identity….”24  Thus the rather dramatic claim which Hegel is making is that not only 
                                                 
21 See Chapter 5, fn. 129. 
22 SL 440, translation emended. 
23 SL 439. 
24 Ibid.  
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ordinary thinking, but all previous conceptions of logic give priority to formal identity in 
their attempts to comprehend things.  In light of our above discussions, we can make the 
addition that both ordinary thinking and all previous logics have operated according to 
the mode of the understanding, dealing with Gegenstände, and dealing with them under 
the assumption that formal identity is the category through which the truth of things is 
known.   
      The flip side of this principle of the understanding is the view that contradiction is not 
actually found in things, i.e., in unified entities. For it believes that contradiction exists 
only between things, and that when this happens the things are completely done away 
with.  Said otherwise, the understanding rejects the possibility of Aufhebung, for it views 
contradiction not as leading to a result, but as leading to nothing.  This difference 
between the mode of the understanding and the mode of philosophy (i.e., the mode of 
reason) with regard to the nature of contradiction is one of extraordinary significance for 
Hegel.  In the following passage – one which ties together a great deal of what we have 
discussed thus far in this dissertation – Hegel highlights how these contrasting views of 
contradiction (stemming from contrasting views of formal identity) constitute the 
difference between two fundamentally different ways of trying to comprehend the world:  
Speculative thinking consists solely in the fact that thought holds fast contradiction, in its 
own self, but does not allow itself to be dominated by it as in ordinary thinking, where its 
determinations are resolved by contradiction only into other determinations or into 
nothing.25  
                                                 
25 SL 440-441. 
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In Hegel’s view, the contradictions that one encounters when thinking something through 
just are the self-movement of that something, i.e., the self-ordering capacity of the Sache 
that we discussed back in Part I.  But when one is proceeding in the mode of the 
understanding, the contradictions that one encounters lead instead either to other, wholly 
separate determinations or simply to a return to nothing.  Why it does this is clear: its 
principle of formal identity demands that things are what they in themselves, merely as 
‘self-related’ and not as essentially ‘other-related.’  Thus the understanding views a 
contradiction as resulting either in the coming to be of something wholly other (an 
entirely new self-identical entity), or in nothing (such as when two self-related entities 
cancel each other out, e.g., +1 and -1).   
      But in Hegel’s view, the understanding’s favoring of abstract identity and its aversion 
to contradiction and to Aufhebung lead it itself to engage in contradiction.  For example, 
its aversion to contradiction results in its embrace of the principle of the excluded third, 
i.e., the principle that with respect to two opposed predicates, only one can apply to a 
given thing.  However, in its very formulation of this principle, the understanding 
expresses precisely the opposite of what it means to express:  
The principle of the excluded third is the principle of the determinate understanding, 
which wants to keep itself away from contradiction and, in so doing, commits it.  A is 
supposed to be either +A or –A; thus the third, the A which is neither + nor –, and which 
is also equally posited as +A and as  -A, is already expressed.26   
In an attempt to avoid contradiction, the understanding tries to define what can be the 
case – either +A or –A – and what cannot be the case – the excluded third of an A that is 
                                                 
26 EL §119, Remark, translation emended. 
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both (or neither) +A and –A.  But to be able to engage in the act of excluding this third, 
the understanding must think the third; indeed, its very act of excluding it is a thinking of 
it.  Put otherwise, in the saying of what cannot be thought, the understanding has thought 
it.  It thus refutes and contradicts itself, for its words and its deeds are in direct 
opposition.27  Additionally, it has contradicted itself by thinking contradiction itself, i.e., 
by thinking ‘A that is both +A and –A.’  
      Nonetheless, the understanding does not realize it has done this.  And one likely 
reason for this is that it is not attempting to think contradiction itself (i.e., as a logical 
determination), but rather simply as something that one applies to things.  In the mode of 
application, especially to material objects, a rejection of contradiction is certainly 
understandable.  To take a quotidian example, either my computer contains parts made of 
plastic, or it does not contain such parts.  And, my thinking of my computer as both 
containing and not containing such parts does not bring such a computer into being (even 
though it does create the thought of such a contradictory computer).   But when we are 
attempting to do philosophy, we are attempting to think through philosophical 
determinations (e.g., ‘finitude,’ ‘plant,’ ‘the state,’ ‘art,’ etc.), which is to say: what one is 
dealing with in philosophy are thoughts.  Of course, ‘thoughts’ in this context are 
precisely not contingent abstractions from, e.g., the computer sitting in front of me, but 
rather determinations of the Idea, i.e., all the determinations in logic, nature, and spirit 
which are involved in the Idea coming to think itself.  But putting that to one side, from 
the discussion above we can see that the understanding’s view of contradiction and its 
                                                 
27 This is not the first time that Hegel has borrowed a move from the Eliatic Stranger’s critique of 
Parmenides.  
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privileging of formal identity are what lead it to operate in the ‘application’ mode of 
comprehension discussed in Part I.  Conversely, it is also evident why the understanding 
would eschew the ‘expression’ mode of comprehension, given that the foundation of this 
mode is precisely the Aufhebung and contradiction (and the self-movement they enable) 
which the understanding rejects.  The understanding proceeds according to the external 
and mechanical mode of ‘application,’ and the formalism of its mode stems from its 
privileging of formal identity.  
 
     iii. Philosophical and Non-Philosophical Abstraction  
      In the previous section we saw that the power of the understanding is the power of 
separating things, and we observed this separating ability in its dealings with the 
category of formal, abstract identity.  Even though identity ‘in its truth’ is intertwined 
with difference, the understanding is capable of separating identity off from difference, 
and, what is more, of viewing the whole world – including its own self, as separated off 
from this world – through the lens of this abstraction.  But an issue we have not yet 
addressed in any depth is Hegel’s view that the understanding – while making possible 
the errors of formalism – also makes possible the activity of philosophy.  In this section 
we will thus investigate these two very different dimensions of the understanding, 
focusing especially on the understanding’s role within philosophy, i.e., on what I will call 
‘philosophical abstraction.’  
      ‘Non-philosophical abstraction,’ then, is the term I am using for what the 
understanding engages in when it is operating not within the larger activity of philosophy, 
but separated off on its own terms.  This is what Hegel is referring to in the Logic’s 
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Introduction when he talks about the point in history when “reflective understanding”28 
came to dominate philosophy.  In ancient metaphysics, he says, the view was that 
thinking is not alien to what it thinks; rather, thinking “is its essential nature…things and 
the thinking of them (our language too expresses their kinship) are in and for themselves 
in agreement, thinking in its immanent determinations and the true nature of things 
forming one and the same content.”29  This prior mode of philosophizing was one which 
was not characterized by finitude and which, strictly speaking, did not have Gegenstände; 
rather, its thinking through of the nature of things was a thinking through of itself.  But 
this view of philosophy was rejected by the ‘reflective understanding,’ which Hegel 
describes as “the understanding as abstracting, and hence as separating and remaining 
fixed in its separations.  Directed against reason, it behaves as ordinary common 
sense….”30  This kind of understanding, then, is itself abstracted away from reason.  
Additionally, it operates in the mode of common sense, i.e., in the mode of having 
objects, objects which in the mode of formal identity stand fixed and independent over 
against each other.   
      Shortly after Hegel’s discussion of ‘reflective understanding,’ we find him speaking 
further about the way that the abstraction of logical determinations from one another 
leads to a ‘dead’ logic: “When they [logical forms] are taken as fixed determinations and 
consequently in their separation from each other and not as held together in their organic 
unity, then they are dead forms and the spirit which is their living concrete unity does not 
                                                 
28 SL 45, translation emended. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid. 
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dwell in them.”31  Determinations which are held fixed in place by the understanding – 
held fixed because of its aversion to contradiction – are unable to be thought in their 
unity, i.e., as concrete.   Put otherwise, the understanding takes moments to be parts, and 
thus believes that by thinking them merely in their separation, it is thinking them in their 
truth.  On the other hand, “…logical reason is the substantial or real being which holds 
together within itself every abstract determination and is their substantial, absolutely 
concrete unity.” 32  As we will see below, reason brings into a living unity not only every 
determination in the logical sphere, but also every determination in nature and in spirit.   
      But to prepare ourselves for examining reason itself more closely, let us consider the 
understanding in terms of what I am calling ‘philosophical abstraction.’  By this I mean 
the abstraction which the understanding brings about when working in conjunction with 
reason.  This kind of understanding is what Hegel describes in the famous passage in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic in which he presents the three-sided form of the logical: “α) the side 
of abstraction or of the understanding, β) the dialectical or negatively rational side, γ) the 
speculative or positively rational one.”33  In the Remark he notes that these three sides  
do not constitute parts of logic, but are moments of everything logically real, i.e., of every 
concept or of everything true in general.  All of them together can be put under the first 
moment, that of the understanding, and in this way they can be kept separate from each 
other, but then they are not considered in their truth.34    
                                                 
31 Ibid., 48.  
32 Ibid.  
33 EL §79. 
34 Ibid., Remark.  
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What is particularly fascinating is that, in order to abstract the understanding away from 
the two forms of reason, one must use the understanding itself to do so.  Doing this is, for 
Hegel, not a problem, so long as one recognizes that one is treating moments as if they 
were parts, and so long as one reunites them in their concretion.  But it is more than a 
little ironic that the understanding – as we saw in the mode of ‘reflective understanding’ 
– is able to abstract itself away from its moments, reduce itself to a part, and view itself as 
such.  This means that ‘reflective understanding’ is not only an anatomist, but also an 
organ within the very body it is dismembering.  It is an organ which has cut itself out of 
its own body.  
      Clearly, though, Hegel sees the understanding as a necessary moment of 
philosophical activity, and we need to say more about why this is so.  In short: this is so 
because the Idea in its totality – logic, nature, and spirit – contains differentiations.  As 
opposed to a ‘Parmenidean’ One, the Idea contains moments.  Because of this, the way 
that the Idea thinks itself (in the form of the philosopher, doing philosophy) is to 
differentiate itself into parts and moments and unite them back into itself.  As a 
separating, abstracting power, the understanding is what makes these differentiations 
possible (e.g., between ‘something’ and ‘other,’ between ‘identity’ and ‘difference’).  
Putting all of this in more detail: the Idea goes about the process of thinking itself by 
separating off one of its determinations from that determination’s ‘diverse other’ (via the 
understanding), then by seeing these abstractions as abstract and thus recognizing them 
as moments, by uniting those moments through Aufhebung into a result (i.e., a new 
determination), by separating this new determination from its ‘diverse other,’ and then 
178 
 
repeating.  Thus, this process is a continual pendulum swing between abstraction (as 
separation) and concretion (as unification).  At the broadest level, this swinging of the 
pendulum is what constitutes the movement that takes place between the determination 
‘being’ at the beginning of the Logic and the determination ‘philosophy’ at the end of the 
Philosophy of Spirit.  For, philosophy begins with what is most abstract – ‘being’ – and, 
after a 1,500 page series of abstractions and concretions, it ends with what is most 
concrete, viz., its own self.35  As the final determination of the Idea, philosophy is the 
most concrete because it is that into which all previous determinations are gathered, i.e., it 
is the result which arises out of all previous determinations being sublated.  In this way, 
philosophy has thought through its own self, and, because philosophy is the final 
determination of the Idea, the Idea has through its own self as well. 
     But let us returning to the matter of the understanding.  Whenever a differentiation 
takes place – e.g., between being and nothing, between finitude and bad infinitude – it 
takes place through the abstractive understanding.  In this very lucid passage, Hegel 
further clarifies the intimate connection between the abstracting, separating, finite activity 
of the understanding, and formal identity: “Formal identity or identity of the 
understanding is this identity, insofar as one holds onto it firmly and abstracts from 
difference.  Or rather, abstraction is the positing of this formal identity, the 
                                                 
35 The philosophizing act that begins with ‘being’ is, however, not identical to the determination 
‘philosophy’ that is accounted for at the end; for, the former is ‘philosophy in action but not yet accounted 
for,’ while the latter is ‘philosophy in action and accounted for,’ and thus the full expression and being of 
philosophy.   
    Additionally, the description above of the movement from ‘most abstract’ to ‘most concrete’ should not 
be taken to imply that ‘later’ determinations in the encyclopedia are inevitably more concrete than ‘earlier’ 
ones.  Cf., e.g., the Absolute Idea at the end of the Logic, and ‘space’ at the beginning of the Philosophy of 
Nature.  
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transformation of something inwardly concrete into this form of simplicity….”36  Any act 
of abstraction, then, is an assertion of the formal identity (independent self-relation) of 
that which has been abstracted.  Back in Chapter 5 we noted that Hegel sometimes 
describes the difference between abstraction and concretion in terms of mediation: what 
is wholly abstract contains no mediation (viz., ‘being’), and, in general, what is abstract is 
less mediated than what is concrete.  We can see this situation in action with regard to 
formal identity, insofar as abstraction takes what is “inwardly concrete” – in this case, the 
unity of identity and difference as mutually-mediating and reciprocal moments – and 
turns it into something simple, abstract, and immediate, viz., formal identity.  With regard 
to the Idea, then, the understanding separates its moments by abstracting them away from 
the whole in which they have their being, reducing them to mere parts, and fixing them as 
self-standing entities in the mode of formal identity.  As such, the abstracted moments 
stand indifferently over against each other and over against the whole.  Yet, as we have 
seen, this process is a necessary one for philosophy, because the Idea is able to think 
itself only if it thinks through the differentiations within itself.   
      Hegel puts this last point very well in the Logic when he says, “…we must recognize 
the infinite force of the understanding in splitting the concrete into abstract 
determinateness and grasping the depth of difference, which at the same time is alone the 
power that effects their transition.”37  Taken at the very broadest level, ‘the concrete’ is 
                                                 
36 EL §115. 
37 SL 610, translation emended.  
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‘the whole,’ i.e., the Idea,38 and the understanding splits all of its moments into parts such 
that the difference within the Idea can be known by the Idea.  Furthermore, despite the 
fact that the understanding fixes determinations, making them inert, dead, and indifferent 
to each other, it is only because the understanding does so that there can be movement 
and self-movement within philosophy.  Hegel alludes to this in the previous quote, when 
he refers to the transition between the various abstract determinations.  If the 
understanding did not fix determinations over against each other as finite and diverse 
(i.e., as verschiedene), it would not be possible for dialectical (negative) reason to then 
recognize them as opposed (i.e. entgegengesetzt) and as interdependent moments, or for 
speculative (positive) reason to then recognize their transition into the unity of a new 
determination.  Thus, when Hegel says that the “struggle of reason consists precisely in 
overcoming what the understanding has made rigid,”39 we can see that the struggle and 
the work of reason would not be possible without the understanding having made things 
rigid.   To give an example: if the understanding did not abstract and separate ‘finitude’ 
and ‘bad infinity’ from each other, dialectical reason could not recognize that bad infinity 
is what it is only insofar as it is not finite (which means that it is finite, insofar as it has a 
limit), and speculative reason could not recognize the dissolution of these opposed 
determinations into ‘affirmative infinity.’   
      It is thus not surprising that Hegel at times comes to the defense of the understanding, 
e.g., saying in the Encyclopaedia Logic that it “must unquestionably be conceded its right 
                                                 
38 As will be discussed below, it is more accurate to say that the Idea in the form of philosophy is ‘the 
whole,’ for, the Idea as found at the end of the Logic is an abstraction away from nature and spirit, 
depending upon these two for its development and expression.  see, e.g., SL 592 
39 EL §32, Addition. 
181 
 
and merit,” because of its important isolating powers.  Even in our favorite passage about 
the anatomist and the corpse, where Hegel sternly critiques such an abstractive approach, 
he qualifies his critique by adding that “this is not to say that this kind of dissection 
should not happen at all, but only that the external and mechanical relation of wholes and 
parts does not suffice for the cognition of organic life in its truth.”40  His reasons for 
qualifying his critique of dissection/abstraction are clear.  Such a dissection is absolutely 
necessary after every act of Aufhebung in order to set the stage for the next Aufhebung, 
i.e., for the next self-moving advance of thought thinking through its own self.41  Thus, 
the progress of thought throughout the entire encyclopedia consists of the Idea 
continually dissecting and reunifying, killing and revivifying itself.  This process 
continues until, finally, through its own living activity, the Idea becomes wholly itself in 
philosophy’s account of its own self. 
    b. The Being of Ordinary Language 
 
      But the understanding both as working alone and as working in conjunction with 
reason are only possible through language.  When it is working alone, it produces a 
different kind of language than when it is working with reason.  However, the language 
of reason will turn out to be dependent upon the language of the mere understanding, and 
we therefore must provide an account of the latter.  The language of the mere 
understanding is what I am referring to as ‘ordinary language,’42 i.e., the philosophical 
                                                 
40 Ibid., §135, Addition.  
41 Additionally, an act of abstraction is necessary for the Science of Logic to begin in a presuppositionless 
manner, given that such a beginning requires starting with what is unmediated and wholly abstract, viz., 
being.  See SL 77-78. 
42 I should immediately admit that, in lumping all non-philosophical language into the category of 
‘ordinary’ language, I am doing a serious injustice to the rich possibilities of language, both qua language 
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determination which Hegel simply calls “die Sprache.”  His most extensive treatment of 
this ‘language qua language’ is found in the third part of “Subjective Spirit” in the 
Philosophy of Spirit, entitled “Theoretical Spirit” and also often referred to as 
“intelligence” [Intelligenz].43  Before our discussion of his treatment of language, we 
should say a word about the overall structure of this part of the Philosophy of Spirit.   
      Hegel presents intelligence as existing in three primary forms – intuition 
(Anschauung), presentation (Vorstellung), and thought (Denken).  Presentation, in turn, 
itself has three different forms – recollection (Erinnerung), imagination 
(Einbildungskraft), and memory (Gedächtnis) – and the production of language takes 
place within imagination.  Because keeping all these terms and their relations straight is 
rather challenging, an outline will be useful:  
I. Theoretical Spirit – Intelligence 
   α. Intuition 
   β. Presentation  
       1. Recollection 
       2. Imagination 
           a. Reproductive 
           b. Associative 
           c. Phantasy  
                i. Symbolic 
               ii. The Sign  
              iii. Language 
       3. Memory 
   γ. Thought 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and qua Hegel’s own views of language. This is especially so with respect to poetic and religious language, 
whose powers of expression are not only far from ‘ordinary,’ but which – given the place of art and religion 
for Hegel – are seen by him as modes of expression which are genuinely about the Idea.  However, in terms 
of this dissertation’s goal of giving an account of philosophical language, my decision to treat only one 
other form of language has to do with the particularly helpful way in which ordinary language will 
illuminate philosophical language, as well as with practical considerations of time and space.  
43 Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, trans. M. Petry, §455.  
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Hegel emphasizes that, in contrast to a common view, the powers of recollection, 
imagination, and memory are not independent of presentation, standing over against it; 
rather, they are the three forms of presentation.44  To comprehend the nature of 
presentation is thus to comprehend the connections between these three forms, and to 
trace the way that intelligence develops in and through them.45  For, intelligence is the 
more general determination that here – through the development of its various forms and 
sub-forms – is itself being developed.46  This is helpful to know because, when Hegel is 
describing what is happening he will often switch back and forth between the ‘local’ and 
the ‘general,’ i.e., between describing a specific form (e.g., presentation) or sub-form 
(e.g., imagination) of intelligence doing something, and intelligence itself doing 
something.   
      In what follows we will give only brief consideration to the first and third form of 
presentation (recollection and memory), and we will focus primarily on the second form, 
imagination, because it is this power which engages in the production of both symbols 
and signs.  Beginning with the issue of recollection will be important, however, because 
doing so will allow us to appreciate the contribution of intuitions that nature makes to the 
existence of linguistic signs.  Nature does this by means of both the images that intuition 
gives rise to within intelligence, and the ‘material’ of intuition that nature provides the 
imagination for the production of symbols and signs external to intelligence (e.g., spoken 
or written words).  These latter, external intuitions are what function as an ‘other’ to 
                                                 
44 Ibid., §451, Addition. 
45 Ibid. 
46 This is somewhat analogous to how, in the Doctrine of Essence, essence as a whole is being developed 
through the coming into being of its many various forms.  
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intelligence so that intelligence – particularly by means of the sign – might fully become 
itself by giving rise to thought.   In grasping how signs are produced, we will begin to 
understand why Hegel claims that “we only know of our thoughts, only have determinate, 
actual thoughts, when we give them the form of objectivity,” 47 viz., objectivity in 
language. 
     i. The Coming into Being of Ordinary Language 
 
         Recollection 
 
     After Hegel has given an account of the first form of intelligence, viz., sensory 
intuition, he turns his attention to its second form, presentation.  The first form of 
presentation, recollection (Erinnerung), creates an image (Bild) from an intuition.  In 
Hegel’s words, the image is “contingently isolated in general from the external place, the 
time, and the immediate context in which it stood.”48  An example would be someone 
seeing a rose, and then having an image of that rose within their intelligence.  The image 
is what is inwardized (erinnert) and thus present within consciousness, but the nature of 
this inwardization is that the image is, in Hegel’s specific terminology, “no longer 
existent [nicht mehr existierend]”49 because it no longer has any kind of ‘external’ form 
by which consciousness can be aware of it.  Thus, the image is “unconsciously 
preserved.”50  By this Hegel also means that recollection is not in control of its images, 
and he describes them as “sleeping within the deep well of my inwardness,”51 unable to 
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49 Ibid., §453. 
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be called forth at will.  Because such an image is wholly inwardized and covered over, 
intelligence at this point is an “unconscious abyss,”52 and is merely “in itself,” 53 which is 
to say that it is not posited and not expressed by the image that it has created, due to the 
latter being so completely inwardized.    
      However, a more developed form of recollection comes into being when an image 
lying hidden in the depths of consciousness is, through the help of an existing intuition 
with the same content, recognized as an intuition that one previously had.  Hegel’s 
example is an image of someone’s face lying ‘unconsciously preserved’ in my 
consciousness, one which I have totally ‘forgotten’ (e.g., a student one had for a single 
semester five years ago).  Nevertheless, when I happen to come upon this person in a 
large crowd, the presence of this preserved image in my consciousness allows me to 
immediately pick the person out as someone I have seen in the past.54  And, my ability to 
do this is the evidence that the image was in fact previously lying unconsciously within 
me.  When this sort of situation occurs, the image moves from lying ‘merely present’ and 
hidden in consciousness to being differentiated from the intuition to which it is related, 
and it is this differentiation which allows intelligence to have actual possession and 
control over the image.  Intelligence can now present the image to itself on its own 
power, and the fact that it can place it before itself shows how the power of ‘Vor-
stellung’ is becoming more properly what it is.  Furthermore, the image now has 
externality from intelligence, i.e., from the unconscious abyss in which it previously lay; 
                                                 
52 Ibid., §453 Remark. 
53 Ibid., §453: “Ansichsein.” 
54 Ibid., §454, Addition. 
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yet because it is an image, its externality is still, in another sense, internal to intelligence  
To put this in plainer terms: when I, of my own volition, recall the image of someone’s 
face, this image is external to my intelligence in comparison to the lack of externality 
which characterized this same image when it was merely lying in my unconscious; but, 
on the other hand, the image as recalled is internal to my intelligence in comparison to 
the intuition of the person’s face which I have when I actually see them.  
 
      Pre-Symbolizing Imagination 
      Intelligence’s ability to present an image to itself of its own accord marks the 
transition from recollection to imagination (Einbildungkraft).  It also marks a transition in 
which  
intelligence becomes even more active; in Hegel’s words, “the intelligence active within 
its possession [viz., within its image] is the reproductive imagination, the going forth of 
images out of the proper inwardness of the I which is now their power.”55  As we saw in 
the previous paragraph, the fact that the intelligence can now – via the imagination – 
externalize the image apart from an intuition means that it can grant the image an 
existence within the intelligence itself, by presenting the image to itself.  In this way, the 
intelligence has, through the imagination, gained some manner of independence from the 
externality of intuition.  Because intelligence no longer needs an intuition to call forth its 
images, it no longer needs intuition to help it find expression – it can now find its 
expression and externality within itself.  This freeing of itself from being wholly 
determined by intuition is important for our particular focus here on language; for, it is a 
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preview of what we will soon see in the intelligence’s relation to the specific intuitions 
which (whether sounds in the air or words on the page) are involved with linguistic signs.  
      An even more crucial aspect of the imagination’s role in freeing intelligence from 
intuition is its ability to relate images to each other.  This marks the transition from the 
reproductive imagination, to the associative imagination.  In Hegel’s words, the 
imagination “does not simply call forth the images present within it, but rather relates 
them to each other and in this way elevates them to universal presentations [allgemeinen 
Vorstellungen].”56  So, for example, from the images of a rose and an oak tree which it 
can recall at will, imagination creates the universal presentation ‘plant.’  A universal 
presentation is produced, then, when the intelligence, via the imagination, brings images 
into an “associative relation.”57  And, the reason that this is produced is that the 
intelligence’s act of relating them to each other just is the act of bringing them under a 
universal, a universal which comes from intelligence itself.  Thus, when the associative 
imagination relates images to each other, the fact that the “I” is what is providing this 
relation means “the intelligence gives the images, in place of their objective bond, a 
subjective one.”58  This subjective bond, then, is simply what the universal presentation 
(e.g., ‘plant’) is.  So it is precisely because the force relating the various images is the 
universal “I” that the result is the production of a universal presentation.  The 
intelligence, says Hegel, is the “universal form,”59 and, in the form of the associative 
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imagination, it “lifts the universality out of”60 the images through the act of giving them 
determinations “which correspond to the I.”61  While Hegel does not mention Verstand 
specifically in his discussion, it is clear that the ‘lifting the universality out’ of the images 
involves abstracting features from them which are deemed to be held in common.  
      Before examining the way in which the imagination produces symbols, we should 
make a general point about the previous paragraph.  While intelligence in the form of 
recollection simply contained images – images of which it was unaware and by which it 
was thus determined – intelligence in the form of reproductive imagination was able to 
recall the images of its own accord.  Then, in the form of associative imagination, it was 
able to produce its own content from these images, viz., the universal presentation.  
Clearly, this constitutes a further increase in the power of intelligence over the images 
present within it, and in the intelligence’s capacity for self-determination.  Nevertheless, 
the universal presentation (e.g., ‘plant’) still finds its existence within intelligence, and is 
only conscious to intelligence, because of its differentiation from, and externalization 
into, the images from which it has been derived (e.g., of a rose, and of an oak tree).  Put 
more directly: despite the intelligence’s ability to create a universal presentation, the 
images derived from intuitions still hold great sway over the intelligence.  For without 
these images, the universal presentation would be present within intelligence in the same 
way that the image of recollection (e.g., the image of a face seen long ago) was without 
its corresponding intuition (e.g., seeing that face again, in a crowd).  That is, it would be 
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merely contained within the intelligence, in its “universal well [allgemeiner Schacht],”62 
as unconsciously present. 
 
     The Symbol 
      Through a form of the imagination which Hegel calls “phantasy,”63 the imagination 
moves beyond simply giving the universal presentation an existence within internal 
images.  Now, it is able to give the universal presentation an existence within something 
more external to itself, viz., within an intuition.  When this is done, a symbol is produced.  
An example Hegel gives of this process is intelligence expressing the universal 
presentation ‘Jupiter’s strength’ in the image – here an external image, an intuition – of 
an eagle (e.g., the image of an eagle painted on a shield).  Through this act, the content of 
intelligence becomes the meaning of the intuition: the image of the eagle on the shield 
comes to mean ‘Jupiter’s strength.’  Hegel describes the universal presentation as the 
“substantial power over the image.”64 And, in an illustration of the in-itself/for-
another/for-itself dynamic we discussed back in Part I, he says that the universal 
presentation “makes itself into the image’s soul, becomes for-itself in the 
image…manifests itself in it.”65  That is, the universal presentation within intelligence 
(e.g., Jupiter’s strength) becomes more fully what it is through its expression in an other, 
viz., the external image (e.g., the eagle).  
      Yet crucially, in the act of symbol production, the intelligence does not in fact have 
full control over the external image (the intuition) into which it has placed its content, and 
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thus it does not have full control over which specific image it can place its content within.  
The reason for this is that the image itself has content, its own content (e.g., the content of 
the image of an eagle is simply: an eagle), and this content exists independently of the 
content of intelligence which is to be expressed (e.g., Jupiter’s strength).  An eagle is 
chosen to express the strength of Jupiter because an eagle is seen as strong, and this 
‘appearance of strength’ belongs to the content of the image itself, a content existing 
quite apart from any content or action of the symbolizing, phantasizing imagination.  
Thus, Hegel calls the symbol-making activity of the intelligence “still conditioned, only 
relatively free.…”66  Intelligence is limited in its control over its expression, for it is 
consigned to express itself and its own content through images that already have a pre-
given content, a content which continues to assert itself67 even after the image has 
received its ‘meaning,’ i.e., the content of intelligence.       
      Nevertheless, the symbol is an important advance for intelligence in that it serves as 
an expression of intelligence, i.e., an other of intelligence into which the latter is in some 
respect able to externalize itself.  As Hegel says, “Because the content which intelligence 
has taken out of itself has an imaged existence, intelligence is to this extent, within 
phantasy, perfected into the self-intuition within itself.”68  When the universal 
presentation ‘Jupiter’s strength’ gains an imaged existence in the symbol of the eagle, 
intelligence has an ‘intuition of itself.’ That is, in the insertion of ‘Jupiter’s strength’ 
within the image of the eagle, intelligence sees its own self.  And the reason it does so is 
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67 and which, in a sense, is competing with the content of intelligence.  
68 Ibid., §457.  
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that, in this unity of symbolized and symbol, intelligence sees its own work.  When 
intelligence sees one of its universal presentations in an image, it sees that presentation as 
something it has produced, insofar as the presentation possesses a determination of 
universality  not possessed by the image itself.69  In being expressed in an other (the 
symbol), intelligence sees its own work and thus sees its own self, allowing it become 
more of what it implicitly is.  For, just as is the case with the Idea, what is implicit within 
intelligence, and what it must actualize in order to fully become itself, is to know itself.   
 
     The Sign 
      And yet, the kind of externality which the intelligence finds in the symbol turns out to 
be not external enough, i.e., not external enough for it to see and know itself fully.  
Intelligence needs to externalize itself in a way that it can see itself and only itself in the 
externalization, but in the symbol, it cannot do this.  For while it does see its own work 
and own self in the intuition of the symbol, it also sees the content of the intuition itself 
(e.g., the eagle, qua animal), due to the latter’s continuing to express itself.  As opposed 
to this partial expression of itself in the symbol, intelligence accomplishes a full 
expression of itself in ‘the sign,’ by means of the “self-externalizing, intuition-producing, 
sign-making phantasy.”70  As with the production of a symbol, in producing a sign the 
intelligence brings a universal presentation and an intuition into a unity, one in which the 
material of the intuition is “initially indeed something taken up, something immediate or 
given.”71  What makes a sign a sign, however, is that the degree to which the intuition 
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presents its own content is either reduced or eliminated.  An example of this would be 
wearing a particular color to symbolize one’s support of a certain political movement.  In 
Hegel’s words, “the intuition in this identity [of presentation and intuition] does not count 
as positive and as presenting its self, but rather as presenting something other.  It is an 
image which has received into itself a self-sufficient presentation of the intelligence as its 
soul, its meaning.  This intuition is the sign.”72   A sign is thus an intuition whose own 
content has been replaced with the content of intelligence, viz., a universal presentation.73 
      An example that Hegel gives of the sign is a cockade, an ornament usually made out 
of ribbons and worn on the hat or lapel; a modern day version of this would be the color 
green worn by members of the contemporary opposition movement in Iran.  Unlike the 
symbol which consisted of the image of an eagle, the color green acting as a sign does 
not, in presenting something else, also assert itself.  So, while the image of an eagle could 
never be used, e.g., as an expression of weakness, there is nothing in the color green 
which would inherently prevent it from being used as an expression of, say, the anti-
opposition forces in Iran.74  (And the color green is in fact used by the anti-opposition, 
‘loyalist’ forces in Libya.)  In the sign, then, intelligence has gained a certain 
independence in its expression of itself, for it can choose whatever intuition it wants to 
serve as its expression. As Hegel puts it, the universal presentation has become “freed 
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73 See Hegel’s contrast of the “content proper to the intuition” and “the content whose sign the intuition is,” 
where the latter is the content of intelligence, viz., the universal presentation (§458, Remark).  
74 except, of course, the history of that color within Iranian society.   
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from the content of the image,” and “makes itself something intuitable in an external 
material voluntarily [willkürlich] selected by it.”75   
      It should be emphasized, though, that Hegel is not claiming that intelligence does not 
need an intuition to externalize itself into.  Rather, his claim is that the more that 
intelligence is able to shake itself free from the imposition of the pre-given content of 
intuition, and the more it is able to provide the intuition with the content of itself alone, 
the more it is able to externalize itself, without interference from the content of the 
intuition itself.  This is the advantage of the sign, for in it, intelligence “is finished with 
the content of the intuition, and gives the sensual material a meaning that is foreign to it 
as its soul.”76  In stark contrast to the symbol, whose content qua intuition (e.g., an eagle) 
needed to be very similar to its content qua expression (to its meaning, e.g., Jupiter’s 
strength), the sign’s content qua intuition (e.g., green) is ultimately irrelevant to its 
content qua expression (e.g., the Iranian opposition movement).77  This irrelevance is, in 
fact, the advantage of the sign.  For, the relation of relative indifference between what is 
being expressed and the content of the sign’s intuition means that intelligence is not 
limited by the intuition in its expression: “As designating, the intelligence thus proves to 
be a freer willfulness [Willkür] and mastery in the use of an intuition than it does in 
symbolizing.”78   
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      Because the point is an important one, it is worth clarifying further why the 
indifference of the intelligence to the intuition of the sign is not an absolute one.  While 
the universal presentation (e.g., the Iranian opposition movement) is indifferent to the 
specific content (e.g., green) of the intuition of its expression, it is not indifferent to the 
intuition of its expression qua intuition.  In order for the universal presentation to be fully 
expressed, the expression must be an intuition, for it is only then that intelligence can 
have an ‘intuition of itself’ by means of seeing itself in an other.  Put otherwise: in 
finding expression in a sign, intelligence and its universal presentation (i.e., the meaning 
of the sign) are indifferent to the particular nature of the intuition in which they end up; 
but, they are not indifferent to ending up in an intuition.     
 
    The Linguistic Sign 
 
      When the intuition which intelligence endows with its content is a tone, the resulting 
sign is a linguistic one.  In this kind of sign, intelligence gains even more control over the 
intuition, for it expresses its universal presentations in an intuition by “using the filled 
space and time of the intuition as its own.”79  For example, when we say ‘lion,’ we make 
the air vibrate in a particular way, and these sounds have their own content qua intuition.  
Into these sounds, intelligence places its universal presentation of a lion (which it has 
created from various images of lions), thereby using these sounds as its own, insofar as it 
causes them to express itself.  In this way, the content (qua intuition) of the sounds ‘lion’ 
is replaced with the content of intelligence.  Hegel describes this replacement in rather 
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striking terms, saying that intelligence “erases the immediate and proper content of it [the 
intuition], and gives it another content as its meaning and soul.”80   
      Of course, this ‘erasure’ does not mean that the content of the sounds themselves – 
i.e., the way they vibrate in the air and affect the eardrums – is done away with; if this 
were the case, the sign would no longer be a sign.  Yet in a certain respect the content of 
the sounds qua sounds does disappear to the person who is speaking or hearing them, 
something which we see quite clearly when we are learning a foreign language.  Early on 
in this process, the meanings of the words are not familiar to us, i.e., are not very 
‘present’ to us, and the result is that the intuitions of the words are very present to us; that 
is, we are very conscious of how the foreign words sound.  But over time, as we learn and 
use the meanings of the words, the meanings become dominant in our experience of the 
words, such that the words qua intuitions become less and less noticeable to the point 
where, eventually, we no longer hear the sounds of the words as sounds at all.  In the 
same way and for the same reasons, when we are very young children learning our native 
language, we are very aware of the sounds of the words we hear and say (think of how a 
2-year-old will often playfully say the same word over and over and over….and over and 
over); but, as we grow older and become more fluent in the language, we become less 
and less aware of the sounds of the words due to their slowly being covered over by their 
meanings.  Incidentally, this also explains why, later in life, with the help of poets and 
poetry teachers, we must relearn how to hear the sounds of words once again. 
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      The same sort of process can be seen in a written alphabetic language.  Hegel says 
that written letters refer to tones; e.g., the letters combined as ‘cat’ refer to the sounds 
combined to make the sound ‘cat.’  Since the sound ‘cat’ itself refers to something – viz., 
the universal presentation of ‘cat’ (created from various images of cats), Hegel calls 
letters “the signs of signs.”81  Even still, when one is learning a new alphabet of a new 
language (e.g., Arabic), the intuitions of these written signs will be much more present to 
the consciousness of the reader than either the sounds or the universal presentations to 
which they directly or indirectly refer.  That the content of these initially foreign 
intuitions (viz., the foreign written letters) begins to fade over time can be seen by a 
consideration of how one views letters when reading in one’s native language.  Just as the 
content of intelligence comes to be more dominant than the content of sounds in the air, 
so it eventually does with the content of marks on the page.     
      So, as indicated above, the ‘disappearance’ of the content of the sign qua intuition 
indicates that intelligence is now in control of the intuitions into which it is externalizing 
itself.   Unlike with the symbol, in the case of the sign the intelligence is able to have a 
‘self-intuition’ in which it sees itself fully.82  Thus, Hegel would say that, as I write the 
words of this dissertation, I am having an intuition of myself, i.e., I am seeing myself in 
and through the intuitions of the words on the computer screen.  That such an 
externalization is necessary in order for thought to come fully into being is something 
Hegel is very emphatic about, as seen in this passage that we excerpted from above:  
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…words become a determinate being animated by thoughts [Gedanken].  This determinate 
being is absolutely necessary for our thoughts.  We only know of our thoughts, only have 
determinate, actual thoughts, when we give them the form of objectivity 
[Gegenständlichkeit], of a being-different from our inwardness, and thus the form of 
externality [Äußerlichkeit] – indeed of such an externality which simultaneously carries the 
character of the highest inwardness.83 
To put this quote in terms of categories dealt with back in Chapter 2, Hegel is describing 
how ‘linguistic’ expression is one kind of ‘developmental’ expression, and that language 
in its essence is not ‘static’ expression.84  That is, language qua philosophical 
determination is that which, by expressing its content, develops that content, by making it 
actually be what it only implicitly was initially.  To refer to three other terms discussed 
back in Chapter 2, we can say that when the ‘in-itself’ of the contents of intelligence find 
their Äußerung in the ‘for-another’ of language, these contents can then become ‘for-
itself.’  These contents of intelligence are given the form of Äußerlichkeit when they are 
placed into intuitions (e.g., the sounds ‘lion’).  And this Äußerlichkeit carries the highest 
Innerlichkeit precisely because the content of the intuitions has been replaced by the 
contents of intelligence, thereby allowing intelligence to see itself, and become itself, i.e., 
to become thought. 
      To use an inadequate but still useful analogy, we could imagine intelligence as being 
something like a person’s ‘bodily self-image’ (i.e., one’s concept of one’s physical 
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appearance), and both signs and symbols as being like mirrors.  One’s bodily self-image 
is based at least in part on how one visually sees oneself, and the degree to which a given 
mirror allows one to see oneself will determine how one sees oneself.  Thus, the more 
that a given mirror disappears in terms of its own visual content – i.e., the better a pure 
reflector it is – the better one will be able to see only oneself in it, and the more accurate 
will be one’s bodily self-image.  A symbol would be something like a mirror with dark 
spots or warpage in the glass, which prevent one from seeing oneself accurately.  A sign, 
on the other hand, would be like a well-made mirror, having a definite visual appearance 
of its own yet allowing a person to see themselves fully in it, such that the mirror itself 
disappears.  Of course, this analogy is imperfect given that what intelligence sees itself in 
is something it produces, and given that it can see itself in any externalization provided 
that this external factor is indeterminate enough (e.g., sounds, as opposed to the image of 
an eagle).  But the need to shape one’s inwardness by means of inserting it into 
something external – by means of seeing oneself in another – is absolutely central to 
Hegel’s view of the relation between language and thought.   
 
     Memory: The Transition to Thought 
      Before taking a brief look at the way that ordinary language goes about using the 
copula and relating words, it is important to address the transition of language into 
thought.  This transition takes place through memory (Gedächtnis), and what memory 
does is very similar to what recollection (Erinnerung) does, but on a more complex level.  
As we saw, recollection takes an intuition and makes an image out of it, one which is 
then stored and which, in certain cases, can be brought forth at will, associated with other 
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images, etc.  Memory involves a similar inwardization of something external.  But, 
instead of inwardizing an intuition, it inwardizes the connection that constitutes the name, 
viz., the connection between the universal presentation (e.g., ‘lion’) and the intuition into 
which it has been placed (e.g., the sounds ‘lion’).  This first form of memory is called the 
“name-retaining memory,”85 and it constitutes the memory of what certain words mean 
despite the fact that one does not have the intuition (e.g., the sounds of the word ‘lion’) 
currently appearing to one’s senses.    
      As we saw above, reproductive recollection was the ability to recall images which 
were previously held only unconsciously.  The next form of memory – “reproductive 
memory” – is very similar: it is the ability to call to mind names and their meanings 
which it has stored.  While this may seem like a rather quotidian activity, its significance 
lies in the fact that intelligence has made something which formerly constituted itself in 
an external form – its universal presentation as inserted into an intuition – into something 
that is now more internal, and over which it has control.  This is why Hegel calls the 
name “the externality of its [the intelligence’s] self in its self.”86  That is, what was 
formerly a more external externalization of intelligence (viz., the word as an intuition, as 
sounds in the air) is now more internal (viz., the word within one’s memory).  However, 
this process of the internalization of the connection between the meaning (the content of 
intelligence) and the name (the intuition imbued with the content) continues even further.  
According to Hegel, the content of intelligence that is connected to the word is “taken 
                                                 
85 Ibid. §461. 
86 Ibid. §462. 
200 
 
up” into intelligence.87  That is, it is taken back into intelligence, from whence it had 
come.  Better put, what the content of intelligence has become through its externalization 
is taken back into intelligence.  But what is the evidence that intelligence is able to 
‘reclaim’ its content in this way?  For Hegel, the evidence is the third form of memory, 
“mechanical memory.”   
      This form of memory is the kind which can reproduce a series of words, but words 
for which no meaning is guiding their ordering or their recapitulation, due to the fact that 
the meaning has been snatched out of the words and taken back up into intelligence.  An 
example of this can be seen when a person meditates upon and then memorizes a poem, 
or, say, the U.S. “Pledge of Allegiance.”  The fact that it is possible to recite these in a 
rote fashion without having any of their meanings present to mind is an illustration of the 
operation of mechanical memory.  From our discussions of mechanism above, it is clear 
what Hegel means by the memory being ‘mechanical’: the relations between the words 
are ones of indifference, as opposed to the reciprocal relations which existed between 
them when they were endowed with the content of intelligence, i.e., with the meaning 
that brought the words together into a meaningful series in the first place.  Now that the 
meaning has been removed, they are “senseless words [sinnlose Worte].”88  Recalled as 
they are simply in a rote fashion, it becomes clear that they are held together by nothing 
more than the abstract ‘I,’ a “spiritless holder of words”89 acting as an “empty bond 
which fixes the sequence [of the names] within itself and in a stable order.”90  Instead of a 
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living connection between the words, one animated by the actual meanings of the various 
words having a genuinely rational relation to each other, now the words are connected 
only by the fact that the subject abstractly holds them together.  That is, the words are no 
longer held together by intelligence in terms of the specific ‘content of intelligence’ (i.e., 
meaning) within each one; instead, the words are held together by intelligence only in 
terms of their ‘content of intuition,’ i.e., merely in terms of what they sound like.  The 
fact that one can do this with the words of a poem which, in the past, one has genuinely 
comprehended is, for Hegel, evidence that intelligence can ‘reclaim’ its contents back 
into itself.  In a passage that will prove crucial for our later discussion of philosophical 
language, Hegel states:  
The more familiar I become with the meaning of the word, the more it unifies itself with 
my inwardnesss, the more the objectivity and thus the determination of the meaning of 
the word can disappear, hence the more memory [Gedächtnis] itself, simultaneously with 
the word, becomes something abandoned by spirit [etwas Geistverlassenem werden].91  
This notion that words formerly animated by spirit have been abandoned by spirit is a 
powerful image.  It illustrates how mechanical memory is what is ‘left over’ after the 
content of intelligence has been drawn out of the words, back into intelligence itself.  The 
words remain, yet only like the buildings of a deserted mining town, standing still, empty, 
and lifeless.  
      Originally, the contents of intelligence (the universal presentation) and the sign were 
in a reciprocal relation, the sign being dependent on the intelligence for its being as a 
sign, and the intelligence being dependent on the sign for its self-externalization and 
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increase in self-knowledge.  But now in mechanical memory, the relation between the 
contents of intelligence and the sign is one of indifference.  The words have ceased 
genuinely being words, and, qua intuitions, do not depend on intelligence.  And because 
intelligence has reclaimed its contents out of the words and taken it back into itself, it is 
no longer in a relation of dependence upon the words. 
      This transition to the self-reflexivity of intelligence marks a crucial transition within 
the “Intelligence” section of the Philosophy of Spirit: the transition from “Presentation” 
to “Thought” (Denken).   For, thought is defined as “simple identity of subjectivity and 
objectivity,”92  a definition which Hegel rephrases when he says of thought, “It is as its 
content and object.”93  Language has played an essential role in enabling intelligence to 
achieve the form of thought, for language was the ‘other’ of intelligence through which it 
developed.  As we saw, language helped intelligence to know itself by being an 
externality into which intelligence could insert itself and see itself.  Now, however, the 
work of language in this regard is over, and thought is its result.  Thus at this point we 
can be more precise about the kinds of expression that have been taking place.  Language, 
as the expression of the forms of intelligence called ‘intuition’ and ‘presentation,’ has 
been engaging in both ‘linguistic’ and ‘developmental’ expression.  And the specific 
manner in which language develops these first two forms of intelligence is, eventually, by 
causing their dissolution: intelligence becomes thought.94  Thought, then, is the 
‘developmental’ expression of language, for thought is that in which what was implicit 
                                                 
92 Ibid. §465. 
93 Ibid., italics mine. 
94 see the outline on pg. 182 above. 
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within language comes to fruition, viz., intelligence making itself its own object and 
content.  We can sum all of this up by saying that, for what Hegel specifically means by 
these terms in this part of the Philosophy of Spirit, language (what I am calling ‘ordinary 
language’) does not express thought.  Rather, it is the other way around.  Language is the 
expression of earlier forms of intelligence, and thought – the final form of intelligence – 
is the expression of language. 
   
     ii. Meaning, Copula, Proposition 
 
      Using the normal, everyday meanings of the words ‘expression’ and ‘truth,’ one 
would likely want to say that language is the ‘expression’ of thought, and that the 
linguistic proposition is what has the possibility of being characterized by ‘truth.’  But as 
we saw back in Chapter 2, Hegel has his own particular meanings for ‘expression’ and 
‘truth.’95  And it is these particular meanings which lead him to say – counterintuitively 
to their everyday meanings – that thought is the expression, and truth, of language.   
      This situation suggests that, in his account of ordinary language, Hegel is not himself 
using ordinary language.  Of course, there is nothing particularly novel about using words 
in a manner at variance with ordinary conventions.  All philosophers have most likely 
done this.  But my claim is that Hegel’s language about ordinary language diverges from 
ordinary meanings because he is using philosophical language, conceived of in a 
particular way.  Back in Chapter 2, I made the assertion that one essential feature of 
philosophical language is that it expresses philosophical determinations,96 i.e., those 
determinations which Hegel views as essential moments of the Idea’s coming to know 
                                                 
95 see pg. 44. 
96 see pg. 28. 
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itself.  This claim could be reversed as well, to say that philosophical determinations can 
only be accounted for through philosophical language.  And since ordinary language (i.e., 
Sprache) is clearly a philosophical determination for Hegel, insofar as philosophy could 
not come into being without it, this entails that ordinary language must be accounted for 
by using philosophical language.   
      But with regard to Hegel’s claim that thought is the expression and truth of language, 
we can see that his meanings of the words ‘expression’ and ‘truth’ are ones that he has 
developed immanently from within his philosophy as a whole.  We will discuss this 
theme in more detail in the next chapter, but at this point we can say that another feature 
of philosophical language is that it uses words which have been endowed with meaning 
through the activity of philosophy.  As we saw in Chapter 2, the word ‘expression’ 
(Ausdruck, Äußerung) for Hegel – what I have been calling ‘developmental’ expression – 
involves a long series of determinations including ‘in-itself/for-another/for-itself,’ 
Kraft/Äußerung (force/expression), Innere/Äußere (inner/outer), and Äußerlichkeit 
(externality), etc.97  Thus, although this sense of ‘expression’ as found in the Logic is 
certainly operative within ‘human’ and specifically ‘linguistic’ affairs, it is first of all an 
ontological category (this despite the fact that it itself later receives a further expression 
in the realm of spirit, in the being of ordinary language and, finally, in the being of 
philosophical language).  The primary point here is that Hegel accounts for the nature of 
ordinary language not through its own self, but through words whose meanings he has 
developed out of previous philosophical determinations. 
                                                 
97 e.g., pg. 47.  
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      To return to the nature of ordinary language itself, how does it derive the meanings of 
its words?  As we saw in our treatment of language’s coming-into-being, linguistic signs 
are formed when intelligence places a universal presentation into an intuition, thereby 
substituting its own content for the content of the intuition qua intuition.  But what is the 
origin of the universal presentation?  We spoke earlier about how it is formed by the 
‘associative imagination’ when it relates images it has stored and, in this relating, 
“elevates them to universal presentations [allgemeinen Vorstellungen].”98  The example 
we gave was the association of the images of a rose and an oak tree to create the universal 
presentation ‘plant’; another, simpler example would be associating the images of various 
roses to create the universal presentation ‘rose.’ Intelligence gives these images a 
‘subjective bond’ when, as Hegel says, it “lifts the universality out of” 99 them; that is, 
because the ‘I’ has a universal form, it is able to grant its own status to the images, by 
associating them with each other and then with the universal presentation that it has 
constructed out of them.  And it is this constructed universal presentation which becomes 
a ‘meaning’ (Bedeutung) when it is placed within an intuition.   
      The result of this process, however, is that the meanings of the words of ordinary 
language have only a tenuous relation to that which the words are naming.  More 
specifically, there is no guarantee that the universal presentation which intelligence 
creates, and which it then places into an intuition, has an actual existence outside of the 
intelligence itself.  Hegel’s description of how the meanings of ordinary words come into 
being is, indeed, extremely similar to a general nominalist view of language and 
                                                 
98 Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, §455, Addition. 
99 Ibid., §451, Addition. 
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universals.  This is no accident, for he does not believe there is such a thing as, e.g., the 
‘eternal essence’ of a rose, as indicated by the fact that he does not view ‘rose’ as a 
philosophical determination.  Put otherwise, philosophy could still have come into being 
even if there were no roses.  It is thus not surprising that he would describe the way that 
the universal ‘rose’ and its name come into being as a subjective process, i.e., one taking 
place merely within consciousness.  It must be stressed that this ‘subjective’ nature of the 
process does not in any way detract from the central importance of the process for 
intelligence; for, although it is only a construct of intelligence, the universal presentation 
which is placed into an intuition still is what allows intelligence to see its products 
outside of itself and thus see itself.  That what intelligence is seeing outside itself does not 
actually exist beyond itself and its words is, therefore, irrelevant to the crucial role that 
ordinary language plays in the development of intelligence into thought.100   
      But what about the universal presentation ‘plant’?  As we have mentioned, Hegel 
does see ‘plant’ as a philosophical determination.  However, what ordinary language 
means when it says ‘plant’ is not what philosophy means.  The reason for this is clear, 
and using a bit of Kantian terminology is helpful here.  Ordinary language’s meaning of 
this word comes into being a posteriori, through intelligence abstracting from various 
images within it, i.e., from a large collection of all the plants it has seen, heard about, etc.  
Thus its meaning of the word ‘plant’ is based on – and limited by – the particular 
experiences it has had of what it ends up considering to be individual plants.  
                                                 
100 A more nuanced account of these matters would need to address the fact that these ‘merely’ subjective 
meanings often have enormous ‘objective’ consequences, e.g., the way that botanists go about investigating 
nature, or – to take an example from the realm of spirit – the shared universal presentation ‘democracy’ 
amongst a population which overthrows a dictatorship and puts a democratic government in its place.  
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Philosophy’s meaning of the word, on the other hand, comes into being through an a 
priori investigation101 which begins in the Science of Logic and proceeds through the 
Philosophy of Nature, up to the point where the result and expression of all the previous 
determinations is given the name ‘plant.’  In light of this, Hegel would view the ordinary 
language meaning of the word ‘plant’ as a contingently and abstractly constructed one, 
not expressive of the essence of what ‘plant’ really is.  Of course, philosophy too – as 
necessarily involving the abstraction of the understanding – has used abstraction to come 
to its definition of plant.  But the mode of abstraction used by intelligence in coming to 
its definition is that of the understanding as separated off from reason.  Because this kind 
of understanding operates according to the category of formal identity, ordinary 
language’s definition of ‘plant’ is formulated through this lens, and thus is formulated as 
something which is – and which can be comprehended – on its own terms.  ‘On its own 
terms,’ quite literally.   
      Of course, this does not mean that the perspective of ordinary language does not 
realize that its definitions also contains words which themselves must be defined.  Take, 
for example, the definition of plant as “any member of the kingdom Plantae, comprising 
multicellular organisms that typically produce their own food from inorganic matter by 
the process of photosynthesis and that have more or less rigid cell walls containing 
cellulose.”  Clearly, this definition contains words which must themselves be grasped in 
order to grasp its definition of the word ‘plant.’  But the way in which such a definition is 
nonetheless abstract is that it does not include any claims about, e.g., the logic, 
                                                 
101 a priori in Kant’s sense of the term, i.e., with regard to intuitions.  However, as we will discuss below, it 
is in fact experiential in that thought experiences itself . 
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mathematics, and physics which are presupposed by its terms.  That is, someone 
operating in the mode of ordinary language would not think that they would need to first 
do logic, mathematics, and physics before being able to grasp this definition of ‘plant.’  
Rather, such a person would view ‘plant’ as something self-standing, both in terms of its 
definition and in terms of its being.  Even though, of course, no one would deny that 
individual plants depend on other things (water, air, sun, etc.) in order to survive, the 
meaning of ‘plant’ – when defined by intelligence through a process of abstraction under 
the category of formal identity – would be seen as having its being within itself. 
      Furthermore, because this definition of ‘plant’ is formulated simply in terms of what 
humans have currently come across and experienced, it is neither necessary nor universal.  
The contingency of this definition can be seen by the fact that, if humans were to 
discover some other solar system with a planet containing life in the form of plant-like 
entities with leaves and stems whose cell walls do not contain cellulose, the definition of 
‘plant’ would then be adjusted accordingly.  Because intelligence forms universal 
presentations by making abstractions from images, it is limited to forming these 
presentations from those images that it possesses, i.e., that it has happened to come 
across.    
      That the meanings of the words of ordinary language are characterized by both formal 
identity and contingency allows us to make a number of connections with our previous 
discussions. To put this in terms of the themes we discussed in Part II, the language that 
intelligence creates is one characterized by the relation of whole and part, and of 
indifference.  For the universal presentation – i.e., the meaning – which intelligence 
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places into an intuition is not one that is reciprocally dependent upon its other, as a 
moment would be; rather, it is a ‘part,’ one which certainly can be placed in relation to 
other parts, but which does not have an opposition (Gegensatz) which essentially 
determines it.  Because the meaning of the word (e.g., ‘plant’) does not have an opposite, 
the relation between various words is one of diversity (Verschiedenheit), and thus one of 
indifference.  When all the words are taken as a whole, one clearly has a language 
characterized by the relation of whole and part.  
      Additionally, both the coming-into-being of ordinary language as a whole, and any 
accounts that are given by means of it, operate in the mode of mechanism.  In our 
discussion of mechanism in Part II we saw that its movements do not arise immanently 
but come instead from some source which is other to it.  This is just what we see with the 
coming-into-being of ordinary language, whose words stand in the relation of ‘parts,’ and 
which comes into being not of its own accord but from some external source, viz., 
intelligence.  We can also see a mechanistic dimension to accounts that are given in 
ordinary language: any such account will be one whose arrangement and movement 
originates in something external to it, for something external must put its words into 
motion.  With ordinary language, this external other is the person making use of the 
language, arranging the words in the manner he or she deems correct because of the fact 
that these words cannot arrange themselves.  Why these words cannot do so is clear: their 
meanings lack the essential difference (opposition) necessary for their mutual 
contradiction and their living self-movement. 
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      Implicit within the mechanism of ordinary language and the externality of its source 
of movement is the matter of the Gegenstände of the understanding.  Intelligence stands 
over against the words and arranges them as it sees fit.  One could object to this claim by 
pointing out that the meanings which intelligence has placed within the intuitions are in 
one sense external to it (in that they are in the intuitions), but in another sense are not 
external, insofar as they are created by it, and are its ‘content.’ What is important to note 
here, though, is that intelligence believes its meanings are external to it: it believes there 
is an ‘essence’ out in the world which it is naming ‘rose.’ Therefore, similar to the 
understanding in “Force and the Understanding,” intelligence believes it is making claims 
about the world, but it is actually only making claims about itself.  This is also analogous 
to the workings of the ‘reflective understanding’ which we discussed earlier.  Although it 
views itself as separated off from reason whenever it makes claims about reason (e.g., ‘I 
am separate from reason’), it is unknowingly making claims about itself, insofar as the 
understanding is genuinely and essentially determined by its relation to reason.  
Nevertheless, the understanding and the intelligence’s belief in the gegenständlich nature 
of what they are considering does, in a very real sense, make it so.  For, we are dealing 
with consciousness here, and the being of consciousness is determined in part by how it 
conceives of itself.  Thus, the relation of the intelligence to the meanings of the words of 
ordinary language which it arranges into an account is genuinely an external one.  And 
the result is that any account given through ordinary language operates mechanistically: 
the meanings of the words are external to each other, and their movement is imparted to 
them by an external force.  
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      We can shed further light on these workings of ordinary language by again 
considering the influence of the category of formal (abstract) identity.  Specifically, we 
should consider the influence of this category on one particular word, the word ‘is.’  Back 
in Chapter 3, on “Being and nothing is one and the same [Sein und Nichts ist ein und 
dasselbe],” we discussed at length Hegel’s view that any proposition ‘A is B’ expresses 
the sameness of the two, and contains as unexpressed their difference.  While we are 
unable to grasp the reason for this in the Doctrine of Being, we come to see in the 
Doctrine of Essence that identity and difference are moments – mutually-determining and 
inseparable – and then we are able to look back and grasp why the ‘is’ contained the 
(unexpressed) difference of being and nothing.  Clearly, ordinary language comes to no 
such conclusion about the relation of identity and difference, and the practical result is 
that it views the copula solely in terms of identity, i.e., solely in terms of formal identity.  
From another angle, then, we see once again why ordinary language is not self-moving 
but rather dead and lifeless, moving only when something other than it acts upon it.  For 
when terms are viewed in terms of formal, abstract identity, those terms cannot be 
oppositionally-related, cannot be contradictory, and thus cannot dissolve in an Aufhebung 
into a result.  As we quoted above, Hegel asserts that “abstract identity is not as yet a 
livingness,”102 and that “identity is merely the determination of the simple immediate, of 
dead being.”103  This was the reason why, if external reflection had not discerned the 
difference implicit in “being and nothing are the same” such that the difference could be 
expressed (in “being and nothing are not the same”), the self-movement of the Science of 
                                                 
102 SL 440, translation emended. 
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Logic would have come to a halt.104  Ordinary language, operating under the assumption 
of formal identity, has no self-movement which even could come to a halt.   
      In raising the issue of the copula, we are now dealing directly with the propositions of 
ordinary language.  And we can apply much of what we said above about how the words 
of ordinary language are related to how its propositions are related.  Because ordinary 
language is formed and utilized by a mode of consciousness which views itself as having 
Gegenstände, its tendency is to view not only the universal presentations (meanings) of 
its words but also the meanings of its propositions as self-standing.  A case in point is 
what we were just discussing, identity statements.  From the point of view of ordinary 
language, the proposition “A monkey is an animal” is a statement that is independent and 
self-standing; that is, it needs no other statement to ‘assist’ it in order for its contents to 
be expressed.  Hegel, on the other hand, would assert that the very nature of the 
proposition is such that no single proposition can express its contents, because no single 
proposition can express both identity and difference.  But given that formal identity is the 
structural underpinning of ordinary language, we can see why someone working in the 
mode of ordinary language would view single propositions as being able to express their 
contents.  Hegel speaks of this indirectly in the Philosophy of Spirit’s account of 
language, when he says, “The formal element of language [Das Formelle der Sprache] is 
the work of the understanding, which informs it with its categories; this logical instinct 
brings forth the grammar of language.”105  Just previously he had spoken of the ‘material’ 
                                                 
104 self-movement which – at that point – consists merely of being transitioning into nothing and back 
again.  
105 Philosophy of Subjective Spirit §459, Remark. 
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element of language, i.e., the intuitions of the sounds used, so it is evident that by the 
‘formal’ element he is referring to how the material of the intuitions is structured.  And 
his statement on this is unequivocal: it is structured by the understanding, which “informs 
[einbildet] it with its categories.”  Philosophical language, as we will see, also has a 
formal element, but because it is informed by both the understanding and reason, it 
operates with different categories and a different grammar.  But because the 
understanding alone determines the formal element of ordinary language, and because its 
fundamental category is formal identity, we can see now even more clearly why ordinary 
language is oriented around this category.  The understanding literally shapes or builds or 
forms (bildet) the category of formal identity into (ein) ordinary language, and in so 
doing it determines its grammar.  The relations within propositions and the relations 
between propositions – all relations in ordinary language – are seen through this 
particular logical lens.  Thus, if any kind of language is able to give a proper account of 
the world, it is not going to be ordinary language.  It will rather have to be some language 
whose structuring force does not cling to the enormously powerful but lifeless category 
of formal identity, but which instead sees this formal category as merely one moment of 
the whole. 
 
7. Philosophical Language  
      a. Reason: Thought as Living  
 
      From the discussions above we have already had the opportunity to sketch an outline 
of reason, particularly in its differences from the understanding. For example, we alluded 
to the fact that, in contrast to the understanding, reason is a non-mechanical knowing 
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insofar as a.) it is not a cause, given that it does not have ‘objects’ which are other to it 
and which it thus might externally arrange according to its own particular movements, b.) 
it is not an effect, again because it does not have objects, which – from an ‘outside’ 
perspective – could cause it to be constituted in a particular way, and c.) it does not view 
the determinations it is dealing with as external and indifferent to each other, because the 
determinations it is dealing with are those of its own self.  Additionally, we have 
examined how the understanding is, nonetheless, intimately involved in the activity of 
reason, and how reason is able to think concretely insofar as it is able to think 
contradiction.  About this last point, more will be said below.  
      But Hegel uses the word ‘reason’ in a number of different ways and contexts, so we 
should first clarify which one is most important for our investigation.  In short, the reason 
which is involved in creating philosophical language is the one which Hegel describes as 
speculative thinking, as in this passage: “Speculative thinking consists solely in the fact 
that thought holds fast contradiction, in its own self, but does not allow itself to be 
dominated by it as in ordinary thinking….106  As we know, speculative thinking is that 
which has “speculative content,”107 i.e., content which cannot be expressed in a single 
proposition insofar as it “expressly contains the very oppositions at which the 
understanding stops short….sublated within itself.”108  Speculative thinking is able to 
comprehend such content because, unlike the understanding, it can think through these 
oppositions and their ensuing contradictions.  This is what we see Hegel describing when, 
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in his description of ‘the three forms of the logical,’ he states that the “speculative or 
positively rational apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the 
affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and in their transition.”109   
      But, is this ‘speculative thinking’ the Vernunft which Hegel is describing in the 
logical sphere, or is it the Vernunft which shows up in the second section of “Subjective 
Spirit” in the Philosophy of Spirit?  Or alternately, is it the Vernunft which appears at the 
very end of the Philosophy of Spirit, in the definition of philosophy itself?  One way to 
address this issue, and to sort out these different senses of reason, is to investigate reason 
under the aspect of infinitude and self-knowing.  
 
       i. Infinitude and Self-Knowing 
 
      Hegel addresses the first two of these three senses of reason – the ones in the Logic 
and “Subjective Spirit” – in a Remark on Denken in the Philosophy of Spirit: 
In the Logic, thinking is, as it first is, in-itself, and it develops itself as reason in that 
oppositionless element.  It also appears as a stage in consciousness.  Here, reason is as the 
truth of opposition, as it had determined itself within spirit itself.  Thinking emerges 
repeatedly in these different parts of science because these parts differ only on account of 
the element and form of the opposition; yet, thinking is one and the same center into 
which the oppositions return as in their truth.110 
We thus see that these two senses of reason involve either no oppositions, or oppositions 
that are overcome.  Let us examine them more closely, then, by means of the descriptions 
in this quote and in several others.   
                                                 
109 Ibid., §82.  
110 Philosophy of Subjective Spirit §467, Remark, translation emended.  
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      First, thinking in the Logic is thinking in the form of reason which, out of its initially 
mere ‘in-itself,’ develops itself by thinking itself.111  Hegel refers to this element as 
‘oppositionless’ in the quote above because the Logic is ‘within itself,’ i.e., is directed 
toward nothing but its own self, and also because the end of the Logic marks the 
overcoming of even that opposition (i.e., relating itself to itself), in the Idea.  As he states 
near the end of the Encyclopaedia Logic, “The Idea can be comprehended as reason (this 
is the proper philosophical meaning of reason)…because all the relations of the 
understanding are contained in the Idea, but in their infinite return and identity in 
themselves.”112  In our treatment of the understanding above we saw that finitude (i.e., 
having an other) characterizes all of the understanding’s operations, due to the fact that 
the nature of the understanding is to separate its objects from itself, from each other, and 
within each object.113   Reason, then, as the Idea, contains all of the separations of the 
understanding within itself; it does not, however, contain them in some still-separated 
form, but rather “in their infinite return” to themselves.  This ‘infinity’ clearly indicates 
that the finitude – the otherness – of the separations of the understanding has been 
overcome.  These separations are the abstractions which the understanding makes 
throughout the Logic every time it sets the result of an Aufhebung over against what first 
comes onto the scene an indifferent other (e.g., ‘finitude’ vs. ‘bad infinitude’). The role of 
reason, then, is to show (in the form of ‘negative’ or ‘dialectical’ reason) that this relation 
is not one of diversity but one of opposition, and to show (as ‘positive’ or ‘speculative’ 
                                                 
111 see also EL §181, Remark, where Hegel speaks of the syllogism as “the determination through which 
thinking is reason.” 
112 EL §214.  
113 Taking this process to its logical extreme is what Lucretius, with the help of his atomist predecessors, 
accomplishes so brilliantly in De Rerum Natura. 
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reason) that these oppositions contradict each other and dissolve themselves into a new 
result.  Being the unity of the “Subjectivity” and “Objectivity” sections of the Doctrine of 
the Concept, the Idea is therefore the consummation of the process of ‘overcoming 
diversity and opposition via contradiction’ which reason has been engaging in all along.  
But since reason is not overcoming diversities and oppositions in something external to it 
but rather within its own self, this means that the Idea – i.e., the result of all of the 
overcomings of opposition from ‘being’ on forward – turns out to be simply what logical 
reason is.   
      Now let us consider reason as a stage of ‘subjective spirit.’  Unlike the logical sphere, 
the sphere of consciousness has numerous oppositions between it and what is conceives 
to be external to it, e.g., in the stage of ‘perception,’ in the stage of ‘recognizing self-
consciousness’ (anerkennende Selbstbewußtsein), etc.  Within consciousness, reason is 
one dimension of the overcoming of these oppositions.  The section on reason comes 
after the sections on ‘consciousness as such’ and ‘self-consciousness’: the former 
involves consciousness of objects (and as we might expect, contains the understanding), 
while the latter involves consciousness making itself its own object.  But in objectifying 
its own self, self-consciousness sees itself as standing over against ‘consciousness as 
such’; that is, when self-consciousness see itself as consciousness of itself, it sees itself as 
not being a consciousness of that toward which ‘consciousness as such’ is directed (viz., 
objects, e.g., birds, trees, 52-inch internet-ready HD televisions, etc.).   
      Reason, however, does not have this limitation of self-consciousness.  In Hegel’s 
words, reason is “the simple identity of the subjectivity of the concept and its objectivity 
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and universality.”114  That is, reason recognizes in itself a universality which includes the 
objects of ‘consciousness as such.’  For, it sees that “its [own] determinations, and 
equally the objective [gegenständlich] determinations of the essence of things, are its 
own thoughts.”115  Reason thus achieves the self-reflexivity of self-consciousness without 
this self-reflexivity excluding anything (viz., the objects of consciousness as such).  
Unlike self-consciousness, reason thus has no ‘other’ standing over against it, and this 
means that, while self-consciousness was finite self-reflexivity, reason is infinite self-
reflexivity.  It has “certainty of itself as infinite universality,”116 and knows that in 
knowing itself it is also knowing the essence of things.  Reason in the “Subjective Spirit” 
section of the Philosophy of Spirit, then, unifies the subjectivity and objectivity of the 
first part of the spiritual sphere, just as reason in the Logic does this in the logical sphere, 
in the form of the Idea.   
      Back in Chapter 5 we examined in some detail the logical determination of life.  
Because this determination is the first form of the Idea (i.e., reason in the realm of logic), 
it will be useful to review a few points about life to see how it sheds light on reason in the 
realm of spirit.  As we saw, life in its logical determination and life in nature differ with 
respect to the ‘purity’ of their respective unities.117  The objectivity of natural life 
possessed a certain determinacy (e.g., nitrogen, from the non-living chemical realm) 
before it unites with its concept and becomes living, a determinacy which is thus in one 
respect external to, and presupposed by, the natural living thing (e.g., a plant).  Logical 
                                                 
114 Philosophy of Spirit, §438, my translation.  
115 Ibid., §439, my translation. 
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117 pg. 133 above. 
219 
 
life, however, is free from such presuppositions because its subjectivity generates its 
objectivity; it is, therefore, a more perfect unity than any natural living thing could ever 
be.  And the same could be said in the comparison of spiritual life to natural life: reason, 
as the identity of subjectivity and objectivity which knows itself through and as “infinite 
universality,” is a more perfect unity – and more properly living – than any plant or 
animal life could ever be. 
      However, reason as found in “Subjective Spirit” is not the reason of philosophical 
activity, the third form of reason we mentioned above.  This should be clear simply from 
glancing at the “Philosophy” section at the end of the Philosophy of Spirit.  Here, reason 
shows up in a specific form: philosophical reason is the Idea as explicitly worked out 
through the entirety of nature and spirit.  In Hegel’s words, “This concept of philosophy 
is the self-thinking Idea, the knowing truth, the logical [das Logische], with the 
significance that it is the proven universality in the concrete content as in its actuality.”118  
The ‘concrete content’ of the Idea, i.e., of reason as found in the Logic, is nature and 
spirit.  And, as Hegel hints at in this passage, nature and spirit contribute something to the 
Idea which it lacked.  On its own, the Idea as found at the end of the Logic – that is, the 
Logic as a whole – is an abstraction.  For, the Idea is not fully what it is until it knows 
itself, and the means by which it does this is philosophy, i.e., being exposited and thought 
by human beings.  Put more precisely: this ‘concrete content’ was necessary for the self-
thinking Idea of the Logic to truly become self-thinking because the fullest expression of 
the Idea is the activity of philosophy – philosophical reason – itself.  For it is only in this 
                                                 
118 Philosophy of Spirit §574, my translation.  
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activity of philosophical reason, i.e., in that which the Idea has become, that the Idea is 
finally self-knowing.   
      At the very end of the encyclopedia, Philosophy of Spirit §577, Hegel asserts this 
dependence of the logical sphere upon the spiritual in an even more direct manner.  
Because this section provides the final definition of what philosophy is, it is worth 
quoting in its entirety: 
The third syllogism is the idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing reason, the 
absolute-universal as its middle term [Mitte], which divides itself into spirit and nature, 
making spirit its presupposition as the process of subjective activity of the Idea and 
making nature the universal extreme, as the process of the in itself, objective, existing 
[seienden] Idea. The originary-self-splitting [Sich-Urteilen] of the Idea in the two 
appearances [spirit and nature] determines these as its (self-knowing reason’s) 
manifestations, and it unifies itself in them, such that it is the nature of the matter at hand 
[die Natur der Sache], the concept which moves itself forward and develops itself, and is 
this movement just as much as the activity of cognition, the eternal in-and-for-itself 
existing Idea, activating, generating, and enjoying itself eternally as absolute spirit.119  
First we can note that the philosophical determination ‘philosophy’ involves the Idea – 
i.e., self-knowing reason – presupposing spirit. This presupposing of spirit is what we 
referred to earlier in terms of the Idea needing spirit in order to receive its expression and 
completion.  Splitting itself into nature and spirit, the Idea then “unifies itself in them.”  
That is, self-knowing reason becomes what it is through this splitting (abstraction) and 
reunification (revivification) of itself.  Furthermore, just as was the case with the Idea 
                                                 
119 Ibid. §577, my translation.  
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apart from nature and spirit, and just as was the case with reason in the realm of 
“Subjective Spirit,” reason as the middle term of the syllogism which constitutes 
philosophy involves a unification of subjectivity and objectivity.  But now, subjectivity is 
the whole of spirit, and objectivity is the whole of nature, such that their unification just 
is: logic as explicitly containing both spirit and nature. That is, their unification just is 
philosophy. 
      In light of this, we can now better grasp why philosophy – reason fully knowing and 
expositing itself – is self-moving, self-determining, and living, i.e., why it is “the concept 
which moves itself forward and develops itself.”120  As we have seen, that which is living 
is that which unifies the subjectivity and the objectivity proper to its sphere.121  But in 
philosophy, the subjectivity and objectivity which are unified, and the resulting unity, just 
are the spheres – spirit, nature, and logic.  Philosophy is infinite because it has no other, 
and it is living insofar as – to an even greater degree than logical life – it is the self-
generating, self-moving, self-knowing impulse which is its Selbstzweck, its own goal. 
      Thus, the sort of reason we are interested in with respect to philosophical language – 
‘philosophical reason’ – is neither the Idea as self-knowing reason found at the end of the 
Logic, nor is it reason as a form of consciousness in “Subjective Spirit.”  Unlike the 
former, it is a determination of spirit, and because it appears at the end of spirit, this 
means that (again, unlike the former) it has worked through the ‘concrete content’122 of 
nature and spirit.  And, unlike the latter, it involves the Idea knowing its own self.  While 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 i.e., in our examples, proper to the sphere of logic, or of nature.  
122 Philosophy of Spirit §574. 
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reason in “Subjective Spirit” did indeed recognize within itself a universality which 
included both itself and the objects of ‘consciousness as such,’ it did not recognize within 
itself the activity of the self-knowing Idea.  Philosophical reason, then, is reason in the 
realm of spirit, and is also the comprehension that, within and through its own activity, 
the Idea has become genuinely self-knowing. 
      Having said all of this, a significant qualification must be made.  For, up to this point 
I have been equivocating on what I am calling ‘philosophical reason,’ sometimes 
describing it as the activity of thinking through the determinations of logic, nature, and 
spirit, and sometimes describing it as the final end result of all this thinking through.  So, 
on the one hand, Hegel seems to be doing philosophy as he thinks through being, nothing, 
becoming, etc. in the opening of the encyclopedia; on the other hand, he seems to not 
really be doing philosophy – i.e., what philosophy actually is – until the very end of the 
encyclopedia.  For it is there where, for the very first time, he comprehends what 
philosophy is and simultaneously – and also for the very first time – actually does 
philosophy, insofar as philosophy simply is the comprehending of itself.  So is 
philosophical reason operative throughout the entire encyclopedia, or only in its final 
words?    
      Hegel would, I think, give the same sort of response that he would if we asked him if 
‘the Idea’ is at work or not in the opening of the Logic: it is at work an-sich, but not as 
gesetzt.  Since we know that philosophy is in fact gesetzt at the end of the encyclopedia, 
the an-sich/gesetzt distinction accounts for the fact that Hegel is in one sense doing 
philosophy from the beginning, yet in another sense is not, due to the fact that what 
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philosophy is, in its entirety, is its comprehension of itself.   Inherent within this 
distinction is the idea of development, which applies equally to philosophical reason.  Just 
as the Idea’s being gradually gesetzt by philosophical reason is not simply a bringing to 
light of what was fully formed and merely hidden, but rather is the full coming-into-being 
of the Idea, so Hegel would say that philosophical reason is coming to be what it is 
through the encyclopedia, i.e., through its dissecting and revivification of itself. 
     ii. Concrete Thinking as Experience 
      In our discussion of philosophical abstraction above, we examined the necessary role 
that the abstraction of the understanding plays in philosophical reason.  As we saw, 
abstraction is an essential step in the process of contradictions coming into being, and 
thus in reason being living and self-moving.  Similarly, we alluded to the fact that 
abstract thinking is what makes reason’s concrete thinking even possible.  That is, 
thinking what is concrete involves, first of all, thinking what is mediated, i.e., it involves 
“…a mediated movement which begins from one of the determinations and advances to 
another….”123  Thinking thus becomes truly concrete when the additional step is taken of 
thinking all of these different determinations together in their unity.  But clearly, if 
something is to be thought in its unity, it must first be properly differentiated, and this is 
precisely what the abstraction of the understanding accomplishes. 
      Implicit in all of this is the connection between reason as concrete thinking and 
reason as the thinking of contradiction.   For it is precisely by means of contradiction that 
reason is able to think what was formerly separated into differences as a unity.  
                                                 
123 SL 77-8, translation mine.  
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Contradiction, as we know, involves the dissolution of two moments into a result, i.e., 
into a unity which contains mediation and which is thus in some sense concrete.  There 
are, naturally, greatly varying levels of both concretion and abstraction, but the point here 
is that reason’s ability to think contradiction and the resulting unity constitutes its ability 
to think concretely. 
      Yet reason, as we have noted on multiple occasions, does not think about ‘objects’; it 
thinks its own self.  Thus, what it breaks into differentiations is itself, and then, via 
contradiction, it thinks them in a concrete unity.  Additionally, the fact that what reason 
thinks is its own self adds to the concreteness of its thinking.  Above we mentioned that 
the abstraction of the understanding can occur in at least three ways: separating between 
things (e.g., separating ‘something’ and ‘other’), separating within things (e.g., separating 
the living parts of a body), and separating between the separator and the separated.  This 
last kind of abstraction, of course, is what leads to the understanding having 
Gegenstände.  Yet, in contrast to the understanding, the fact that reason thinks only its 
own self means that its particular abstractions are all self-abstractions.  Its very nature is 
to abstract from its own self via the understanding at work within it, and then to 
concretize the abstractions by means of thinking them in their contradiction into a unity.   
      Furthermore, each new unity that is thought is more concrete than the one that 
preceded it.124  As we discussed with regard to philosophical abstraction, the pendulum 
swing back and forth between abstraction and concretion is, for Hegel, simply what the 
                                                 
124 e.g., the unity of finitude and bad infinitude (affirmative infinity) is more concrete than the unity of 
being and nothing (becoming), insofar as affirmative infinity is less of an abstraction from the whole than 
becoming is.  
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activity of philosophy in the encyclopaedia is, all the way from reason at its most abstract 
(‘being’) to reason at its most concrete (‘philosophy’).  Above we stated that the 
understanding acting in isolation is both a dismembering anatomist, and an organ within 
the very body it is dismembering.  Reason, by contrast, is a dismembering anatomist 
dismembering its own entire body.  Yet, reason also follows each cut with a revivification 
(via contradiction) of what has been cut away.  To rephrase this train of metaphors: while 
the understanding is an organ which has cut itself out of its own body, reason is the body 
(i.e., the whole), and its activity is to separate and then rejoin and revivify every member 
of its body until it has reconstructed itself entirely.  At that point, it is not just a whole 
living body once again, but now – because it has done this separating and reunifying – it 
is a living body which knows itself.  Having developed itself out of what it was an-sich 
and into its fullest expression, philosophical reason is the Idea fully knowing itself. 
      Above we noted Hegel’s comment in the Science of Logic that “…logical reason is 
the substantial or real being which holds together within itself every abstract 
determination and is their substantial, absolutely concrete unity.” 125  Now we have a 
better grasp of how philosophical (as opposed to merely logical) reason brings not only 
every logical determination, but also every natural and spiritual determination into a 
concrete unity.  For the very activity of philosophy is to be alternately separating and 
rejoining all of its determinations, and its completion consists of all of these 
determinations being gathered into itself through its own activity.  In Hegel’s view, then, 
philosophy as self-knowing is what is most concrete, what is wholly concrete.   
                                                 
125 SL 48.  
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      To be sure, there are some passages in the Logic which seem to indicate that complete 
concretion occurs in the logical sphere.  For example, when stressing how the moments 
of the concept (universal, particular, singular) cannot be separated, Hegel describes the 
concept (der Begriff) as “what is altogether concrete [das schlechthin Konkrete].”126  But 
a few lines later, in the Remark, he adds, “The absolutely concrete [Das Absolut-Konkret] 
is spirit.”127  We can see why Hegel would make these two claims, in light of our 
discussions above about how the logical sphere is – in a specific but very real sense – an 
abstraction.  Spirit, as the expression and truth of logic (and of nature), is that which is 
most concrete because, unlike logic, it does not find its full development in another 
sphere, but rather in itself.  It is certainly true that spirit presupposes logic, and that – in 
its return to logic in Philosophy of Spirit §577 – it reveals itself to have not been ‘other’ 
to logic.  But it is still the case that spirit does not find its expression in anything other 
than its own self.  Logic, on the other hand, presupposes spirit (and philosophy in 
particular) for its full expression, an expression which is an ontological/developmental 
one accomplished, as we will see, through the linguistic expression of philosophical 
language. 
      Before finally turning to a more sustained discussion of this kind of language, it will 
be useful to develop one more aspect of the activity of philosophical reason, viz., how it 
experiences what it thinks, and how this experiencing relates to concrete thinking.  
Earlier I made the claim that when philosophy thinks through the determination ‘plant,’ it 
is engaging in an a priori investigation, in the sense of an investigation not involving 
                                                 
126 EL §164. 
127 Ibid., Remark.  
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sense experience (Wahrnehmung).  While Hegel does often use the term ‘Erfahrung’ in 
the Kantian meaning of ‘sense experience,’ he also regularly uses it to mean something 
else, viz., in terms of ‘thought experience.’  The most obvious example is his designation 
of the entire Phenomenology of Spirit as the “Science of the Experience of 
Consciousness,” and throughout this text he presents consciousness as experiencing its 
own self.  A passage at the Phenomenology’s conclusion helps to elucidate this non-
sensory kind of experience quite clearly:  
…it must be said that nothing is known that is not in experience, or, as it can be otherwise 
expressed, nothing is known that is not available as felt truth, as the eternal which is 
inwardly revealed…. For experience consists in precisely this, namely, that the content – 
and the content is spirit – exists in itself, is substance and therefore the object of 
consciousness.128 
It is in this sense that philosophical reason operating throughout the encyclopedia 
experiences what it is thinking, i.e., experiences itself as it thinks through itself.  When it 
thinks through the determinations of logic, nature, and spirit in order to bring them into a 
concrete unity within itself, it does this by experiencing its own self.   
      In this broader sense of the word, we might say rather colloquially that experience is 
‘what happens to you,’ as opposed to something which one merely hears about, or merely 
observes happening to someone else, etc.  Yet, even in an everyday context, this broader 
sense of ‘experience’ does not need to entail mere passivity.  For example, someone 
might say that he has had the experience of making himself into a world-class marathon 
runner, an experience which clearly involved him being both passive and active insofar as 
                                                 
128 Phenomenology §802. 
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he was ‘working on’ his own self.  Something similar could be said of philosophical 
reason, as it engages in its self-dismemberment and revivification.   
      In the Phenomenology’s Preface, Hegel makes the connection between concretion 
and experience explicit.  Here he explains that – just like concretion – experience both 
involves and requires abstraction:   
Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what is in its experience, for what is in 
experience is just spiritual substance, to be precise, as the object of its own self.  However, 
spirit becomes the object, for it is this movement of becoming an other to itself, which is to 
say, of becoming an object to its own self and of sublating this otherness. And experience is 
exactly the name of this movement within which the immediate, the non-experienced, i.e., the 
abstract…alienates itself and then returns to itself from out of this alienation. 129   
As we know, one can have an object only through abstraction.  Thus, to make oneself 
one’s own object – to think oneself – requires that one abstract from oneself, i.e., that one 
become an other to oneself.130  This is what we see philosophical reason doing by means 
of the understanding operating within it, and it does this every time it makes an 
abstraction, e.g., when it separates off ‘nothing’ from ‘being’ and ‘quantity’ from 
‘quality’ in the Logic, or when it abstracts ‘time’ from ‘space’ in the Philosophy of 
Nature, or even in the massive abstraction which takes place when logic and nature as a 
whole are separated.  For every time philosophical reason makes an abstraction, it is 
abstracting from itself.  And when it does so, it becomes ‘other’ to itself in the 
                                                 
129 Phenomenology §36, translation emended. 
130 While I have been claiming that reason – in contrast to the understanding – does not have objects, there 
is another sense in which it does, when it makes itself its own object, abstracts from itself, etc.  This 
‘weaker’ sense of Gegenstand is one that Hegel uses very frequently in the Phenomenology, and with less 
frequency, although not rarely, in the Logic as well.  
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abstractions and therefore can transform this otherness (through contradiction and 
Aufhebung) into progressively more concrete unities, i.e., into unities more like its own 
unity: the “absolutely concrete,”131 the unity of the whole.  
      Now, to match up this process more clearly with the part of the quote above about 
experience, we can describe it from the opposite direction.  The pure immediacy of 
‘being’ contains an-sich the entire encyclopedia, including the philosophical reason 
which is not only at work throughout the encyclopedia but which is also posited at the 
very end.  In the quote above from the Phenomenology, the Idea in the form of ‘being’ 
would be “the immediate, the non-experienced, i.e., the abstract,” and experience in the 
Logic would consist of the “movement within which the immediate, the non-experienced, 
i.e., the abstract…alienates itself and then returns to itself from out of this alienation.”   
So, the Idea in its immediacy – pure being – alienates itself through the myriad of 
abstractions that take place throughout the Logic, but through these abstractions it is able 
to move through all of its differentiations and, eventually, return to itself now as 
differentiated and concrete.  Hegel’s claim is that this movement – reason’s pendulum 
swing of abstraction and concretion which results in a higher level of concretion – just is 
‘experience.’132  
                                                 
131 EL §164, Remark.  
132 If experience is the process of what is abstract becoming concrete, the analogy with the marathon runner 
is again an apt one.  Before actually experiencing the process of becoming a world-class runner, he had 
certainly heard from others what things one would need to do to accomplish this goal; thus, he had an 
abstract relation to these things, viz., one of words and concepts separated off from the physical feeling of 
exhaustion, pain, etc.  His experience of becoming a runner, then, consisted of these abstractions becoming 
concrete.  
 
230 
 
      Since the word ‘a priori’ means ‘prior to experience,’ the broader sense of the word 
‘experience’ as concrete thinking entails a broader sense of ‘a priori.’  An investigation 
that is a priori in this broader sense would be one devoid of concrete thinking, one which 
engages in abstractions of both its objects and itself from its objects, which does not 
reunify them by means of contradiction.  Which is to say, a priori thinking would be 
abstract thinking.  So while Hegel’s encyclopedia is certainly a priori in the ‘traditional’ 
sense of not involving sense-experience, it is in no way ‘prior to’ the experience of its 
own thoughts.  For the self-moving activity of philosophical reason is nothing but this 
experience.   
 
    b. The Being of Philosophical Language 
 
      In a dissertation about Hegel’s view of philosophical language, it might seem strange 
to speak at length about this topic only at the work’s very end.  My decision to do so 
stems partially from my view that the language of philosophy can only be given a full 
account after one has accounted for many, many other things – in fact, almost all other 
things.  While this dissertation is only aspiring to give the rough outlines of such an 
account, following this general approach was the direction I decided to take, not least of 
all because of my own dearth of knowledge about Hegel’s philosophy.  That aside, my 
contention is that philosophical language is what it is through its relation to philosophy, 
and vice versa; thus, this language is philosophy’s non-indifferent medium.  Just as a 
body can neither be, nor be accounted for, in isolation from its specific kind of soul (e.g., 
plant, animal, human), so it is with philosophical language’s relation to philosophy.   
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      Philosophy, as we know, is not given a systematic account until the very end of 
Hegel’s encyclopedia.  This means that he sees philosophy as not only the most 
developed of philosophical determinations, but also as containing all the other 
determinations in sublated form.  Additionally, that philosophy is accounted for only at 
the very end of his philosophical account of the whole means that, from the words 
“Being, pure being…” at the beginning of the Logic all the way to the Philosophy of 
Spirit’s conclusion, we have not fully known what we have been doing.  That is, the 
activity of philosophy which we have been doing is not something we comprehend, or 
could comprehend, until we have reached its completion.133  It is therefore also true that, 
until we have reached this completion, we do not fully know what we are saying.    
      So, while philosophy and its language are ‘underway,’ there is a gap between our 
‘doing’ and ‘knowing what we are doing.’  But what is particularly fascinating about this 
situation is that the gap between the two is closed by the doing.  That is, the specific 
determinacy of the activity of philosophy and its language just is to be closing this gap, to 
be comprehending more of what it is that they themselves are.  This is clearly not the case 
with other philosophical determinations, e.g., sexual reproduction, having sense 
perceptions, establishing a family, or making art.  To be sure, doing any of these 
activities repeatedly may lead one to better comprehend the nature of what one is doing; 
but, this improved comprehension would simply be a side effect of doing the activity, and 
not – as with philosophy and its language – the activity itself. 
  
                                                 
133 This is another way of describing why Hegel sees philosophy – and the not the Absolute Idea at the end 
of the Logic – as truly being ‘thought thinking itself.’  
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       i. Does Hegel Have an Account?  
 
       As mentioned in this work’s Introduction, an important question that must be 
addressed is why Hegel himself never provided an extended and systematic account of 
philosophical language, especially in light of his extremely confident claims about the 
completeness of his system of philosophy.  One way to get some traction on this question 
is to ask, “If he had given philosophical language a systematic account, at what point in 
the encyclopedia might he have done so?”  Because of the very intentional way that 
Hegel orders his encyclopedia, asking the question “where does X belong in the 
encyclopedia?” is to ask an ontological question.  To refer back to our discussion in 
Chapter 2,134 we can say that asking where something belongs in the encyclopedia is to 
ask what it is, and to ask what it is is to ask how well is it capable of expressing the Idea.  
In that previous discussion, we also noted that the more something is like philosophy, the 
better it goes about expressing the Idea: “a turtle better expresses what is implicit within 
the Idea than a rock because a turtle is more like philosophy than a rock is.”135 
      To start out most broadly, then, it is clear that philosophical language does not lie in 
the realm of nature.  So does it lie in the realm of logic, or of spirit?  The view that it lies 
in the realm of logic seems somewhat plausible; for, the Logic certainly consists of a 
great deal of language, and Hegel claims that the logical sphere is presuppositionless, 
‘within itself,’ self-determining, etc.  Yet when we consider that the logical sphere is, 
according to Hegel, non-spatial, non-temporal, and non-material, the fact that 
                                                 
134 pg. 57.  
135 pg. 57.  I.e., ‘animal’ is more like the determination ‘philosophy’ than is some part of ‘geological 
nature.’  
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philosophical language involves material signs (in the air, on the page, etc.) within space 
and time means that the being of these signs cannot lie within the logical sphere, i.e., that 
they are not themselves logical determinations.  Similarly, given that the logical sphere 
does not contain the category of materiality itself, it is evident that material signs could 
not possibly be accounted for in terms of the other determinations in the logical sphere.  
Thus, philosophical language must be a determination of the realm of spirit.  And since 
this language receives its determinacy at least in part from philosophy itself, it would 
make sense that it would need to be accounted for in conjunction with philosophy.  
Additionally, given that Hegel believes that thought cannot come into being without 
language, philosophical thought (i.e., philosophy) must – in at least some sense – receive 
its determinacy from philosophical language.  We have claimed several times above that 
there is a kind of reciprocal dependence between the two, and this indicates that one 
would only be able to account for each of them through the other.  What the precise 
nature of this ‘reciprocal dependence’ might be will be dealt with below; nonetheless, 
given that philosophical language involves material signs which are in some way 
determined by philosophical thought, it seems reasonable to say that this language would 
receive its proper systematic treatment in close conjunction with the systematic treatment 
of philosophy itself, i.e., in the closing sections of the Philosophy of Spirit, at the very 
end of the encyclopedia as a whole.  
      If this is indeed where an account of philosophical language would be given, one 
possible reason – and a rather unexciting one – why Hegel might not have given such an 
account is this: these concluding sections of the Philosophy of Spirit are, aside from a 
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very long Remark, approximately four pages long.  This becomes more significant when 
we consider that the Philosophy of Spirit §556-563’s five-page treatment of “Art” 
receives its expanded version in the two-volume Aesthetics lectures, and Philosophy of 
Spirit §564-571’s five-page treatment of “Religion” receives an expanded version in the 
two-volume Philosophy of Religion lectures.  This is not to imply that the non-existent 
Philosophy of Philosophy lectures would have been anywhere near the size of these other 
lectures, particularly, e.g., given the great diversity of materials that art can work with 
which might be accounted for.  Nonetheless it seems safe to assume that these 
hypothetical lectures would have been more than 4 pages long. 
      Yet on further consideration, we can say that Hegel did provide an exposition on the 
‘Philosophy of Philosophy’: his encyclopedia as a whole.  Given that philosophy is 
defined at the very end of the encyclopedia as ‘the self-thinking Idea as worked out and 
expressed in nature and spirit,’ and given that this is precisely what the Science of Logic, 
Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit in combination account for, it seems true 
to say that the encyclopedia as a whole is an account of philosophy.  But if this is so, and 
if the nature of philosophical language   
is in some way determined by philosophy, this might mean that an account of 
philosophical language is similarly located in the whole of the encyclopedia.   
      That this is a possibility highlights the fact that the attempt to present Hegel’s view of 
philosophical language has a number of similarities – including similar difficulties – with 
the attempt to present his view of the human body.  It is this latter task which John 
Russon takes up in his book The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.  
235 
 
Because the subject matter of the Phenomenology is human consciousness, and because 
the work makes few direct claims about the human body, Russon’s goal in his book is to 
present an account of the human body which is not directly stated, but rather implied, in 
the Phenomenology.  That is, Russon provides an account of just what sort of thing the 
human body would have to be in order to be consistent with human consciousness as 
presented in the Phenomenology.  And his claim is that it is indeed possible to glean such 
an account from the Phenomenology itself.  In his words:  
My argument is that…a phenomenology of the body is implicitly carried out in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, and the effort here will be directed to extracting from Hegel’s 
text the philosophy of the body that is there implied and to showing how this is the 
rational comprehension of human embodiment.136 
While the relation of the human body to human consciousness is by no means identical to 
the relation between philosophical language and philosophy, it seems that a profitable 
approach to accounting for philosophical language would nonetheless be similar to 
Russon’s approach to accounting for the human body.   
      The reason for this is that, in several respects, the human body and philosophical 
language occupy a strikingly similar place within Hegel’s philosophy.  Both of them 
receive no distinct, extended systematic treatment by Hegel, yet both of them have a kind 
of ‘precursor’ which is given such a treatment.  The ‘precursor’ to the human body is the 
animal body, treated systematically and at length in the Philosophy of Nature; the 
‘precursor’ to philosophical language is ordinary language (Sprache), treated 
                                                 
136 John Russon, The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1997), 3. 
236 
 
systematically and at length in the Philosophy of Spirit.  Additionally, both the human 
body and philosophical language are essentially different from their ‘precursors,’ for each 
of them stands in a constitutive relation to something to which their ‘precursor’ does not, 
viz., human consciousness and philosophy (respectively).  That is, the human body is 
essentially different from the animal body insofar as the former is what it is only through 
human consciousness; and, philosophical language is essentially different from ordinary 
language insofar as the former is what it is only through philosophy.  In Hegel’s 
systematic accounts of human consciousness and of philosophy in the Phenomenology 
and Philosophy of Spirit, one does not find the systematic treatments of the human body 
and philosophical language that one might expect.  A further reason one might expect 
such treatments of these two determinations is that their ‘accompanying’ determinations 
which Hegel does systematically address are dependent on them: human consciousness 
cannot be what it is without the human body, and philosophy cannot be what it is without 
philosophical language. 
      An important question raised by these seeming gaps in Hegel’s philosophy is this: 
when something is sublated, what ‘happens to’ it?  Abstractly speaking, Hegel says that 
what is sublated is both done away with and preserved in the result.  In the transition 
from the Philosophy of Nature to the Philosophy of Spirit, it is clear that the animal body 
is sublated (i.e., as a determination of thought, it ceases-to-be, and yet does not go into 
nothing), and that the result which comes-to-be is the first determination of spirit, viz., 
the “natural soul.”  My argument is that ordinary language is sublated and an essentially 
different kind of language comes-to-be in conjunction with philosophy.   
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      Given that what is sublated becomes a moment and then a vanishing moment within a 
new whole, and given that moments are constitutively determined by their relation to 
other moments and to the whole, one might suppose that every sublation would require 
Hegel to present a new account of every sublated determination (e.g., the animal body, 
ordinary language) which now stands, in an altered form, as a moment in the new whole.  
Yet obviously Hegel does not do this; instead, with each sublation, he begins accounting 
for the result as a new whole.  That is, while he claims that each such new whole contains 
the origins out of which it came, and contains corresponding differentiations, the new 
whole is nonetheless a true whole, something immediate with a living (non-mechanistic) 
unity. For, the unity of the determinations which are sublated into a new whole simply 
are that new whole.  Thus, when the determination ‘animal’ (and the entire sphere of 
nature) is sublated and the result is the ‘natural soul’ and the realm of spirit, the activity 
of the natural soul just is what the human body is.  In this way, an account of the human 
body is, as Russon puts it, “implicitly carried out” in Hegel’s account of human 
consciousness. 
      In a similar fashion, I would like to argue that, in Hegel’s account of philosophy, an 
account of philosophical language is implicitly carried out.  Thus, to try to grasp 
philosophical language by simply looking to the ‘language’ section of the Philosophy of 
Spirit would be just as misguided as trying to grasp the human body by looking to the 
‘animal’ section of the Philosophy of Nature.  Instead, one must look to philosophy itself. 
      This raises two separate issues.  The first is that the relation between philosophical 
language and philosophy is not the same as the relation between the human body and 
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human consciousness.  A very significant difference, one we will discuss in some detail 
below, is that while philosophy comes into being only through its language, philosophy 
can, and must, ‘abandon’ this language to become fully itself.  A second issue – also to be 
taken up below – is actually a question: if one must ‘look to philosophy’ to grasp the 
nature of philosophical language, and if the account of philosophy is the entire 
encyclopedia, where precisely should one look?  As we will see, while the Logic is its 
own form and its own content, the fact that it is nonetheless (in another sense) a “formal 
science”137 means that it will play a special role in determining the structure of 
philosophical language.  But before looking to these issues, we should consider a more 
preliminary matter, viz., the role that the contingency of any given specific language 
plays in the nature of philosophical language. 
  
     ii. The Necessarily Contingent Dimension  
     As language, philosophical language always takes the form of some particular 
language which has developed in history (e.g., French, Russian, German).  Given that 
particular languages possess contingent dimensions – e.g., the way the words sound and 
how the letters are shaped – does this situation compromise philosophical language’s 
ability to mediate the non-contingent nature of philosophical thought?  If the medium 
through which philosophy takes place has such arbitrary features as having or not having 
umlauts, or placing adjectives before the noun or after it, how can it be used to give an 
exposition of that which is necessary?  To see why Hegel does not view this as a problem 
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for philosophy, we will look briefly at the way that necessity and contingency function in 
the realms of logic, nature, and spirit. 
      As we mentioned on several occasions in Part II,138 thought in the Logic is ‘within 
itself’ insofar as its contents become its forms and vice versa.  Because all the various 
logical determinations are thought by means of other logical determinations, and because 
these determinations have their existence in the logical sphere, logic as a whole is, qua 
logic, not external to itself but rather self-contained.  Additionally, we saw that certain 
logical determinations are thought in terms of their own specific selves.  A few examples 
we have seen thus far are the determination ‘becoming’ itself becoming (in the form of 
coming-to-be,139 and also in the form of ceasing-to-be140); ‘something’ being itself a 
something, as contrasted over against an ‘other’ which is other than ‘something;’141 
‘difference’ being that which is different from identity; and contradiction as contradicting 
itself.142  While it is only fully thematized in the Doctrine of the Concept, when 
‘universal’ develops into ‘individual,’ all of these various determinations we have listed 
turn out to be instances of themselves.  So, in sum, the Idea qua logical Idea (and all of its 
logical determinations) is ‘within itself’ insofar as it is what it is in the logical sphere 
without any need for external instantiation.  To use medieval terminology, we could say 
that, for the Idea and all of its logical determinations, essence and existence are the same.  
To use Russellian terms, the Idea is a set that is a member of itself.143 
                                                 
138 pg. 115; pg. 138, fn. 112.  
139 SL 83.  
140 Ibid., 106. 
141 Ibid., 116-122. 
142 See Chapter 5, pg. 145, fn. 129.  
143 and, further, it is the set of all sets.   
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      That this kind of inwardness and self-reflexivity is unique to the sphere of logic 
becomes clear when we compare logical determinations to determinations in the spheres 
of nature and spirit.  While the logical philosophical determination ‘something’ is a 
something, the natural philosophical determination ‘plant’ is not in fact a plant, nor is the 
spiritual philosophical determination ‘language’ a language.144  That is, while 
‘something’ is an instance of its own self, ‘plant’ and ‘language’ are not.  One result of 
this is that, while ‘something’ finds existence within its sphere (logic) as an instance of 
itself, ‘plant’ and ‘language’ do not find existence simply as instances of themselves.  
This is the reason why, when walking through the woods, one never comes across ‘plant.’  
It is also the reason why it is not possible for a human being’s native language to simply 
be ‘language.’  For, philosophical determinations in the realm of nature and spirit require 
further specification in order to be individuated, in order to exist.  So, e.g., the 
philosophical determination ‘plant’ finds existence as a specific material plant, e.g., as a 
rose, and the philosophical determination ‘language’ finds existence as a specific material 
and spoken language, e.g., as German.   
      And here we come upon a point of great consequence: this ‘further specification’ 
required by determinations in nature and spirit is, by its very nature, something 
contingent.  For there is nothing within the Idea which requires that roses exist, or that 
German exist.  There did need to be some form of plant life, and some particular 
language, because both of these are necessary in order for the Idea to come to know itself 
                                                 
144 Similarly, the determination ‘space’ is not itself spatial, and the determination ‘matter’ is not itself 
material.  
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through living embodied human beings doing philosophy.  But the particular forms in 
which these determinations appear are not necessary.   
      In fact, it is necessary that these particular forms not be necessary.  As we discussed 
back in our treatment of philosophical reason, logic – despite its ‘inwardness’ and 
‘existence within itself’ – can actually reach full expression only through becoming other 
to itself in the determinations of nature and spirit.  This ‘becoming other’ entails precisely 
that it cease being ‘within itself,’ and cease having only determinations whose full being 
consists of simply being their own selves.  That is, logic’s ‘becoming other to itself’ 
entails that it find expression in the determinations of nature and spirit as determinations 
within those spheres which are ‘not-within-themselves,’ and which involve 
contingencies.145  The determinations of nature and spirit – with the exception of 
philosophy itself146 – thus involve specifications (instantiations) which are not 
determinations of the Idea itself and which are necessarily contingent.  That is, these 
natural and spiritual determinations necessarily have specifications which could have 
been otherwise and which are outside of the realm of philosophical thought strictly 
speaking.  This is true of language, and it is also true of the language that philosophy 
uses.  Philosophical language must possess contingent dimensions, for it is precisely its 
                                                 
145 To be sure, logic contains the determination ‘contingency,’ as well as the individualized contingency 
that accompanies this universal.  However, this contingency,  i.e., the philosophical determination 
contingency – unlike the various contingencies in nature and spirit – is one that is in fact known by 
philosophical thinking.  
146 The reason that philosophy is the one determination of spirit that is an exception to this – i.e., which 
does not require contingency – is that the role of ‘othering/expressing of the Idea’ which contingency plays 
is precisely not played by philosophy, given that philosophy is the Idea as returned unto itself, i.e., as fully 
self-thinking. 
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‘not-being-within-itself’ which allows it to be other to the realm of logic, and thus to be 
its developmental expression.  
      To lend further clarity to the difference between the necessity of logic and the 
contingency involved in nature and spirit, we can talk about what goes on when we think 
the philosophical determinations in each of these spheres, i.e., when we think the 
determinations of thought.147  When I think the philosophical determinations within the 
logical sphere, my thoughts are the same as these determinations, and there is nothing 
further to do in order to grasp their existence: there is no remainder which lies beyond 
the determinations themselves.  For example, when I think ‘something’ and then think it 
as a something, this is simply what it is in its existence.  Now, when I think the 
philosophical determinations within the natural and spiritual spheres, my thoughts are, 
once again, the same as these determinations (e.g., ‘plant,’ ‘language’).  Here, however, 
there is a remainder beyond the determinations, for in order to grasp them in their existent 
forms, I must go beyond them, viz., into the spatial and material world, e.g., into ‘rose’ 
and ‘German.’  And in so doing, I am no longer only dealing with philosophical 
determinations, i.e., the determinations of thought itself.  Instead, I am engaging 
‘universal presentations’ which have been formed by abstracting from, e.g., all of the 
images of roses in my mind.  So, when I think the determination ‘plant,’ the ‘remainder’ 
beyond this determination which must be engaged in order to grasp ‘plant’ in one of its 
existent forms is not itself a philosophical determination, but rather is something 
                                                 
147 As discussed on pg. 28 of Chapter 1, by ‘philosophical determination’ I mean ‘all the determinations of 
the Idea in logic, nature, and spirit.’  These determinations, in aufgehoben form, just are what philosophical 
thinking is.  Thus, when one thinks the determinations of philosophical thinking, i.e., the determinations of 
the very activity in which one is engaged, one is in fact thinking all the determinations of the Idea in logic, 
nature, and spirit.   
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contingent.148  And, as we have seen, the language used by philosophy also possesses 
such a necessarily contingent dimension, one which does not detract from but actually 
enables it to be an expression of the Idea.  
 
     iii. The Origins and Relations of its Words 
 
      Up to this point I have claimed several times that philosophical language is 
essentially constituted by its relation to philosophy, and now I will attempt to show more 
specifically how this is so by discussing the way that its words come into being.  
Additionally, how they come into being will have a great deal to do with the relations 
between them.  As one might suspect, the genesis of philosophy’s words and their 
relations determines what sorts of things they are, and it turns out that on both counts 
they are fundamentally different from the words of ordinary language. 
      Let us quickly review part of our discussion of ordinary language above.  We saw 
there that the words of ordinary language originate when intelligence places a ‘universal 
presentation’ [allgemeine Vorstellung] into an intuition (e.g., spoken sounds).149  
Intelligence, in the form of presentation (Vorstellung), which is itself in the form of 
‘associative imagination,’ creates a universal presentation (e.g., ‘rose’) by associating and 
abstracting away from various images (e.g., of various roses), and it then places this 
                                                 
148 A longer discussion of these matters would require us to specify the sense in which the totality of logical 
determinations – as the Idea – has ‘no remainder’ (i.e., to specify the sense in which the Idea is ‘within 
itself’).  For clearly Hegel thinks that, in another sense, it does have a remainder, that it does have 
something beyond it which must be thought in order to think it in its existence, viz., the determinations of 
nature and spirit.  And because these latter determinations have an empirical and contingent remainder, we 
could say that what is a direct remainder to the determinations of nature and spirit is an indirect remainder 
to the determinations of logic.  This is the case because the logical determinations of the Idea must find 
expression in natural and spiritual determinations, and these latter determinations must find expression in 
contingent and material things.  For as we have seen, there needs to be, e.g., a real and particular plant, 
and a real and material language, in order for philosophy to be possible. 
149 Pg. 61.  
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universal presentation into an intuition.  The result is that a ‘merely sensuous’ intuition 
becomes an ‘intelligent intuition’ – the sounds ‘rose’ become the word ‘rose.’  As Hegel 
puts it, “The tone which articulates itself further to express specific representations – 
speech and its system, language – gives to sensations and intuitions a second and higher 
existence than they immediate possess…”150  Through the intuition’s “second and higher 
existence,” i.e., the linguistic sign, intelligence is able to see itself, for the sign is 
intelligence’s externalized self.    
      How, then, does this process compare with the origin of the words used in 
philosophical language?  And what is the influence of ‘ordinary words’ on ‘philosophical 
words’?  Hegel addresses this latter question directly in the Science of Logic:  
Philosophy has the right to select from the language of common life, which is made 
for the world of presentations (Vorstellungen), such expressions as seem to 
approximate to the determinations of the concept.  There cannot be any question of 
demonstrating for a word selected from the language of common life that, in 
common life too, one associates with it the same concept for which philosophy 
employs it; for, common life has no concepts, only presentations (Vorstellungen), and 
to recognize the concept in what is otherwise a mere presentation is what philosophy 
itself is.151   
Philosophy, then, takes words from ordinary language and reappropriates them for its 
own use.  Because the meanings of these words in their everyday senses are inadequate 
for its purposes, philosophy endows the intuitions of the words with its own content, thus 
replacing the universal presentation, i.e., replacing the content which was originally 
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151 SL 708, translation emended.  
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endowed to the intuition by intelligence.  Thus we see how the specific manner of the 
coming-into-being of philosophy’s words entails that they are a different sort of entity 
than ordinary words.  For while a word of ordinary language consists of a universal 
presentation combined with an intuition, a word within philosophical language consists of 
a concept – a philosophical determination – combined with an intuition.152         
      When Hegel says that the language of common life is “made for the world of 
presentations,” he is saying that this language came into being within the context of the 
kind of mental activity which deals with images and representations – e.g., the world of 
the hunter, the farmer, the politician, etc.  Because of what was needed from such a 
language, it developed in such a way as to meet those needs.  But in Hegel’s view this 
kind of language simply does not meet the needs of philosophy.  Thus, instead of using 
the language which was made for the ‘world of representations,’ philosophy must make 
its own language, one which is suitable for the ‘world of philosophical determinations’ 
insofar as it is able to express these determinations.   
      Let us look then in more detail at how it makes its own language.  As the Logic 
progresses, thought is thinking through its various determinations as they come into 
being, and is then choosing intuitions – e.g., the sounds ‘difference’ – within which to 
                                                 
152  Another important dimension to Hegel’s method of choosing words – one which deserves a much 
longer treatment than this footnote – is that he very often draws words from the philosophical tradition.  
So, when he has a group of logical determinations before him and wishes to insert the unity of their 
sublation into one term, he often considers what term from the tradition would have a similar definition and 
then uses that.  A good example is ‘identity,’ a word which he obviously realized had been thought through 
in a much more rigorous way (e.g., auto kath auto in Plato) within the tradition than merely in terms of a 
vague ‘universal presentation.’  Identity is also a good example to illustrate how the first moment – the 
‘formal’ moment – of a determination in the Logic oftentimes closely resembles the way in which that 
determination has been viewed in the tradition; e.g., Hegel would say that auto kath auto is very similar to 
formal identity.  Other relevant examples would be formal causality and formal (abstract) universality.  
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place its determinations.  But, unlike ordinary language, it is not choosing bare intuitions, 
e.g., a collection of meaningless tones whose intuitional content it then replaces with its 
own intelligent content (viz., a universal presentation); rather, it is choosing intuitions 
that are already words, i.e., a collection of tones with intelligent content, which it then 
replaces with its own conceptual content.  So, for example, the first step would involve 
intelligence placing a universal presentation into the sounds ‘difference,’ a universal 
presentation of difference which – given its origins in the associative imagination – 
would be entirely in abstraction from identity.  Philosophy then, as Hegel says, takes that 
word “from the language of common life, which is made for the world of presentations,” 
and replaces the universal presentation of abstract difference with the concept of 
difference which is what it is only in relation to identity.    
      Philosophy’s endowing of its words with its own content is clearly an enormous shift 
away from ordinary language.  Nonetheless, it is drawing its ‘material’ from ordinary 
language, and it creates its words on a model similar to that of intelligence.  Just as 
intelligence produces its words by reappropriating intuitions for its own use, so does 
philosophy.  Both intelligence and philosophy remove the content of what they come 
upon and then insert their own content in its place: they carve out the inside of what they 
find, and give it a new internality.  The basic mode of the production of both kinds of 
words is thus structurally parallel, with the difference – the crucial difference – being that 
while in ordinary words the immediate content of an Anschauung is replaced by a 
Vorstellung, in philosophical words a Vorstellung is replaced by a philosophical 
determination, by a Begriff.  
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      We have already noted Hegel’s claim that when the contents of intelligence replace 
the sensuous contents of intuitions, the latter achieve “a second and higher existence than 
they immediately possess.”153  We can now extend this idea to say that when the contents 
of thought (i.e., philosophical determinations) replace the intelligent content of ordinary 
words, those ordinary words also achieve a ‘second and higher existence,’ and the 
intuitions involved achieve a third existence.  Thus, intuitions are to ordinary words as 
ordinary words are to philosophical words: just as ordinary words are ‘reappropriated 
intuitions,’ so are philosophical words ‘reappropriated ordinary words.’  And – most 
importantly – it is through the intuitions’ ‘third existence,’ i.e., through philosophical 
words, that thought is able to see itself, for in these words thought is made external to 
itself.  In these words the ‘in-itself’ of thought is made other to itself, such that thought 
can become ‘for-itself,’ by thinking itself.    
      With this sketch of the genesis of philosophical words in mind, we can now go a step 
further into the details, and also look at a specific example.  As thought thinks through its 
various determinations (e.g., being, essence, plant, language, etc.), it gathers together the 
various elements of its progress up to that point into a unity, by means of a single word.  
To do this, it first looks to the language of everyday life and chooses a word whose 
meaning – i.e., whose universal presentation – is most similar to the conceptual 
determination at which it has just arrived.  Then, thought endows that word with that 
conceptual determination.  Put more precisely, thought chooses a word whose meaning is 
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approximate to a unified version of the several conceptual determinations of which it has 
just finished giving an exposition.  
      To see how this works at the ground level, let us take the example of ‘reciprocity.’  
This determination is dealt with, unsurprisingly, in the “Reciprocity” section, which 
makes up Section C of the chapter entitled “The Absolute Relation” at the very end of the 
Doctrine of Essence.  Section A of this chapter had provided an account of “The Relation 
of Substantiality,” and in Section B the topic is “The Relation of Causality.” As we saw 
back in Part II of this dissertation,154 the relation of causality begins with the idea that 
cause is primary and independent, and effect is secondary and dependent upon the cause.  
But when it becomes evident that cause is also dependent upon effect, a contradiction has 
arisen: the two are interdependent, and thus they are neither the separate substances they 
were thought to be, nor are they standing in a one-way relation of cause and effect.  As 
the contradiction results in the dissolution of these previous determinations of thought, 
they collapse in on each other, and thought needs a word within which to express them in 
a unity.  At this point philosophy ‘selects from the language of common life’ a word 
which ‘seems to approximate the determinations of the concept.’155  So it selects the word 
‘reciprocity’ from ordinary language and fills it with its own determination, viz., the unity 
of the sublated and now unified determinations of ‘substantiality’ and ‘cause and effect.’  
The result is the philosophical word ‘reciprocity,’ a word which has come into being 
through thought reappropriating the word of ordinary language by replacing the content 
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of intelligence with its own content.156  Thus, while the ordinary and philosophical uses 
of ‘reciprocity’ have the same intuition, they contain different content, i.e., different 
meanings.157  
      As we have seen, it is only by means of the intuition ‘reciprocity’ containing a 
determination of thought that thought can make its activity, i.e., its own self, other to 
itself.  For in general, since the differing content of ordinary and philosophical words 
dictates that what they mean is different, it also dictates that what they accomplish is 
different.  Ordinary words’ expression of intelligence allows the latter to see itself and 
become itself due to the fact that the content of these words, and thus the words 
themselves, are the product of intelligence.  Clearly, though, these kinds of words are not 
capable of expressing philosophy, i.e., of expressing the thinking (Denken) which 
philosophy is, insofar as they are not the product of philosophy.158  In order for 
philosophy to become itself through seeing itself fully and completely in an other, it 
needs an other which it has produced, and this is why it produces the words of 
philosophical language.  For Hegel, philosophy is the thinking which thinks itself, and it 
thinks itself by and through making its own language. 
      We should return for a moment to our above description of the coming-into-being of 
the word ‘reciprocity’ in the Logic.  While this word comes into being out of the 
                                                 
156 That this content is different from the content of intelligence when the latter says ‘reciprocity’ is evident 
from the fact that the philosophical meaning of the word involves a self-standingness, i.e., the self-
standingness which is carried over into the very next determination, ‘the universal concept.’  This self-
standingness is the sublated form of ‘substance,’ which was what contradicted the interdependence of cause 
and effect and led to the coming-into-being of reciprocity.  
157 Another example of all this would be the word ‘mechanism’; in EL §195, Hegel says that “we must also 
vindicate for mechanism the right and the significance of a universal logical category; and therefore we 
must not restrict it simply to the domain of nature from which it derives its name.” 
158 Yet, in the same way that intelligence sees itself imperfectly in the symbol, the Idea can often see itself 
in ordinary language in a blurry and imperfect way. 
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sublation of ‘substantiality’ and ‘causality,’ where did the meanings of those 
determinations come from?  Obviously, they came from sublations of determinations 
which took place prior to them.  This means that, if someone were to ask, “What is 
reciprocity?”, Hegel’s answer would be that its definition consists of all the words that 
have come before it in the Logic, viz., the words describing all the previous 
determinations and their sublations.  Similar to how the words ‘cold-blooded four-footed 
amphibious creature with a tail’ are collected up into the term ‘salamander,’ all the words 
Hegel has written about, e.g., being, nothing, their unity in becoming, and all of the other 
determinations and sublations up through ‘causality,’ are collected up (in their sublation 
into a unity) into the term ‘reciprocity,’ constituting its definition, its content, its 
meaning.   
      This mode of proceeding – we might call it the linguistic side of Aufhebung – is at 
work throughout the entire Science of Logic.  As a result, each term’s definition consists 
of all the determinations which precede it.  So while one could, to be sure, give a short 
definition of reciprocity such as “a mutual causality of presupposed, self-conditioning 
substances,”159 this would be nonsensical if one did not know what Hegel meant by all 
those words.  In order to comprehend what Hegel actually means by these words in the 
short answer, one would have to read the hundred pages leading up to reciprocity.  The 
full definition of ‘reciprocity’ consists of the entire Science of Logic up to, and then 
including, the section on reciprocity. 
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      Through our consideration of Hegel’s manner of defining philosophical 
determinations, the difference between the meaning of philosophical words and ordinary 
words becomes even more apparent.  The content of ordinary words is inadequate for the 
activity of philosophy because this content is not speculative, i.e., does not contain 
opposed determinations, and therefore would not allow philosophy to engage in the 
conceptual contradictions which drive it forward.  Said differently, the content of 
ordinary words is inadequate for philosophical reason because this content (e.g., the 
universal presentation ‘plant’) has not arisen immanently within reason, from out of 
reason.  As we have seen, as reason thinks through its own determinations, it abstracts 
them from itself and inserts them into intuitions, thus creating words by giving them the 
speculative content which has arisen from its self and through its own movements, its 
self-movements.  And this leads us to an important conclusion about the relation of 
reason’s living self-movement and philosophical language: the activity of reason thinking 
through its own determinations, inserting them into intuitions to create words, and 
thinking new determinations out of these words just is the self-movement of reason. 
      Philosophy’s need to extract and replace the content of ordinary words can further 
illuminated, interestingly enough, by those rare occasions in which an ordinary word is 
not entirely inadequate to philosophy’s needs.  Such an occasion is what we find Hegel 
describing in the Remark on Aufheben, regarding the meaning of this word in the German 
language. After his discussion of how the word in ordinary German has the double sense 
[gedoppelt Sinn] of preserving and putting to an end, he says that these two 
determinations [Bestimmungen] could be referred to as two meanings [Bedeutungen] of 
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the word.  Then he states, “But it is certainly remarkable that a language has come to use 
one and the same word for two opposed determinations.  For speculative thinking it is 
delightful to find words in the language which have within themselves [an ihnen selbst] a 
speculative meaning….”160  While it is not uncommon for a word to have two meanings, 
it is rather strange for a word to have two opposed meanings.  These rare ordinary words, 
then, already have a speculative meaning when philosophy “finds” them.  That is, they 
have this meaning before any reappropriation of the word is done by philosophy, and this, 
presumably, is why coming across such words is “delightful” for philosophy.  But while 
Hegel himself does not point this out, it must be added that, even though ‘Aufheben’ 
contains an unusual amount of speculative content for a word originating from ordinary 
language, philosophy must nonetheless insert its own content into it.  For, while 
‘Aufheben’ can indeed be used to mean two opposing things, it is still the case that one 
could use this word and only intend one of these meanings, e.g., ‘Ich habe mein 
Zeitungsabonnement aufgehoben.’  It is precisely this mere cancellation/negation sense of 
‘Aufheben’ which Hegel cautions the reader against on multiple occasions, as when he 
says that the true meaning of the word is “especially to be differentiated from nothing. 
What sublates itself does not thereby become nothing.”161  So we see that even with a 
‘naturally-speculative ordinary word,’ philosophy must still replace the ambiguous 
content of intelligence with its own content.   
      And, as we have seen, most ordinary words have a meaning further removed than this 
from their philosophical counterparts.  Above we discussed the difference between the 
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ordinary and philosophical meanings of the word ‘plant,’ and now we have the resources 
to describe this difference more fully.  Because ordinary language’s meaning of ‘plant’ 
comes from abstracting from the various images it has gleaned from intuition, its 
meaning of ‘plant’ is based on its limited experiences.  But because philosophy’s 
meaning of the word comes into being immanently from within philosophy, its meaning 
is not limited by what it happens to have sensuously experienced.  Rather, it experiences 
the determination ‘plant’ within itself, and it does so when the previous determinations 
which it has experienced within itself – viz., ‘being’ all the way through ‘the Idea,’ and 
then ‘space’ all the way to ‘geological nature’ – are sublated and result in the 
determination which ordinary consciousness had experienced only finitely and in a 
confused way, and which Hegel gives the name ‘plant.’  So, when he defines ‘plant’ in 
the Philosophy of Nature as “…subjectivity, according to which the organic is as 
singular, develops itself in an objective organism,”162 it is no wonder that this seems 
strange and even bizarre to ordinary consciousness.  For there is not an immediately 
obvious similarity between that philosophical content of the concept and the intelligent 
content of the universal presentation, a presentation derived by abstracting away from 
remembered images of plants one has seen which involved green or brown entities with 
stalks, leaves, roots, etc.   
      Ironically, though, while ordinary consciousness would certainly consider Hegel’s 
strange definition of ‘plant’ to be an abstract one, Hegel would say that it is precisely the 
ordinary meaning of ‘plant’ that is abstract, because this meaning has come into being 
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through a process of contingent, finite, and arbitrary abstraction from the various images 
that one happened to have gained from one’s sense experiences of the natural world.  The 
understanding and intelligence, operating in the mechanistic fashion that they do, view 
‘plant’ as something external to themselves which they must then – from an external 
position – account for and comprehend by means of a.) sensation and b.) the application 
of various terms which have been imported in from other fields of study, e.g., chemistry.  
Philosophical reason, by contrast, while in the process of working through all of its own 
determinations, comes upon the determination ‘plant’ as within its own self, and thus 
gives the word ‘plant’ this content which has immanently arisen, through reason’s own 
movements, its self-movements.  More precisely, as reason is thinking through itself, it 
recognizes that the determinations it is currently thinking contradict each other and are 
dissolving into a unity; it then recognizes that this unity is what ordinary consciousness 
would, in a confused way, calls ‘plant.’  So, it chooses this word and inserts its own 
content – the determination of its own self which has just come into being as the result of 
an Aufhebung – into the intuition of the sounds ‘plant.’  
      To close out our treatment of philosophical words, we should briefly address the issue 
of their relations.  Insofar as Hegel sees philosophy as producing the words of its 
language as it proceeds, he sees philosophy as defining its words as it proceeds.  As we 
saw in the example of ‘reciprocity,’ every time an Aufhebung occurs, philosophy collects 
the conceptual determinations at which it has arrived thus far into a unity, placing them 
into a single word.  This fact illuminates a second major difference between ordinary 
words and philosophical words, one to which we have already alluded.  While the 
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relation between ordinary words is one of relative indifference, the relation between 
philosophical words is one of reciprocity.  This reveals itself in two ways.   
      First, while the meaning of a given word within ordinary language is generally 
considered to be relatively self-standing, the meaning of a philosophical word is 
dependent on – because it is constituted by – all of the previous words in the exposition.  
So, as we have seen, to comprehend the philosophical sense of the word ‘reciprocity,’ 
one needs to comprehend not only the meanings of the words immediately unified into its 
definition (viz., ‘causality,’ ‘substance,’ etc.), but also the words which make up their 
meanings, i.e., the words that preceded them.  On the other hand, to comprehend the 
ordinary sense of the word ‘finitude,’ saying the definition ‘something limited’ would 
likely be adequate to this word’s universal presentation.   But the fact that the meaning of 
philosophical words includes all the meanings that preceded them entails that, e.g., when 
Hegel refers to being and essence as the moments of the concept,163 he is implying that 
one must comprehend all that those two tiny words entail (i.e., the first several hundreds 
of pages of the Logic) to begin comprehending what the word ‘concept’ means.  
Similarly, if we were asked to provide the definition of the word ‘Idea,’ our reply would 
have to be: the definition is the 762 pages of the Logic itself.164  In a very limited way, 
then, the Science of Logic could be compared to a conceptually-ordered dictionary, and 
not simply because of their similar thickness and weight. 
      But there is a second way in which the reciprocity of philosophical words (as opposed 
to the relative ‘indifference’ of ordinary words) can be seen.  And it is in this context that 
                                                 
163 SL 577. 
164 minus the Remarks, of course.   
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we can begin to grasp Hegel’s words which we quoted at the very beginning of Part III, 
that “Knowing what we say is much rarer than we think.”  It also in this context that I can 
defend my claim that, in Hegel’s view, everyone who has not thought through the totality 
of philosophical determinations does not fully comprehend the words that they speak.  
And so the issue is this: within the encyclopedia, the complete meaning of a given word 
depends not only on the words that precede it in the exposition, but also on the words that 
follow it.  Let us take an example we have already worked with in detail, the 
determination ‘becoming.’  Back in Part I we saw that Hegel finds the proposition ‘being 
and nothing are the same’ defective because it does not express the difference of being 
and nothing, only their identity.  But even when their difference is expressed by the 
assertion that ‘being and nothing are not the same,’ we still cannot explain why this is so, 
or how this makes any sense.  As a result, we cannot fully comprehend what we are 
saying when we say ‘the unity of being and nothing is becoming.’  And as we saw,165 it is 
not until the Doctrine of Essence, some 300 pages later, that we come to see that identity 
and difference define and interpenetrate each other, are contained within each other; this 
allows us to see that any ‘is’ statement is also simultaneously an ‘is not’ statement, which 
allows us to make more sense of the relation of being and nothing.  However, even with 
this significant advance in our comprehension of ‘becoming’ which we gain from the 
Doctrine of Essence, we are still, all along in the logical exposition, making judgments 
about things.  And yet, what a judgment truly is – and how it is shown to be a defective 
                                                 
165 Chapter 3, pg. 76. 
257 
 
form of speculative expression – is not taken up until pg. 622 of the Logic, which entails 
that for the last 621 pages we have not fully known what we have been saying.    
      Back in Part I we also noted Hegel’s claim about the progression of philosophy being 
a matter of the ‘in-itself’ being posited: “the whole course of philosophizing… is nothing 
else but the mere positing of what is already contained in a concept.”166  Thus, as we are 
‘underway’ in this course of philosophizing, every time we think a philosophical 
determination, we do not fully know what it is that we are thinking.  Similarly, whenever 
we speak a philosophical word, we do not fully know what it is that we are saying.  For 
what we are saying fails to fully express and fully posit the ‘in-itself’ of the determination 
of which we are speaking.  Yet, it is precisely this inadequacy with regarding to thinking 
and speaking which drives the exposition forward, for what is not fully thought or spoken 
is some further content within the Idea, i.e., some further differentiation within the Idea.  
And when the differentiation then comes to the surface, there is another contradiction and 
another movement – self-movement – of reason.  Thus self-moving reason proceeds, 
positing and expressing more determinations until all that is ‘in-itself’ has been fully 
posited and fully expressed, a point which is marked by the self-thinking Idea returning 
to itself in philosophy’s account of its own self.  As the ‘in-itself’ becomes the posited, 
the said becomes the comprehended, and what is implicit in what is said becomes explicit 
and expressed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
166 EL §88.  
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    iv. A Few Remarks on Form and Grammar 
      One of the primary issues we have been trying to comprehend in this chapter is how 
philosophy forms and structures philosophical language.   Thus far we have examined 
this ‘forming’ primarily with respect to individual philosophical words.  We have also 
seen some of the ways in which these words are connected, in terms of philosophy’s 
comprehension that the copula contains unexpressed difference which must be expressed 
in a second proposition.  Thus the smallest unit of speculative expression is, it seems, two 
propositions.  Yet we have said very little about the grammar of philosophical language.  
Some pages ago I posed the question, “If one must ‘look to philosophy’ to grasp the 
nature of philosophical language, and if the account of philosophy is the entire 
encyclopedia, where precisely should one look?” I noted then that the Logic, while being 
its own form and its own content, nevertheless plays the major formal role with respect to 
philosophical language.  This formal role extends, I believe, to determining the 
grammatical structure of philosophical language.  So now I will say a few words about 
why I hold this view, along with a few words about why most of this view’s most 
important implications will not be addressed in this dissertation.   
      In the introductory section of the Doctrine of the Concept entitled “The Concept in 
General,” Hegel sheds some indirect light on the form of philosophical language.  One of 
the topics he addresses is the status of logic in relation to the natural and spiritual spheres, 
and in this context he says:  
Since it is primarily logic and not science in general [Wissenschaft überhaupt] with whose 
relation to truth we are here concerned, it must further be conceded that logic as the formal 
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science cannot and should not contain that reality which is the content of the further parts 
of philosophy, namely, the philosophical sciences of nature and spirit….As contrasted with 
these concrete sciences – which nonetheless have and retain as their inner formative 
principle [inneren Bildner] the logical, or the concept, which had served as their archetype 
[Vorbildner] – logic itself is indeed a formal science, but it is the science of the absolute 
form….167 
While logic is its own form and its own content, it serves as the form of the content of 
nature and spirit.  That is, while logic plays a formal role with respect to its own self, it 
does so also with respect to everything else: it is the form of all that is.  Logic is 
contained within nature and spirit as their Bildner or sculptor or ‘shaper,’ but logic is also 
their Vorbildner insofar as it is both a sculptor that is vor/prior to them168 and their 
pattern and example.  Yet as we know, Hegel is adamant that logic is not a form that is 
indifferent to its content; rather, in sculpting the sculpted, logic is sculpting and 
completing itself.  For logic’s forming and structuring of nature and spirit is what 
eventually, within spirit, give rise to philosophy, i.e. logic’s knowing of its own self.  Put 
otherwise, logic’s forming of its content (of nature and spirit) is such that it leads the 
content to become form – to become the absolute form of logic – once again.  For when 
spirit results in philosophy, it results in something whose being is the activity of thinking 
thinking its own self; that is, this result is, like the Idea at the end of the Logic, its own 
form and its own content.  So the ‘content becoming form once again’ which finds its 
                                                 
167 SL 592, translation emended. 
168 But it is prior only in one sense, insofar as there are setzen/voraussetzen reciprocal relations present 
between logic, nature, and spirit.  See Chapter 4, pg. 103-ff for our discussion of setzen/voraussetzen, and 
Philosophy of Spirit §575-577 on how this applies to logic, nature, and spirit. 
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completion in philosophy is what the entire progression of thought through nature and 
spirit just is.    
       Because philosophical language is a determination of spirit, logic is also the form of 
this language.  But this is not saying very much, given that logic is, in one way or 
another, also the form of spatiality and rocks and aardvarks and the family and the state 
and everything else.  What makes philosophical language unique is the degree to which 
logic acts as its form.  Speaking in general, how well logic exhibits its form in any given 
determination of nature and spirit dictates what sort of thing that determination is.  For 
example, logic exhibits its living, self-moving form most poorly in the extreme 
indifference and utterly static nature of spatiality (Raum), the first determination after the 
logic.  It exhibits its form progressively better as the Philosophy of Nature proceeds, and 
better still as the Philosophy of Spirit proceeds.  Back in Chapter 2, I expressed a similar 
point in the following words: ‘In Hegel’s view, to ask what something is is to ask about 
its specific ability to express the Idea.  What something is, is its particular capacity of 
expressing the Idea.’169  This was illustrated by the fact that, for Hegel, a turtle expresses 
the Idea better than a rock, human desire better than a turtle, ordinary language better 
than human desire, etc.  Now we can specify these points a bit more by saying that what 
something is, is its particular capacity to express the form of the Idea, within its own 
form.  So, the form of a rock – as dead, and as relatively indifferent to that around it – 
exhibits the form of logic rather poorly; the form of animals, as we might expect, exhibits 
                                                 
169 Chapter 2, pg. 57.  As we also noted at the time: ‘What something is determines how well it is capable 
of expressing the Idea.  But it is just as true to say that what something is is determined by how well it is 
capable of expressing the Idea.’ 
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the form of logic much better (regardless of the ‘content,’ i.e., which specific animal it 
is); and the form of ordinary language exhibits the form of the logic extremely well 
(regardless of the ‘content’ of language, i.e., what specific language it is and what in 
particular is being spoken about170).   
      But the form of philosophical language is something quite different.  This language is 
directly involved in the step immediately before logic (form) returns to itself, a return 
which takes place by the content of spirit taking on the form of logic entirely and thereby 
becoming philosophy.  Because philosophical language occupies this place and plays this 
role, it exhibits and expresses logical form, we might say, ‘extraordinarily well.’  More 
specifically, by being that into which philosophy inserts its concepts and thus sees itself, 
philosophical language directly mediates philosophy’s ability to think its own self; thus, 
this language is the final step of the long process of logic forming its content such that the 
content becomes form once again.   As a result, the form of philosophical language is 
more like the form of logic than is the form of anything else. 
      This description of philosophical language might seem to be appropriate only with 
regard to philosophy itself, not to its language.  But since philosophy simply is the logic 
as self-knowing, philosophy has the form of logic.  Thus it is appropriate to say that the 
form of philosophical language, in comparison with the forms of all other determinations, 
is the most like the form of logic.  Since philosophical language is the ‘other’ of 
philosophy through which it comes into being (i.e., the other through which logic 
becomes genuinely self-knowing), this means that this language is, in its own being, the 
                                                 
170 cf. Chapter 2, pg. 61.  
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final step in content (spirit) become form (logic) again.  When we connect this last point 
with the ones above, we can see that the reason philosophical language allows ‘content to 
become form again’ is that its own form ‘is more like the form of logic than is the form of 
anything else.’   
      If the form of philosophical language is so similar to the form of logic, we must now 
ask, ‘What is the form of logic?’  And although we might quickly starting chasing our tail 
by responding that the form of logic is its content, etc., we know from our previous 
discussions that as the Logic proceeds, logic becomes less an-sich and more posited, i.e., 
better expressed.  That is, logic as form – as ‘absolute form’ – is more fully expressed the 
farther one proceeds in the exposition.  One example of this that we discussed back in 
Part I is the inadequacy of the proposition (any ‘A is B’ statement) for expressing 
speculative content, given that such content involves both identity and difference; since a 
single proposition is unable to express both of them simultaneously, a second proposition 
is needed.  So, a formal dimension to language has arisen in the very first pages of the 
Logic, yet we cannot comprehend why this form is necessary until the Doctrine of 
Essence, when we recognize that identity and difference are mutually dependent.   
      But of course, even after grasping the nature of identity and difference, we still do not 
comprehend the reasons behind another – perhaps paradigmatic – formal dimension of 
the Logic: its triadic nature.  Thinking through the nature of contradiction certainly grants 
some clarity to the triadic form; yet, this form is not fully thematized and exposited until 
the “Subjectivity” section of the Doctrine of the Concept, in the syllogism.  So, while 
Hegel has great distaste for formal logics, and while the “Subjectivity” section generates 
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the “Objectivity” section, it is nonetheless true that the “Subjectivity” section speaks 
directly and extensively about the logic’s formal side.   
      Because of this, I believe that grasping the form of philosophical language – and, 
specifically, grasping its grammar – would require a detailed investigation of the 
judgment and the syllogism in “Subjectivity.”  It would also require tracing these themes 
out in “The Idea of Cognition,” where the issues of analysis, synthesis, and definition are 
addressed.  Unfortunately this task is one for which I have neither the time, nor, at 
present, the level of comprehension to accomplish.  But if one worked through these 
themes, one could, I believe, see much more clearly how the grammar of philosophical 
language is formed by philosophy.   
      A point from our treatment of ordinary language sheds some light on this matter.  As 
we saw there, Hegel states, “The formal element of language is the work of the 
understanding, which informs [einbildet] it with its categories; this logical instinct brings 
forth the grammar of language.”171  The understanding’s building of its categories into 
ordinary language is what creates its grammar, its formal dimension, and this ensures, 
e.g., that ‘is’ will always be expressed only in terms of formal identity.  I have been 
claiming that, instead of being the “work of the understanding,” philosophical language is 
the work of philosophical reason: this language has its categories built into it by reason.  
The fact that reason does not orient its entire being around the extremely powerful but 
lifeless category of formal identity means that it can, e.g., produce a language which can 
contradict itself and not go into nothing, but rather into a result.  Thus, when reason 
                                                 
171 Philosophy of Spirit §459, Remark. 
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replaces understanding as the producer of language, both the content of the individual 
words, and the form of how the words are combined, become something different.  That 
is, the meanings of words change, and the grammar of the language changes: language 
becomes philosophical.    
      To specify this point, I would claim that it is reason as the Doctrine of the Concept 
which produces philosophical language and informs it with its categories.  In one way 
this is not saying very much, since the third part of the Logic is the expression of the first 
two.  Yet from specific examples we can see how the Doctrine of the Concept lends 
particular insight into the structure of philosophical language.  Two such examples are 
the judgment and the syllogism.  To be sure, these ways of determining the form of 
language also have much to say about language’s content,172 and in the syllogism in 
particular one sees the gradual overcoming of the indifference of form and content.173  
But as influencing form, they are operative not only throughout nature and spirit, but are 
also present in inchoate forms at the very beginning of the Logic, structuring the language 
there despite the fact that it is impossible, at that point, to comprehend what ‘judgment’ 
and ‘syllogism’ even are.  
      In “An Aside on Language” in Chapter 2,174 we discussed ordinary and philosophical 
language in the context of the categories of ‘linguistic’ and ‘developmental’ expression, 
with the latter type of expression being one in which the expression genuinely alters and 
develops what is expressed.  This discussion is worth recapping so that we can now place 
                                                 
172 e.g., in the judgment (as opposed to the proposition), it is no longer the case that the form can receive 
any given content.  SL 626  
173 SL 665, 669.  
174 pg. 59-ff. 
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it in a broader context.  First, ordinary language’s ‘linguistic’ expression engages in the 
‘developmental’ expression of the Idea just by being ordinary language;175 at times, it 
engages in the ‘developmental’ expression of its own content as well (viz., whatever the 
speaker is trying to express).  Yet, this kind of language can also engage in the ‘static’ 
expression of its content by merely externalizing it.  Furthermore, it does not need to have 
any particular content in order to be ordinary language.  Turning to philosophical 
language, we saw that it too developmentally expresses the Idea just by being what it is, 
by being philosophical language.  By contrast, though, philosophical language is not what 
it is – and thus does not developmentally express the Idea qua philosophical language – 
unless it has a specific content and a specific form, viz., the content of philosophical 
determinations, and the form of developmentally expressing those determinations.  Yet as 
we noted, the philosophical determinations which make up the content of philosophical 
language just are determinations of the Idea.   So, given that all of philosophical 
language’s ‘linguistic’ expressions are ‘developmental’ expressions of its own content, 
and given that its own content just is the Idea, all of its specific ‘linguistic’ expressions 
are ‘developmental’ expressions of the Idea.   The complete convergence of ‘linguistic’ 
expression and the ‘developmental’ expression of the Idea is, we noted, just what 
philosophical language is.  
      In the meantime we have said a great deal more about the content and the form of 
philosophical language.  For example, we have examined in detail how philosophical 
reason takes ordinary words and endows them with philosophical determinations by 
                                                 
175 in the same way that an animal is an expression of the Idea just by being an animal.   
266 
 
replacing the content of intelligence with its own.  Regarding its form, we have seen how 
philosophical language engages in ‘developmental’ expression of the Idea by its 
expression of opposed meanings which contradict one another, with the new meaning 
that results allowing us to know more of what we were saying than we previously did.  
And while our treatment of philosophical language’s form ended up being very 
incomplete, we discussed some of what would need to be further investigated in the 
Doctrine of the Concept in order to flesh out philosophical language’s grammar.  One of 
these issues, the syllogism, would certainly shed light on the conclusion we made back in 
Part I that philosophical language is what it is only by having a specific form and a 
specific content, given that the working out of the syllogism involves the elimination of 
the indifference of its form from its content.  And this would coincide with Hegel’s 
general view of philosophy, that its purpose is “to banish indifference and to become 
cognizant of the necessity of things, so that the other is seen to confront its other.”176  
However, uncovering the full extent to which philosophy banishes indifference from its 
own language will have to wait for another dissertation.   
 
     v. Diaeresis and Synagoge: Beginning and Ending with a Word 
      How does ordinary language become philosophical?  This is a question we have 
already addressed in part, but as a preface to talking about philosophical language in 
terms of diaeresis [division] and synagoge [collection], we should push the question 
further.  Above I have made the argument that language moves from being ordinary to 
being philosophical when philosophical reason replaces the understanding as the 
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producer of language; I have also argued that this ‘replacement’ brings about both 
fundamentally different meanings and a fundamentally different way of combining 
meanings.  But where and how does this ‘replacement’ take place?  I would claim that it 
takes place at the beginning of the Science of Logic, and my support for this claim would 
be the particular relation that holds between logic and philosophy.  On the one hand, the 
Logic presupposes none of its content and none of its form, because the two generate 
immanently out of the Logic’s opening.  On the other hand, the Logic presupposes and 
depends upon philosophy for its full development.  That is, given that the Logic 
presupposes a human being thinking through the nature of thinking, it presupposes a 
being which is its expression, to give it expression.177  So while it is more obviously the 
case that the activity of philosophy presupposes the Idea,178 it is also the case that the 
Idea presupposes – depends upon – a human being thinking through the nature of 
thinking.   
      But this needs to be put more precisely.  For its full development, the Idea 
presupposes philosophy’s fully development, and both of these take place simultaneously 
at the very end of the Philosophy of Spirit.  Given that both are fully gesetzt only at the 
end, at every point before the end both of them are partially an-sich, partially 
unexpressed.  Leaping all the way back to the first words of the Logic, we see that both 
the Idea and philosophy are not just an-sich but fully an-sich.  This is the point at which 
philosophy begins, and thus the point at which philosophical language begins.  For this is 
                                                 
177 this is the reciprocal relation between Setzen and Voraussetzen operating at the very broadest of levels. 
See Chapter 4, pg. 103-ff. 
178 Hegel accounts for relative ease of grasping this particular set of relations in Philosophy of Spirit §575, 
where the first and most immediate of the three syllogisms involving logic, nature and spirit is “logic-
nature-spirit” (the second two being “nature-spirit-logic” and “spirit-logic-nature”).    
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the point at which Hegel, a human being with language, moves from ‘spirit’ into logic.  I 
put spirit in quotes here because this transition into logic is not the transition which is 
accounted for at the end of the Philosophy of Spirit; for, that transition consists of 
philosophy as fully posited recognizing that it is the Idea returned unto itself and thus 
fully posited.  Rather, the transition of which I am speaking here is philosophy as not yet 
accounted for, i.e., as philosophy still fully in-itself which starts the Logic, and which just 
is the ‘Idea in-itself,’ i.e., Sein.  When Hegel makes this transition, the transition into 
beginning to do philosophy, his thinking – and therefore also his language – take on a 
new shape.  
      The transition from ‘spirit’ to logic that Hegel makes is one that we can describe only 
with the benefit of hindsight, once we have actually accounted for what spirit is.  
Nonetheless, this transition is worth comparing to the transition from nature to spirit.  In 
the latter, the determination ‘animal’ at the end of the Philosophy of Nature passes away, 
and is not present qua animal at the beginning of the Philosophy Spirit.  The human soul 
– as an embodied, living entity – contains the animal as a moment, but the human is a 
new kind of entity.  In the transition from ‘spirit’ to logic, i.e., in the transition to doing 
philosophy, ordinary language179 is sublated and philosophical language is the result; the 
latter – as intuitions having been endowed with mental contents – contains ordinary 
language as a moment, but it is itself a new kind of entity.  This is how, and where, 
ordinary language first becomes philosophical.   For this is how, and where, philosophical 
reason begins thinking through its own determinations.  And as we have discussed above, 
                                                 
179 this would also include the non-ordinary but still non-philosophical languages of poetry and religion.  
See pg. 181, fn. 42 above. 
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philosophical reason goes about doing this by placing its determinations within intuitions 
so that they become other to itself and it can see its own self in them.  
      This, then, is by way of a preface to discussing philosophical language as diaeresis 
and synagoge.  Or, rather, it is a preface to talking further about these topics, because 
what I mean by these two terms is what I have been describing up to this point as 
abstracting/dissecting and reuniting/revivifying, respectively.  Yet it seems appropriate to 
acknowledge Hegel’s debt to Plato here, given that Hegel is – as Socrates described 
himself – “a lover of these divisions [διαιρέσεων] and collections [συναγωγῶν].”180  To 
be more accurate, it seems appropriate to acknowledge Hegel’s debt to the gods, in light 
of Socrates’ wonderful description of dialectic as “a gift of the gods to human beings” 
that was “hurled down from the heavens by some Prometheus along with a most dazzling 
fire.”181  
      Specifically, I would like to further develop the way in which philosophical reason’s 
moments of abstraction, negative (dialectical) reason, and positive (affirmative) reason 
affect, and are effected by, philosophical language.  Above we have described this 
process in terms of reason being an anatomist who makes a cut at some point of 
differentiation within its body, who then realizes that the ‘parts’ on either side of the cut 
are not actually parts but moments, and who then – through this very realization – 
revivifies the parts via their contradiction and dissolution into a new and more concrete 
unity.  This process repeats over and over, with the resulting unities being less and less 
abstract in comparison to the whole of reason.  When reason has dismembered and 
                                                 
180 Phaedrus, trans. R. Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 266b. 
181 Philebus, trans. Dorothea Frede (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 16d.  
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revivified itself in its entirety, it then knows itself in its living concretion, and has 
completed its knowing of itself: it is philosophy as fully gesetzt and expressed.   Yet this 
description of the progression of reason only includes reason’s thought, while leaving out 
reason’s language, so let us now look at the latter.  To do so we will take a specific 
example, examining what reason does with the determination ‘finitude’ in the Logic.   
      Just previous to the ‘finitude’ section, reason had worked through the determinations 
‘something and other’ and then ‘determination, character, and limit.’  Then it had 
recognized a contradiction therein, and expressed the dissolution of these determinations 
into a unity by choosing the word ‘finitude.’  Then, by thinking through various 
dimensions of finitude, reason recognizes that the limit of finitude entails that there is a 
beyond of this limit, and thus an other to finitude.  In this recognition, reason – 
specifically, the understanding within reason – is in the process of making a cut/diaeresis 
between finitude and….what?  Reason searches for a word from the language of 
everyday life and realizes that the word ‘infinitude’ approximates what it has in mind as 
this ‘other’ of finitude, so it places its thought determination ‘the beyond of the limit of 
finitude’ into the sounds ‘infinitude.’  Upon doing this, reason sees within this intuition 
the determination that it has cut away from finitude, and in so doing completes the 
abstraction from finitude, i.e., in so doing fully thinks the determination ‘infinitude.’  
Thus, this thinking of infinitude is the expression of – the development and result of – the 
word ‘infinitude.’ 
      But as we know, reason quickly notes that if infinitude is what is beyond the limit of 
finitude, infinitude also has a limit, and thus is a.) not limitless, b.) not any different from 
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finitude, and c.) actually dependent on finitude, and vice versa.  Finitude and infinitude 
are moments, and furthermore, are set apart as being opposites while nonetheless being 
the same.  Reason thinks this contradiction, notes the two determinations as dissolving 
into one another in an act of synagoge, and thus sees that they form a unity.  But what to 
call this unity?  In this case, the language of common life falls short: reason cannot find a 
word that approximates the determination which is beginning to form within it.  So it 
creates the term ‘affirmative infinitude’ and endows it with the determination which is 
coming to be within it.  Having done so, it recognizes within this intuition the unity of the 
determination which has come about out of the abstractions of finitude and infinitude.  
And in this recognition of the contradiction’s result which reason has placed within the 
intuition, reason completes the revivification process.  Once again we see that the word’s 
naming of the determination makes it possible for reason to actually think the 
determination; thus, this thinking is the development of, and expression of, that word.  
      When we look back over this section of the Logic and consider how language was 
functioning within it, we notice something significant: the result – the meaning of the 
word ‘affirmative infinitude’ – has come out of the meaning of the word ‘finitude,’ 
indicating that the former was implicitly within the latter.  As we saw, the way that reason 
expressed this implicit meaning such that it could actually think it was by splitting the 
meaning of ‘finitude.’ This splitting/diaeresis of the meaning was, therefore, the 
recognition of a first meaning implicit within ‘finitude,’ viz. the meaning  ‘infinitude’ 
(initially as simply ‘the other side of the limit of finitude,’ and then as ‘the other side of 
the limit of finitude which is also finite).  The contradiction of these two meanings was 
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then what led them to dissolve and unify into the second meaning implicit within 
‘finitude,’ a collection/synagogue which is dubbed ‘affirmative infinitude.’  
      Now let us step back from this somewhat close-up view of the Logic and see how the 
linguistic side of Aufhebung functions in the encyclopedia as a whole.  The activity of 
philosophical reason is, as we have noted, a pendulum swing between abstraction and 
concretion, dividing and collecting, cutting and revivifying, and this process allows 
reason to gradually think through its own self in its entirety.  We also noted that the first 
and most abstract determination of the encyclopedia is ‘being,’ and that the last and most 
concrete is ‘philosophy.’ In light of this, we can bring together a great deal of what we 
have said thus far about philosophical language:  philosophical reason’s use of language 
in thinking through its own determinations begins with it naming ‘being’ and then 
splitting this meaning, and it ends with it reunifying all the previous meanings into the 
word ‘philosophy.’  And this is simply to say: all of the meanings in the encyclopedia 
spill out of the word ‘being,’ and all of these meanings are also reunified in the word 
‘philosophy.’   
      At the ‘micro’ level, the ‘spilling out’ and the ‘coming back together’ take place in an 
alternating sequence, as we saw with finitude, infinitude, and affirmative infinitude.  But 
at the ‘macro’ level the two take place throughout the entire encyclopedia simultaneously.  
That is, the whole encyclopedia is simultaneously an analysis of the word ‘being’ and a 
synthesis into the word ‘philosophy.’ Speaking of the progress of the concept, Hegel 
speaks of this simultaneity of analysis and synthesis when he says, “This progression is 
equally both analytical – because through the immanent dialectic only what is contained 
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in the immediate Concept is posited – and synthetic, because this difference had not yet 
been posited in the immediate Concept.”182  Although he is here speaking only of the 
sphere of logic, the same could be said of the encyclopedia as a whole, and with respect 
to the words’ meanings.  For, as thought progresses past ‘being,’ meanings continue 
multiplying ‘out of’ that first determination (e.g., quality, quantity, measure); yet also at 
the same time, these meanings are being ‘collected into’ more and more concrete 
meanings (e.g., quality and quantity sublating into measure), i.e., meanings which are 
closer to the most concrete meaning, the meaning of the word ‘philosophy.’   
      Earlier we spoke of how the meanings of philosophical words are constituted by the 
meanings of all the previous words and all the words that are to follow.183  That is, 
insofar as all the philosophical determinations are moments of each other, so also are the 
meanings of all the words, such that one only fully knows what one is saying when one 
reaches the end.  And so we noted that the Science of Logic could, in a loose sense, be 
compared to a very large dictionary, a dictionary whose entire contents are in the service 
of defining one word, the ‘Idea.’ Hegel mentions such a ‘cumulative defining’ in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic’s transition from the Doctrine of Essence to the Doctrine of the 
Concept.  Speaking rhetorically, he asks why it is the case that, if the concept is the truth 
of being and essence, one does not simply begin logic with the concept.  His response to 
his question is this:  
 If the concept were posted at the head of the logic, and defined as the unity of being and 
essence (which would be quite correct from the point of view of its content) then the 
                                                 
182 EL §239, Remark. See also Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline §185.  
183 Pg. 256.  
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question would arise about what one should think under ‘being’ and essence,’ and how 
the two of them come to be brought together into the unity of the concept.  This would 
mean that we were beginning with the concept in name only and not with the matter 
itself [Sache].184   
In other words, if we defined the concept as ‘the unity of being and essence’ before we 
had come to comprehend what the words ‘being’ and ‘essence’ mean – i.e., what the 
elements of the definition mean – we would have a definition of the concept that, 
although in one sense ‘correct,’ would be essentially empty.  A definition consisting of 
undefined parts does not provide one with a comprehension of what is defined, but only 
with a name.  This mere name ‘concept’ would not allow one to think the actual meaning 
of the word; for, while one would have the correct intuition (in the sounds), the content 
within would be entirely abstract, thus failing to provide the proper philosophical content, 
i.e., the proper meaning.   
      Hegel speaks of the Logic as a kind of dictionary even more directly when 
commenting on what will come after the initial determinations of being and nothing.  He 
states: 
Every following significance, therefore, is only to be seen as a more precise specification 
and truer definition of the absolute; such a definition is then no longer an empty 
abstraction like being and nothingness, but rather a concrete entity in which both being 
and nothingness are moments.  When the difference emerges in such a concrete entity, 
then it is further determined in itself.185  
                                                 
184 EL §159, Addition.  
185 Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline §40.  
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And we can extend this point about a “truer definition of the absolute” beyond the realm 
of logic, to the entire encyclopedia.  All determinations after being and nothing are more 
concrete and more complete definitions of the Idea as fully self-knowing, with the final 
definition being this very definition itself, i.e., the definition of philosophy.  Thus, to read 
and comprehend the encyclopedia is to rebuild one’s vocabulary according to the 
demands of reason’s own self-defining activity.  And were someone to ask what the 
difference is between the meaning of the word ‘being’ and the meaning of the word 
‘philosophy,’ we could answer: it is the difference between both the Idea and 
philosophical reason being merely in-itself, versus being posited and expressed, i.e., the 
difference between them not knowing themselves, versus actually knowing themselves. 
 
     vi. The Last Expression of the Idea 
      If language has something to do with truth, it would be reasonable to think that 
Hegel's claim that “the true is the whole” has some significance for the issue of 
language.  And this is what we have just observed: all of the meanings of philosophical 
words reciprocally constitute each other, and all of these meanings are taken up into one 
word, ‘philosophy,’ for the determination ‘philosophy’ just is the whole.  This helps to 
further elaborate my claim from Chapter 2186 that, when Hegel says ‘A is the truth of B,’ 
it could equally be said that ‘A is the expression of B,’ where ‘expression’ means a 
developmental expression.  For – just to use two examples – to say ‘animal is the truth of 
plant’ is to say ‘animal is more like the whole than plant.’ And this latter could be 
rephrased as ‘animal develops out of and is more concrete than plant,’ or, simply, ‘animal 
                                                 
186 pg. 44. 
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is more like philosophy than plant.’  For Hegel, philosophy is the whole, the only truly 
concrete philosophical determination; all the others – including logic itself – are 
abstractions from it.187     
      As the encyclopedia progresses, philosophical reason and philosophical language are 
reciprocally expressing each other.  That is, philosophical determinations 
developmentally express philosophical language and vice versa, and they do so by 
forming what might be imagined as an interlocking web: a philosophical word is the 
developmental expression of either a determination’s negation (e.g., the negation of 
‘finitude,’ in ‘infinitude’) or of two opposed determinations coming into a unity (e.g., 
‘affirmative infinitude’).  And, a philosophical determination is the developmental 
expression of the word which named it – e.g., reason sees one of its own determinations 
(and thus its own self) in the word ‘affirmative infinitude’ and therefore is able to 
actually think this determination fully.  This interlocking web of mutual dependence 
between reason and its language continues throughout the encyclopedia, but – and this 
point is absolutely crucial for Hegel – reason’s dependence on its language ends at the 
encyclopedia’s end.    
      Although it is not a little ironic, there is one philosophical determination that 
philosophical language does not express: ‘philosophy.’ As we have seen, what a 
philosophical word expresses is not the determination which it names, but rather those 
previous determinations which it collects into its own self.  For, the determination which 
                                                 
187 This way of articulating things helps to illuminate the precise nature of Hegel’s ‘monism.’  Yet, unlike 
the problems posed to other forms of monism by the need to speak (cf. Parmenides’ “being is one”), the 
inward differentiation of Hegel’s monism demands that he speak. And it is his conception of Aufhebung 
that allows him to speak and still remain consistent with a monistic ontology, as opposed to refuting 
himself by slipping into an ontology of ‘discrete’ substances. 
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the word names is the developmental expression of the word, and this is so because the 
thinking of the determination is the result of – the truth of – the naming of it.  So we can 
see why the word ‘philosophy’ does not developmentally express the determination 
‘philosophy’: while the word unifies and then expresses the definition of philosophy (i.e., 
the syllogism ‘spirit-logic-nature’), it does not express the philosophical determination 
‘philosophy.’ Rather, the word ‘philosophy’ is expressed by, developed by, the 
determination ‘philosophy.’ For the determination ‘philosophy’ posits what was implicit 
within the word ‘philosophy,’ namely, thought actually thinking the determination 
‘philosophy.’  The reason that these distinctions are so crucial for Hegel is that, if things 
were reversed – if the word ‘philosophy’ were the expression of the determination 
‘philosophy’ – then the Idea at the end of the Philosophy of Spirit would not actually be 
able to return to itself by thinking itself.  But because the determination ‘philosophy’ is in 
fact the expression of its word, philosophy becomes complete when philosophy as in-
itself becomes philosophy as posited, as self-posited.  Said otherwise: because the 
determination ‘philosophy’ comes after, and is the expression of, the word ‘philosophy,’ 
philosophy is able to think itself only through itself, and not through language.  
      To better grasp how philosophy does this, we should remind ourselves of our 
discussion of the ‘mechanical memory’ section of the Philosophy of Spirit.  This kind of 
memory is able to reproduce a series of words (such as a song or poem) by rote, without 
the speaker having any of the meanings present to her.  The relations between the words 
are mechanical because they are external and indifferent to each other qua words: the 
meaning has been drained from them.  Hegel sees the existence of this kind of memory as 
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evidence that intelligence can snatch the meaning which it placed into words back out of 
them and into itself.  That is, he sees it as evidence that intelligence can leave language 
behind and become thought.  In this ‘being left behind,’ the word, he says, becomes 
“something abandoned by spirit.” 188  Just as intelligence is able to ‘reclaim’ its meanings 
out of the intuitions of words such that it can become thought, so can philosophy do so 
with its meanings throughout the entire encyclopedia.  And this is what we have been 
describing above, simply in different terms, when we talked about philosophical reason 
seeing itself when it sees its own determination within an intuition and, in so doing, being 
able to think this determination of itself.  This thinking of one dimension of itself, then, 
takes place when reason ‘reclaims’ its content out of the word, a reclaiming which takes 
place all along the path of the encylopedia.  But what is most relevant for our discussion 
here is that this is precisely what philosophy does at the very end of the encyclopedia, to 
complete the encyclopedia.  First, it places its content – the syllogism ‘spirit-logic-nature’ 
– into the intuition ‘philosophy.’ When it sees itself in this intuition, it then ‘abandons’ 
the intuition by reclaiming the meaning out of it.  In so doing, it thinks itself, and now, at 
the end of the encyclopedia, it has thought itself fully.  
      In “The Absolute Idea” section in the Logic, Hegel speaks directly of this process of 
thought externalizing itself into words and then drawing itself back into itself.  In this 
quote, he also makes a fascinating reference to the language of the logic:  
The logical Idea is the Idea itself in its pure essence, enclosed in simple identity in its 
concept and having not yet entered into the appearing [Scheinen] of its form-
                                                 
188 Philosophy of Spirit §462, Addition.  
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determinateness.  Thus logic exhibits [darstellt] the self-movement of the absolute Idea 
only as the original word, which is an expression [Äußerung], but one that, in its being, as 
something external [Äußeres] immediately vanishes again; the Idea is thus only in this 
self-determination of apprehending itself; it is in pure thinking, in which difference is not 
yet otherness, but is and remains completely transparent to itself.189 
Logic is, as he says, enclosed in itself, and has not yet entered into the ‘appearing of its 
form-determinateness,’ i.e., into nature and spirit.  Because it has not yet done so, it 
exhibits or displays “the self-movement of the absolute Idea only as the original word….”  
That is, the Idea at this point – before externalizing itself in nature and spirit – has only 
one way to display itself, via the ‘original word.’  And even though this ‘original word,’ 
this ‘expression’ is the only form-determinateness that logic has, it nonetheless 
“immediately vanishes.”  As soon as it has played its role – that of containing as external 
whatever determination the Idea is attempting to think through – the Idea reclaims its 
content out of that word and is once again simply by itself, no longer thinking itself 
through the ‘other’ of the word, but only through itself.   This is the process that 
continues throughout the entire encyclopedia, until the final abandonment of the final 
word.   
      Let us conclude this dissertation with two final remarks on Hegel’s view of the 
relation of philosophical language to the Idea.  We have seen how the determination 
‘philosophy’ is the expression of the word ‘philosophy,’ and how the Idea is therefore 
able to think itself through itself alone.  Nevertheless, aside from philosophy in its fully 
posited and complete form, philosophical language does in fact express philosophy in a 
                                                 
189 SL 825, translation emended.  
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certain sense: it expresses philosophy when the latter is still in some way an-sich, in some 
way undeveloped and unexpressed.  For as we have seen, all the self-movements of the 
Idea as it develops are expressed by philosophical language.  As an abstraction from, and 
thus ‘other’ to, the Idea, every philosophical determination (e.g., essence, plant, art) is 
also in some manner an expression of the Idea; yet philosophical language is, all through 
the progression of the encyclopedia, what mediates reason’s thinking of these its 
determinations.   
      But furthermore, philosophical language is the final ‘other’ of the Idea before its 
return to itself.  This is so because the determination ‘philosophy’ is not itself an 
expression of the Idea.  For, an expression is other to what it expresses, and philosophy is 
not other to the Idea, because it just is the Idea as completely self-knowing.  Thus, 
philosophical language is the full expression of the Idea, its last expression.  
      Above we noted that ‘the form of philosophical language is more like the form of 
logic than is the form of anything else.’190  This claim, we can now see, helps to explain 
why Hegel views philosophical language as the last expression of the Idea.  For this 
language is able to be the Idea’s full expression due to the fact that its form is the most 
like the form of the Idea that it is possible to be without being the form of the Idea.  Its 
materiality is what prevents its form from being the form of the Idea, and thus what 
allows it to be ‘other’ to the Idea such that it can express it at all.  And as an ‘other’ to the 
Idea, philosophical language is the ‘last other’ to it because it is the least other to it.  
More than any other determination which is ‘other’ to the Idea, language is able to be 
                                                 
190 Pg. 261.  
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formed by the Idea, taking the Idea’s form literally into its own self and, in so doing, 
becoming philosophical language.  It is for this reason that, in the process of the Idea 
becoming other to itself in nature and spirit, philosophical language for Hegel is the last 
step of this ‘othering’ process.  In the sequence of decreasingly external determinations, 
philosophical language is the least external and least other to the Idea, thereby directly 
leading the Idea into the experience of the final result of its self-externalization, viz., 
thinking itself in and through the activity of philosophy.   
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